SECTION 4: RELEVANCE OF THE ASEAN EXPERIENCE FOR ECOWAS

The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no single charted course for regional co-operation process. Each co-operation grouping goes through a series of unique experiences with its own dynamics, amidst the socio-economic and geopolitical milieu of the region. However, the early starters in their course of co-operation gain certain experiences that may have some relevance and learning value for the late starters, at least in respect of trying the success path and avoiding pitfalls that the early starters might have encountered.

Over the past few decades, despite internal conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines the Southeast Asian region has been cited as a shining example of stability and development compared to other regions. What is critically important is that ASEAN is now a zone of true peace, a community of warm and enduring peace. The achievements of the ASEAN in the economic field have been at best moderate, although in recent years they have maintained relatively high growth rates compared with other developing countries. Whether this was due to co-ordinated efforts of the ASEAN countries in general or to factors specific to each country, to congenial political atmosphere, or to a combination of them, all the countries in the region experienced this growth in varying degrees.

However, experience – both successes and failures – of regional organisations with longer experience (ASEAN - 1967) are expected to be of relevance to the late starters (ECOWAS - 1975) on a number of counts. The first is, of course, the fact that so many attempts of establishing regional organisations have been made in different parts of the world and only a few have survived. Very few of these few, again, are showing signs of continued viability. This makes the study of experiences of these fortunate ones all the more interesting. Secondly, in cases where the regional organisations are more or less similar in terms of values, socio-cultural traits, and geopolitical situations, the experiences of the regional organisations with longer experiences are expected to have relevance for the younger ones.

Thirdly, even when the organisations are different in their political settings, motive forces and courses of development, an objective analysis and assessment of the experiences of the organisations, their successes and failures, and associated factors may provide useful insights and perspectives for other organisations in deciding on their respective courses of development. Fourthly, in the context of the rising trend of inter-regional co-operating within the framework of economic co-operation among developing countries (ECDC), a comparative study of regional organisations is expected to lead to an appreciation of each others’ objective realities and perceptual dispositions.

It is with these ends in view that the ASEAN experiences of regional co-operation are looked into and their relevance to the ECOWAS underlined. It should be stressed that the purpose is not to equate the future prospects of ECOWAS with the experiences of ASEAN. There is no automatic association of ASEAN experience with the ECOWAS process. ECOWAS formed in 1975 has its own course in its quest for mutually beneficial co-operation for its sixteen member states. In that, there is little justification for it to follow the ASEAN pattern as such. The reason is too obvious: conditions are different in ECOWAS than that in ASEAN, and conditions in the 1960s are different from the 1970s when ECOWAS institutions were developed. Some of the ASEAN experiences – successes as well as failures, and factors behind both – may however be of interest to ECOWAS, in some cases as positive knowledge while in others as the kind of things to be avoided. The rationale and utility of a study like the present one are placed in proper perspective only if viewed in such a frame.

The Southeast Asian leaders at the time of launching the association were all intent on coming out of the morass of tensions and instability. The driving force was provided by the desire to ensure peace and stability in the region to pave the way for unhindered national socio-economic development. The quest was coincidentally, and no less importantly, backed by commonalties in threat and security perception from both within and outside the region. But, the real motivation emerged from an appreciation of the evils and futility of mutual mistrust, tension and confrontation, which forced the states to negotiate and eventually go for co-operation under the ASEAN. A point often missed or under-emphasised is that the inter-state political relations were far from happy and that it was political problems between ASEAN states that brought them together. The basic purpose was of course, a socio-economic uplifting of the respective peoples. Juxtaposing this experience with the West African situation, this line of thinking may be carried one step further to argue that regional co-operation in socio-economic areas would itself create a congenial political atmosphere, first by the gradual and incremental process of co-operation and, second, by the self-generating compulsions of maintaining political stability or at least easing tensions in inter-state relations in order to facilitate co-operation in socio-economic fields.

Unlike the European Union (EU) which has the explicit objective of creating a regional integrated community, the ASEAN approach was one of regional economic co-operation, harmonisation and pooling up of resources among sovereign nations with no supra-national authority to impose any ‘federal loyalty’. The concept of regionalism in ASEAN is one of inter-governmental co-operation as compared to integration as in the EEC. Regional co-operation is not to supplant national efforts but to supplement national development efforts in the case of ASEAN.

