Introduction

On Christmas Eve 1999, a military rebellion in the West African State of Côte d’Ivoire swept aside the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain Government of President Henri Konan Bédié and installed a military junta headed by former Army Chief of Staff, General Robert Guei. Looting and arson by ill-disciplined soldiers followed initially in the commercial capital, Abidjan, amidst fears that irresponsible civilian government would now be replaced by military misrule. However, many civilians have been celebrating the Army’s success in the hope that Bédié's exit will pave the way to a resolution of the growing crisis in the country. Such an event exposes the inherent emptiness of the Ivorian State as currently constructed thereby enabling a section of the Ivorian army, seeking recompense for poor service conditions, to completely subvert the constitutional order.

CDD unreservedly condemns the coup d’etat in Côte d’Ivoire and calls on the Ivorian people, the West African and international communities to isolate the military junta and pressurise it to immediately restore the rule of law in la Côte d’Ivoire.

The late President Felix Houphouet Boigny, who reluctantly led the former French colony to independence in 1960, came to symbolise the very essence of the Ivorian nation. To France and the West at large, he represented the ideal image of post-colonial Africa: his conservative politics (including advocating dialogue with former apartheid South Africa, supporting the Biafra secessionist war in Nigeria and opposing closer African integration) complementing that of the former colonial masters. On the economic front, President Houphouet Boigny’s uncritical adherence to the free market and the dictates of the IMF and French economic prescriptions endeared him to the existing patron-client economic order.

Benefiting from Cold War-induced handouts, the Ivorian economy was held up as the beacon of hope for the sub-region. Beneath the apparent stability, however, lay mass poverty, an emaciated labour movement and mass illiteracy. Dissent was crushed under the military - both local and French. Thus, while the mass of the population was denied basic medical care, President Boigny could spend hundreds of millions of dollars transforming his native town, Yamoussoukro, into the new capital - with a replica Basilica to boot. He was the father of a patrimonial society, and as such untouchable. Houphouet Boigny’s death in 1993 changed all that.

Since President Konan Bédié took over the reigns, governance in Côte d’Ivoire has been reduced to an act of crisis management aimed at damage limitation. The economy has been in free fall while the hitherto enfeebled civil society has become bolder and more vocal. Meanwhile Konan Bédié lacked the political astuteness of his predecessor whilst still holding the support of France.

Since 1990, the Ivorian economy, still heavily dependent on cocoa and a few agro-based product exports despite years of dicing with the Paris Club, has nose-dived. Faced with difficult presidential elections in 1995, the government spent millions of dollars of donor assistance to buy votes, corrupt politicians and induce the restless army to put down mass disturbances in the aftermath of rigged elections. In 1997, corrupt state officials embezzled close to 20 billion CFA francs in EU aid. This led to the suspension of over US$700 million of combined IMF and World Bank credit facilities with donors demanding a full inquiry. 1997, therefore, saw widespread industrial and student unrest as workers went for months without pay and students were priced out of higher institutions against the backdrop of falling educational standards. Only 30% of high school students passed the 1997 baccalaureate exams. The army, until now the beneficiaries of generous state handouts, also began to feel the pinch of economic collapse and austerity. The discomfort of the army was clearly evident in discussions with senior officials attending a colloquium on civil military relations in Côte d’Ivoire’s capital Abidjan, earlier this month.

Thus, the ruling PDCI-RDA dynasty looked forward to next October’s presidential elections with trepidation. Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a former Prime Minister under President Houphouet Boigny, had emerged as the most likely candidate to win the elections. Until recently IMF deputy Managing Director, Ouattara could not be labelled as anti-Paris and anti-market. Instead of countering legitimate claims of inequality with government measures aimed at redressing the appalling conditions of the poor, President Konan Bédié resorted to xenophobia as his last card.

Classifying Allasane Ouattara as a Burkinabe, Bédié took a leaf from the practice of former and present Congo leaders Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila who declared the local Tutsi as aliens and Zambian President, Chiluba, who declared independence leader, Kenneth Kaunda, a foreigner. This enabled Bédié to successfully remove Ouattara from the forthcoming elections. His government had also threatened long-term residents from neighbouring Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Mali with expulsion, blaming them for the economic and political malaise in the country. It was no surprise, therefore, that the military took advantage of this situation to usurp power on 24 December and even those Bédié expected to come to his rescue quickly pledged loyalty to the junta leaders because of the groundswell of opposition in the country against the country’s political and economic direction.

Accelerated Collapse of la Côte d’Ivoire?

While we understand the growing opposition to the government of President Bédié, West Africa’s experience with military regimes cautions against indiscriminate endorsement of military do-gooders who appear in the garb of a national salvation agenda. In this vein, CDD is strongly of the view that what is required is focussed and unambiguous condemnation of the coup d’etat on all sides. In arguing for outright condemnation of the coup and non-cooperation by civil society, we are not oblivious of the space the military take-over offers politicians and activists hitherto excluded from past governments. Nevertheless, we are cautioning against misconstruing repackaged space for controlled clientelistic politics as a new space for genuine democratic endeavour for opposition politicians. We are also aware that President Bédié and his government blocked all avenues for peaceful resolution of the Ivorian crisis and the people were left with no alternative than to support any means of the government’s removal.

