Senegal: Beacon of Hope for the West African Democratisation Process

The Centre for Democracy & Development's Position on the Presidential Elections in Senegal

Introduction

On Sunday 19 March 2000, the people of Senegal gave the thumbs down to the 40-year Senghor-Diouf oligarchy by electing Abdoulaye Wade, the veteran opposition politician, as the next president. Having been voted in by over 60% of the electorate in the round-off, President-elect Abdoulaye Wade and his Patti democratique senegalais (PDSJ have been given a clear mandate to further open the democratic space to enable radical socioeconomic transformation in Senegal. The aim is to forge a new image from that of a Senegal of political despondency and economic stagnation, an image that has come to symbolise the country in four decades of Patti socialiste rule.

CDD heartily welcomes the peaceful change in Senegal and calls on African civil society organisations and governments, as well as the international community, to extend solidarity, support and practical partnership to the Government and people of Senegal as they embark on a new chapter in governance and nation-building.

Background

Senegal was a beneficiary of the mass independence granted to most French colonies in 1960. Before (and after) that date, Senegal was nurtured as the intellectual centre of French dependencies in Africa, just as la Cote d'Ivoire was projected as the economic and financial engine of Francophone West Africa. Former President Leopold Sedar Senghor's Patti socialists, whose precursor was the Bloc democratique senegalais (1948), led the country to independence and has dominated the political landscape until the last elections. President-elect Abdoulaye Wades PDS, the second legal party in Senegal, became functional only in 1974 and has since remained the main opposition platform in the unequal battles for power with the establishment party - PS.

ECONOMIC STAGNATION VS POLITICAL 'STABILITY'

The much-vaunted 'stability' in Senegal has been at variance with the continuing economic downturn. Unlike her neighbour la Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal has been unable to diversify her economy beyond the near total dependency on peanut exports. The rural habitat, home to some 78% of the population, has been starved of basic amenities - roads, health facilities and education. In a country that produced literary luminaries such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Leopold Senghor and Sembene Ousmane, today over half the population is illiterate and 40% are unemployed. Corruption and institutional graft have been at the butt of several of Sembene's satiric writings and cinematography.

Foundations of 'stability' in Senegal

External

Throughout the Cold War, the Parti socialiste, and President Senghor in particular, enjoyed a special status with and patronage by I'Elysee, and consequently the West. This special status translated into the permanent stationing of French troops in the country to serve both as a deterrent to 'destabilising' forces within the country and a base for the protection of French interests in Africa.

Internal

Internally, the interplay between a sophisticated co-optation strategy designed by the ruling PS to dilute political opposition at the top and religious allegiances created a fagade of national consensus and pluralism while subduing the struggle for power in a de facto oneparty system dominated by the PS. Indeed, all the key presidential candidates in the just ended elections Moustapha Niasse (Alliance des forces du progres, AFP), Djibo Ka (Union de renouveau democratique, URD) and lba Der Thiam - emerged from the bowels of the PS. Even Abdoulaye Wade was no exception but he was the first to jump ship by creating his own party. Though he has served in various coalition governments under the PS (notably 1995-1998), he has remained true to his principles and his party and has not been co-opted; he politely but firmly rejected Abdou Diouf s offer in 1992 to become Vice-President.

Thus, the ruling civilian elite presided over state machinery that rewarded institutional graft and patronage. Remarkably for Africa, the military has been conspicuous by its absence in governance. This situation may be explained by the countervailing presence of the French military in the country.

Religion and 'stability'

About 95% of the Senegalese population is Muslim. It goes without saying that the religious leaders (Marabous or Serignes as they are called in Senegal) wield considerable power over the believers. The Serignes preside over Fraternities of Muslims - Mourides - whose activities span spiritual guidance, interpretation and execution of aspects of Sharia law and economic activity. Perhaps the most powerful of these traditional/religious governance structures is the Mourides of Touba, an enclave situated some 200 kilometres east of the capital, Dakar. Under the overall control of the spiritual leader, Serigne Salieu Mbake, Touba is the most autonomous region of Senegal, where economic activity, taxation and the civil/criminal justice system are remarkably free from state intervention. To most in the community, the word of the S&igne is law, usually more respected than the laws of the State.

In principle, the Mourides do not interfere with the secular matters of state and do not intervene in politics. For example, the head spiritual leader, Serigne Mbake, never makes political statements. In practice, however, divisional S6rignes have been traditionally known to tacitly endorse a particular candidate in state elections; occasionally, they have done that publicly. In a society steeped in religion, such endorsements usually circumvent voters' free will and bestow unfair advantage to the lucky candidate. Endorsements are usually carried out through the effective use of NdigaL Originally meant to be exultation to the faithful to donate alms for the upkeep of the Mourides, Ndigal partially assumed a political connotation where the obligation to vote for a particular candidate replaced the religious obligation to give alms. Ordinary people, political leaders and military officers freely consult with the Serignes on a wide range of issues - from personal blessing and protection to predictions of the future.