Comparing the process of development in ECOWAS with that in the ASEAN, it may be argued that both ECOWAS and ASEAN emerged as an extension of national efforts for development through co-operation primarily in the socio-economic, technical and cultural fields. For both the associations, the central goal is the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony and stability in the respective regions and to concert and harmonise efforts in accelerating economic development. And for both, the immediate goal of socio-economic and technical co-operation is viewed as a catalyst to the realisation of the ultimate goal of regional peace, stability and harmony. In the process, both the associations, as and when they deem fit, may include new areas of co-operation in addition to the so-called agreed areas and also adopt new strategies.

In terms of organisational structure and institutional arrangements ASEAN opted for a relatively small, informal and functional bureaucracy following what has come to be known as ‘minimalist approach’. All the functional committees and organs, including the Secretariat, are inter-governmentally constituted. The ECOWAS approach to regional organisation is also observed to be similar. ECOWAS has a Secretariat. Decision making in both the organisations is carried out through layers of horizontal and vertical committees. Although the principle followed in ASEAN is flexible – one of consensus compared to the principle of unanimity that has been adopted by the leaders of ECOWAS in the perceived interest of the region, the mechanism followed in arriving at the decision is similar, that is the practice of extensive consultation, and behind the scene negotiations in a bid to arriving at a position of consensus or unanimity as the case may be.

The flexible formula of 10-x as followed in ASEAN should be understood in its own perspective. Even if a certain country or countries may opt out of a particular project, the decision is an ASEAN one, not a 10-x one. There is, however the possibility, as has actually happened also, that certain country or countries may avail this option frequently creating misgivings among others. On the other hand, given the realities of Southeast Asia, the principle of unanimity has been adopted in order to ensure democratic participation of all members on the basis of sovereign equality. Whether a more flexible approach of decision-making in ECOWAS would be adopted or is being adopted is usually dictated by the course of events in West Africa as demonstrated by ECOWAS peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra-Leone.

ASEAN experiences of regional co-operation show that although the avowed objective of the association was primarily co-operation in socio-economic areas, over the years the association appears to have concentrated more on co-operation in politico-security and strategic matters. To say that the ASEAN co-operation in the socio-economic fields have been relatively less successful is to state the obvious. It would be pertinent to observe that even within the socio-economic areas, the success has been of a lesser degree in cases where schemes or projects were apparently too ambitious, whereas in cases of issue-based and modest scale schemes, and most importantly in case of specific result-oriented ones, progress has been considerable. Examples are areas like tourism, food security and the like, co-operation in which has not merely been successful in itself but has also contributed to the strengthening of the popular base in favour of the association.

In relation to co-operation in the more vital areas like trade, the main problems, as discussed earlier, have been linked to issues of ‘economic nationalism’ like market sharing and protectionism. Disparate levels of development coupled with divergent national interests lead to a search for national solutions to problems. Member states have tended to develop and intensify extra-regional linkages independent of the interest of the grouping as a whole, sometimes adversely affecting the basis of confidence in the usefulness of regional co-operation. The problem is further compounded by the structural linkage of the economies with the West on the one hand and relatively low level of mutual complementarity on the other. The private sector performance in co-operative ventures has also not reached the desired level in some of the economic sectors.

Despite the low level of performance in some of the economic sectors, the ASEAN has continued to move forward while apparently aware of the limits to what regional co-operation arrangement can be expected to achieve in the specific context, terms of reference and time-span. The level of expectation in ASEAN seems to have been pragmatic so that not too much was expected too soon. Regional co-operation is viewed as one of the many other ways that member states endeavour collectively and severally to resolve the problems facing them nationally, bilaterally and regionally. The basic approach admittedly was ‘go-slow’ so that activities and programmes do not have any ‘grand design’ disproportionate to regional preparedness.

In terms of the modality, the ASEAN approach has been fairly informal. The process of decision-making and deliberations has been almost exclusively on the basis of mutual consultation. There has been a tacit understanding of avoiding any disputable and conflicting situation on matters both within and outside the purview of ASEAN. Problems of a bilateral and contentious nature have been regarded as part of the reality and member-states did recognise their impinging potential on the process of multilateral co-operation. It appears that ASEAN member-states have followed a deliberate policy of keeping the bilateral discords below a level that might lead to a crisis.

It is important to note in this connection that although bilateral and contentious issues are not formally within the ASEAN agenda, the member-states are not precluded from using the forum for informal discussion on any such subject. The resilience that the ASEAN member-states have shown in coping with a given situation impinging on their national interests is, perhaps, the most striking phenomenon in the development of the ASEAN.

The ASEAN experience has shown that in the context of asymmetries and divergences, and the concomitant disputes, member states have demonstrated over the years a remarkable degree of understanding of each other’s problems, aspirations and limitations. There has been more importantly, a tacit agreement on mutual role perception and role-playing. There have been references to the workshops organised by Indonesia, the pivotal power in the region, over the South China Sea disputes. A similar role has been played by Nigeria in ECOWAS. It is difficult, however, to generalise or offer a modulus of such understanding. But the experience has certainly shown a working level of mutual give-and-take approaches. In terms of specific issues the member states have initially tried to iron out differences. In the event of a failure to do so they have opted for bypassing them in favour of the greater cause of co-operation. It appears that there was in ASEAN a consensus that disputes at bilateral level are part of the reality in inter-state relations, and whilst there were attempts at settlement of such disputes, failure to do so was never allowed to impede the process of co-operation under ASEAN.

As already indicated, considering the status of inter-state relations in the region this approach has largely been regarded as a pragmatic one. In the backdrop of ASEAN experience, and even from what has happened so far in the ECOWAS forum, there seems to be two aspects to this problem.

Firstly, although such issues are not excluded from the formal agenda of ECOWAS, member-states thus raise and discuss these issues when they assemble for meetings within the ECOWAS forum. Indeed, some bilateral issues have already been picked up by member-states on more than one occasion and the forum has to that extent been found to be a tension-diffusing platform. It appears by all indications that given the political will, taking the advantage of the frequency of high political level meetings the member-states may increasingly find ECOWAS a useful forum with an opportunity to iron out differences the way their ASEAN counterparts have done.

The second aspect is linked with the role of Nigeria. It appears that the sooner there is an understanding and consensus among the ECOWAS member-states about the mutual role perception and role playing the better for co-operation within ECOWAS. There should be more open and frequent discussion among the member-states at both official and unofficial levels and a certain degree of positivism and enlightened national interest member-states may be able to cement the differences among them on that score.

The ASEAN and ECOWAS experience underlines, on the other hand, critical importance, in this respect, of the foreign policy posture of Indonesia and Nigeria, both the largest and the most powerful countries in Southeast Asia and West Africa. And, on the other hand, the development of the spirit of mutual understanding, accommodation and trust which characterised ASEAN and ECOWAS regional and inter-state relations. There is a clear need for striking a balance between bilateral and multilateral interests of ECOWAS member states for the better future of the region.

ASEAN is certainly a success story in terms of its experience in inter-regional co-operation, particularly the way in which ASEAN has proffered the member states the possibility of establishing closer linkage and co-operation with ‘third party’ states, groups of countries and other regional and international bodies. ASEAN inter-regional co-operation has been effective not merely in obtaining aid or assistance packages but also in building long term complementary economic relations. Particularly notable has been the ASEAN success in projecting the region as an ASEAN entity whereby it has been possible to strengthen its bargaining position. The association has often been successful also in projecting matters of its own interest as an overall Third World issue. Notable elements of inter-regional co-operation from ASEAN experience include a) shared actions and approaches in furthering regional interests, b) sharing of benefits of each other’s experiences and advancement in various fields, and c) common front in relation to the ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO), WTO and other related matters.

The present study has shown that prospects of co-operation between ECOWAS and ASEAN, two regions geographically far apart, are promising and are likely to be beneficial to each other. There should be a long term planning and vision in this respect and a pragmatic approach. Co-operation between the two organisations can take off only on a ‘go slow’ strategy on the basis of a clear cut vision of both the sides of each other’s benefits and should necessarily be complementary to existing bilateral or multilateral relations rather than at the latter’s experience. Inter-regional co-operation should also complement each other’s capabilities and not supplant them. Any programme or project for inter-regional co-operation from ECOWAS perspective should be untied and unconditional and should of necessity be equitably beneficial to all ECOWAS countries. But, most important of all, any formal linkage of ECOWAS with other regional bodies and for that matter any concrete co-operation project therewith should be deferred until such time as the underpinnings of the development of ECOWAS member states is sufficiently strengthened.

CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD

Effective regional integration is generally recognised as a component of a strategy to improve economic growth. The inter-regional co-operation initiative addresses some of the weaknesses of regional initiatives by emphasising outward orientation, national and regional policy complementarity, and the direct involvement of private sector. Given the precarious environment facing ECOWAS members, particularly under the WTO agreement and the trends of globalisation, ECOWAS cannot afford to lag behind in these developments. At least three of the findings that emerge from this research may have a dramatic effect in creating an environment conducive to ECOWAS economic co-operation.

First, the challenge to ECOWAS economies is to be able to maintain high and sustainable rates of economic growth and of exports. This requires them to sustain their economic reform. Although they have come a long way to liberalise their economy, their tasks are far from completed. Globalisation, or the challenge of globalisation, has given the governments a strong enough justification for undertaking the reform. While at first it might be seen paradoxical, these countries’ participation in and efforts to promote a number of regional co-operation schemes are also seen as important elements of their globalisation policy. Regional co-operation helps its participants to take part in global economic integration more effectively as a group of regional economies.

It is of no surprise, therefore, that in West Africa, the Preferential Trade Area, the Ghana - Fast Track Approach, the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), and the Common External Tariff (CET) are widely seen as representing the globalisation phenomenon because of the importance of trade and investment liberalisation in the agendas of these fora. Further, the ETLS seeks to consolidate customs duties and charges, liberalise all customs duties on unprocessed and traditional handicrafts, liberalise tariffs on approved industrial goods – making a zero rating and establishing a Common External Tariff (CET) regime to be applied to third countries. The introduction of the CET and country standards will enable the West African sub-region to respond more favourably to the globalisation phenomenon, while the onus of economic discipline will force governments to be more circumspect in the management of their economies.

ELTS also necessitates a series of domestic adjustments that are parallel with or may be entirely identical to those that are undertaken in response to the challenges of globalisation. Because globalisation is being used as a justification for economic reform, and successfully so thus far, the sustainability of the reform programme itself will depend to a large extent on the ability of the government and the society at large to redress the negative impacts of globalisation as perceived by the public.

Third, the governments of the region must demonstrate both the political will and willingness to implement ratified protocols, treaties and programmes. They must take necessary remedial steps towards fiscal restraint, currency flexibility and the introduction of supervisory mechanisms to keep pace with financial liberalisation. What needs to be realised and learnt as a lesson from Southeast Asia, though, is that ASEAN states exhibit a lot of complementarity even in a sector (for example, agriculture) that is perceived to be common (thus competitive) among members. Thus, a clear understanding of where comparative advantages lie in each West African countries appears to be the first hurdle that member countries must pass before a common agricultural policy can be implemented.

The above conclusion was also reflected in the viewpoints of the scholars interviewed at the ECOWAS Secretariat and the University of Abuja.

In summary, these new challenges mean three things for ECOWAS. First, is the acceptance of new objectives and new principles to achieve those new objectives. The most important new objective is ECOWAS’s greater integration in the future. It has to develop beyond state-to-state relations. In practice, integration has been going on for some time and some integration has already happened as shown by the Liberian crisis and its immediate contagion among ECOWAS members. How much integration is to be achieved in ECOWAS in this respect depend on the development of ingenuous strategies and an ability to implement them. Astute economic diplomacy will have to be displayed in the premises that will bring ECOWAS to the level of development achieved in ASEAN.

Exchange on the direction and speed of regional integration could first be undertaken at the Second Track level of academics, journalists, policy analysts etc. before it can be discussed in the First Track of politicians and diplomats. Sensitive domestic issues should be left out until every member is ready to accept them, except in cases where the regional impact is obvious.