It is, for example, known that the personal spiritual leader of the outgoing president, Abdou Diouf, is S6rigne Mansour Sy of Tivaone while that of the AFP leader, Moustapha Niasse is Serigne Abdoulaye Niasse. It is significant that the first demarche of Abdoulaye Wade after learning of his victory was to visit his Serigne in Touba.

The consensus built around the unquestioned authority of and loyalty to the Marabous has, it is anecdotally claimed, served as a unifying and stabilising influence on society. It should be pointed out, however, that given the role religion, and particularly Islam, has played in igniting conflicts around the world (Sudan, Nigeria, Afghanistan), this tradition could lead to state paralysis depending on the politics of the Mourides. It is important that such traditional/religious systems in Africa are thoroughly interrogated with the view to finding out how they could influence accountable governance in the modern setting.

Triggers of instability

A key source of future instability in Senegal is Casamance. The other is economic malaise, particularly as it impinges on youth illiteracy and unemployment and spawns corruption.

Casamance

Casamance, an enclave of 800,000 in southern Senegal populated mainly by Catholic and Animist Jolas as opposed to the Muslim Wolof majority, has emerged as a major threat to the integrity of Senegal. Since Senegal became independent, the people of the province have been fighting the Dakar administration for independence. The struggle, which began relatively peacefully, took on a violent turn with time under various movements that eventually coalesced under the banner of the Mouvement des forces democratiques en Casamance (MFDC). Its proximity and historical ties with Guinea-Bissau have meant that a weapons pipeline was established between them, further fuelling the conflict. The attempts at rapprochement between outgoing President Diouf and Guinea-Bissau, including the Senegalese military intervention in the Guinean war in January 1998, was part of Dakar's attempt to contain the Casamance rebellion.

Even though a cease-fire accord was signed between Dakar and under the banner of the Casamance last December, the conflict is far from over as isolated skirmishes continue.

Reasons for Abdoulaye Wade's Victory

• Against the background of declining standards of living and increasing restlessness, the people had come to associate the unchanging political face - Diouf and the SP - with stagnation and resistance to change. The phased disengagement of France from its proactive role in Francophone Africa has also added new pressure points on client regimes.

• Perhaps more than any external factor, the sweeping away of a similar oligarchy by a military coup in Cote d'Ivoire last December sent clear signals to Dakar: If you render peaceful change impossible, you make violent change inevitable. Commenting on the General Guei coup in Cote d'Ivoire, Abdoulaye Wade is on record as having urged the military to step in if the Senegalese elections were fiddled with to deny him victory. Given Wade's long and illustrious peaceful campaign for change, however, his comments should be considered more as additional psychological pressure on the PS, rather than a genuine call for military intervention. One fact remained incontrovertible: Given the mood of the electorate, Abdou Diouf would have fiddled with the election results only at his own peril. It is significant that, even by their own standards, the grave-yard silence maintained by the Mourides in the course of the electioneering campaign spoke more of disapproval of the existing order than a demonstration of neutrality.

In voting out the 40-year rule of PS and installing the 74 year-old Wade, the people of Senegal did not necessarily vote for a new face; they voted out the old order.

Significance of the Senegalese elections

The ripples of the truly monumental change in Senegal will be felt in West Africa and beyond. Despite the controlled space within which governance in Senegal has unfolded over the past four decades, there are clear and useful experiences that would make Africa and the world richer in the global quest for democracy.

•:• African leaders have often been accused of clinging on to power till death. By voluntarily stepping down in 1981 thus allowing outgoing President Diouf to take over, ex-president Leopold Senghor, just like Nelson Mandela in South Africa and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, have put a strong caveat to this assertion.

•:• Secondly, after recent experiences in Benin and Guinea-Bissau, the elections in Senegal are further testimony to the fact that the peaceful transfer of power from one party to another no longer occupies the realm of fantasy in Africa.

•:• Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, Wade comes to power armed with the necessary structure - his political party (PDS) - that must necessarily spearhead the drive for fundamental change in Senegal. The PDS, leading a formidable opposition alliance and civil society, demonstrated a high level of mobilisation, organisation and vigilance in the run-up to the run-off. Their vigilance paid off, demonstrating that even in societies of suspect electoral supervision and monitoring, it is possible to ensure relatively free and transparent elections. The times when the opposition won the votes but lost the count through fraudulence are coming to an end. Wade now needs to demonstrate that the unity he forged with other parties of the opposition was not a short-term measure triggered by the common need to topple the PS. More than ever, he needs to maintain and build on this partnership with these other parties, without attempts at co-optation, as a vanguard of national consensus for fundamental political and economic transformation.

•:• Finally, Wade is the very embodiment of perseverance and non-violent action for change. Since 1978 when he first challenged ex-President Leopold Senghor for the presidency, he has neither relented in, nor deviated from, his objective of seizing and transforming the system that had done all in its power to keep him out.

Implications for West Africa

• President-elect Wade and some of the leading opposition activists such as Professor Abdoulaye Bathily hold strong track records as champions of West African integration that makes nonsense of the Anglophone-Francophone divide. Having consistently advocated for the breaking down of barriers inhibiting the flow of trade in the region, and linked to the waning interest of France in Francophone Africa, the in-coming government is most likely to place increased activity around ECOWAS on top of its policy in-tray. Since 1975 Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire have been projected as the Francophone counterweight to Nigeria's influence. Such diversionary mentality will most likely rapidly disappear with the anticipated increasing rapprochement between the new leaders of Nigeria and Senegal.

• The domino effect of the opposition victory in Senegal will be felt in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, two countries awaiting the verdict of their electorates on long years of stagnant defacto one-party rule. In spite of the fears internal to Ghana about the likelihood of engineered chaos in the run-up to next November-December elections, the wind of change from Senegal will no doubt clear any residual hesitations in President Jerry Rawlings's mind about officially quitting the political scene. In the same vein, whatever the intentions of General Guei's dictatorship in la Cote d'Ivoire, it is becoming clear that a democratic dispensation spearheaded by the ex-opposition to the Boigny-Bedie oligarchy would triumph, come next October's elections.

• The momentum that Wade's victory has given to the wind of democratic change in West Africa will further invigorate civil society in its struggle to build solidarity, further open up the democratic space and champion sustainable development. Already, civil society organisations in the sub-region have taken giant strides in the last few years towards greater partnerships across frontiers. Last October CDD and other leading NGOs in the region met in Abuja, Nigeria to set up the West Africa Democracy Network (WADNET) as a common platform for solidarity in promoting democracy, human rights and a West African civil society parliament. Victories, such as that chalked by Senegalese civil society in the last elections, make such initiatives worthwhile.

• All these 'presidential exits' in West Africa also pose a dilemma: What to do with this club of men, hardly any woman, in their quest for after-office self-relevance. They may well constitute themselves into a Parliament of Elders with a limited mandate that will not go beyond embarking on trouble-shooting (peace) missions.

An Agenda for Change for Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS.

In any attempts to suggest policies and mechanisms for the consolidation of democracy in Senegal, it is necessary that the circumstances surrounding the astounding victory of Abdoulaye Wade are unpacked. There is no doubt that the political arrangements that have ensured the survival of the PS administration for 40 years against all odds cry for fundamental change. President-elect Abdoulaye Wade is uniquely placed to initiate and lead the process for change, and for good reasons:

1. At 74, the temptation for Abdoulaye Wade to cling on to power is virtually non-existent. Besides, since 1978 he and his party have been at the receiving end of the politics of exclusion and co-optation masterminded by Senghor/Diouf. Wade can only be a transitional leader who will be remembered more for the structures that he is able to erect to sustain really competitive and transparent governance. Perhaps parallels with Nigeria are appropriate here. President Olusegun Obasanjo did not see his election to power last May as a 'transition within a transition'. If he had, and limited himself to just one term in office, his hands would have been freer to adequately respond to Nigeria's historic demands - take on vested interests and lay solid foundations for long-term reforms.

2. Abdoulaye Wade came to power with the slogan 'Change'. In a departure from the promise all - deliver none' style of African politicians, he refreshingly promised

nothing that he could not deliver. He promised root and branch changes to the system of governance that would transform the country into a truly pluralistic and democratic country - 'a country where the law is upheld and human rights respected'. With the help of a properly selected team buttressed by his party, he is very capable of delivering on this promise.

What needs to be done?

While it is important to initiate programmes to tackle unemployment, illiteracy and institutional graft, it is even more urgent to create the necessary environment for delivery. The immediate challenges facing Senegal relate to control mechanisms on the presidency, legislature, the bureaucracy and mechanisms for the delivery of human, social and economic rights. In short, governance must be transparent, responsible to the people and responsive to the needs of society. Crucially, the populations in the regions and provinces should be empowered to take ownership of self-governance over local processes. The constitution of Senegal, like its prototypes in the West African sub-region, contains clauses that promise decentralisation to the regions. In all the instances, however, the process of decentralisation is often remote-controlled from the capital and devoid of any meaningful devolution of power. Devolution could serve as the key that would unlock the Casamance stalemate and empower the rural population to tackle poverty.

These challenges require fundamental constitutional reform. President-elect Abdoulaye Wade and the alliance of forces behind him have been given a moral and legitimate mandate to spearhead these reforms. Their success or failure will determine whether the people's aspirations and hopes can be realised. Among the burning issues confronting Senegal, CDD considers the following as among the most urgent:

•:• The consolidation of the peace process in Casamance: As long as conflict persists in the province, creating the required atmosphere for Senegal-wide reform becomes even more difficult. Devolution talks should be opened for a frank discussion of the problem. Perhaps, Senegal could glean very useful experience from the process used to end the conflict between the Government and the Tuaregs in Mali.

•:• Creating the structures for accountable governance: There is the need to revisit the constitution of Senegal with the view to:

 Ensuring the real separation of powers

 Putting a finite term to the presidency, as Abdoulaye Wade promised on his campaign trail

 Devolving real power to the provinces to make the people objects and subjects of developmental processes.

CDD, London, 28 March 2000
for more infomation contact cdd @ cdd.org.uk

 


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