Second, is the institutional response. ECOWAS has been proud to be able to do things without having strong institutions. That may be valid for the first 25 years when state-to-state relations alone sufficed. But if regional integration becomes an important development for ECOWAS, which it should be if ECOWAS wants to maintain its relevance in the future, then greater institutionalisation is a must. This means resources (human and financial) should be given to ECOWAS. ECOWAS may still avert becoming a Brussels-type of bureaucracy, but there is a long way to go from transforming the ECOWAS Secretariat as it is now into a Brussels-type one in future. Something in between these two types is advisable.

Third, is the need for the NGOs to participate more fully in ECOWAS’s activities and to create a nexus between governments and NGOs through the idea of an annual ECOWAS Congress in which both sides can explain their ideas and programmes and can explore ways to promote co-operation.

It needs to be reiterated that these challenges and responses are critical for ECOWAS’s future. First, the number of economic interactions among members at all levels should be increased. If the same members are obliged to meet frequently, there is much less tendency for them not to co-operate than if they meet only after long intervals. Translated into the ECOWAS framework, this suggests the need for more regular meetings and at more levels. This is not only true of the meetings of the ECOWAS Heads of Government and the Foreign Ministers, but also of those in other functional areas who have not, to date, been involved in the process of co-operation.

Second, the interaction among members must be made more durable. If the present and future decisions of ECOWAS are thought to be irrelevant to the goals of member countries, the likelihood of non-co-operation becomes higher. ECOWAS existence cannot depend solely on the progress in the political arena - successful restoration of peace and security in Liberia by ECOMOG and the return of elected President Kabbah and restoration of constitutional order in Sierra-Leone by ECOMOG. However, given the prevailing political unrest in many of the countries in the sub-region, it is doubtful that any economic integration can succeed without a ‘political guarantee’. Successful economic co-operation, consolidation of regional peace and security, democracy and reinforcement of pluralism must be an essential element to ECOWAS survival.

Third, the ‘pay off’ of integration must be transformed. Large payoffs or benefits can act as an incentive to co-operation. Success in small matters may have served its purpose in ECOWAS’s early life, but the strategy is not appropriate at a time when development and growth are so high on the priorities of member economies. Thus, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) within the sub-region may not benefit much from economic regionalisation of ECOWAS unless some fundamental issues are tackled from the root. As a measure of increasing the low level of intra-ECOWAS trade, the following measures need to be addressed:

1. trade finance to SMEs must be encouraged.
2. potential inter-regional business information enlarged.
3. integration of trade, technology and investment at the sub-regional level promoted.
4. measures to resolve infrastructural problems of transport, customs systems, product standards, trade information flows etc. embarked upon.
5. investment integration policies pursued.
6. Promoting private sector – all the sub-regional countries need to develop and expand the private sector to build a strong foundation for sustaining national economic development.
7. Transportation, energy, trade and investment, tourism and health are among areas requiring substantial private sector investment.

1. Incorporating the informal into the formal economy;
2. Monetarising the rural and informal economies;
3. Mobilisation of domestic savings;
4. Promoting small enterprises in the light industry and service sectors;
5. Factors and constraints affecting exporting and importing in West Africa.

Fourth, there is the need for quick implementation of the ECOWAS treaty that recognises the need for regional co-operation in areas of investment, innovation and enterprises development. Such co-operation will include a suppliers’ network arrangement; joint venture and strategic alliances to pull resources together; cluster development strategies; and provide growth pole and growth triangle strategies like the BIMP-EAGA in Southeast Asia. The initiative, when extended to SMEs, is expected to boost their growth. To support and sustain economic growth, the private sector requires small- and medium-scale manufacturing industries, supported by both domestic and foreign investment, and the existence of a sizeable and viable local small-and medium-scale industries. This is particularly important for development of commercial activities in non-urban centres to ensure a more equitable income distribution.

Topics which could be addressed through dialogue at a sub-regional level include the promotion of enterprises in the light industries and service sectors and access credits to small-and medium-scale enterprises. The UN agencies and multilateral funding institutions are approaching this problem in the following manner:

1. Information dissemination, policy reviews, and exchange experiences;
2. Undertaking surveys, credit schemes, research, pilot programmes; and
3. Establishing and strengthening institutions, organisations and networks directly relating to promote trade, commerce, industry and services.

Viewed in its proper perspective, the current economic turmoil affecting West Africa represents only a temporary though painful, setback to the onward march of West African economies. In essence, it is a wake-up call to us all to address whatever weaknesses we have.