Even so, the scenario has always been the same in Africa. General Guei who is no green horn in politics will attract key opposition members into his government for legitimacy and credibility, promise to hold elections soon and allow political parties to be formed, including one on whose crest he will run and win (or rig) elections as a transformed military leader. The stage is already being set for this with current talks between General Guei and the opposition parties. The outcome of this would be yet another electoral democracy, which has no basis in popular will and another basis for the politics of exclusion. It is our hope that opposition politicians will temper personal ambition with judicious popular demands for a genuine politics of meaning. The military in West Africa has always taken advantage of civilian grievances against governments and intervened in politics only to make matters worse. Despite local euphoria at Bédié’s overthrow, CDD would ask the putschists in Côte d’Ivoire what has transformed them overnight from an instrument of oppression against Ivorian citizenry into their redeemers? What is their programme for societal transformation and with whose mandate are they going to make decisions for the country?

Experience from the sub-region shows that, if not contained immediately, the military intervention will only speed up the disintegration of Côte d’Ivoire. The Ivorian army has no history of direct state intervention except when it has been called upon to suppress civil unrest. The history of the country is dotted with massacres committed by the army on behalf of the government. The veteran opposition politician, Laurent Gbagbo of the Front Populaire Ivoirien, has spent the post-independence years in the country either as a detainee or under constant surveillance. With the help of the military and gendarmérie, pro-democracy activists and students have over the years been incarcerated or hounded into exile. The struggle of the people against institutional graft and irresponsible governance cannot be usurped by the military, especially a praetorian army. Evidence suggests that it is only a matter of time before the army turns its guns against the people it purports to have come to save. It should be recalled that General Guei was detained in 1995 for an alleged coup plot in the wake of the 1995 elections and was removed as Chief of Army Staff as a result.

For those who have lost out in the current struggle for power, it is no wolf crying to predict a determined effort to engineer instability in the country from their bases in exile, further lurching a hapless population into a cycle of instability among hungry power seekers. The outcome of this unfolding development is one that cannot be easily captured at this stage. Suffice it to say that its implications would reach further than the borders of Côte d’Ivoire given the fluid nature of the region’s population and the fragile state of democratisation in the rest of the region.

The Implications for the West African sub-region.

The coup could have far reaching consequences on the fragile democratisation process and the security landscape of West Africa beyond the threat of state collapse in the country. From the standpoint of governance and conflict management in West Africa since independence in 1960, two archetypal forms of state existed in the period between independence in the sixties and the end of the Cold War. One half loosely grouped the states that were internally and externally dynamic but wracked by internal instability - Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Guinea and, to some extent Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The other half was seen as moderate, conservative and a paragon of tranquillity - Senegal, la Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Gambia.

While countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Benin and Mali cannot as yet lay claim to political stability, it is evident that civil society groups in these communities have matured with the spate of past instability, adapted to the environment and proven to be adept at managing conflict and change relatively peacefully. Ironically, the opposite has been the case in the ‘stable’ countries of the past at the end of the Cold War. Liberia and Sierra Leone have virtually collapsed. The war in Casamance is threatening state dislocation in Senegal while the coup in Côte d’Ivoire, if not carefully managed, could usher in a cycle of violence and instability and Togo, fast becoming a haven for discredited and ousted potentates, remains perched on the precipice of instability as well.

The calm in Côte d’Ivoire, just like the stability in Senegal, Sierra Leone and Liberia, was too eerie to be natural. Below the surface, the populations were subjected to mass poverty, alienation and a denial of basic necessities - health and decent education. Above all, they were denied a voice in matters of governance. Meanwhile, the ruling civilian elite, usually in tandem with the co-opted military top brass, presided over state machinery that rewarded institutional graft, patronage and manipulated ethnic differences to keep the people divided and incapable of collective resistance. Signs of restlessness among the population have always been crushed with the help of the establishment’s military and external agencies. In the case of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, French military bases often acted as an additional prop for the Elysée’s client rulers - former Presidents Leopold Sédar Senghor and Houphouet Boigny respectively.

Two developments have changed the situation and stacked the odds against the ruling elite in these societies: Firstly, the end of the Cold War and the supremacy of the liberal market have drastically reduced the value of former prized states in the sub-region. Finally, the abdication of Senghor and the death of Boigny - two key disciples and sacred cows of Paris - have rendered the current ruling elite more dispensable. Immediately, however, the coup in Côte d’Ivoire could impact on the security of the sub-region in two distinct ways.

1). If the generals decide to cling on to power against the wishes of the population, Côte d’Ivoire could implode adding to the refugee crisis in the sub-region. At present, the country is home to several thousand migrant peasants, workers and traders from the sub-region. In addition, thousands more who have fled the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone have sought refuge in the country. The consequences of another war on the sub-region cannot be overemphasised.

2). West Africa is fast becoming a region of pseudo-democracy where soldiers usurp power, manipulate the democratisation process and entrench themselves in power by swapping their military fatigues for suits. At present the leaders of Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, the Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are all former or serving military officers who have legitimised their rule with constitutions and/or stage-managed elections. La Côte d’Ivoire could follow suit if the voices of reason and resistance are not clear and unambiguous in their condemnation of what has happened. In many respects, this constitutes a setback to the democratisation drive in the region. The relative political ‘stability’ that such arrangements bestow on the society is only guaranteed by the threat of the gun and hardly underpinned by consent. This should caution us against seeing these transitions as teleological progressions that are hardly reversible especially in situations where prolonged authoritarian rule has reduced the quality of civil society input into the framework of democratisation.

It is no secret that the presence of French troops in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire has contributed to propping up the regimes in these countries. France maintains a defence pact with Côte d’Ivoire dating back to 1961 and has a force of some 500 troops based in Port Bouet. France, thus, could foil the coup if it had so wished. Claims of its Ivorian based troops running out of ammunitions would seem too convenient for us to swallow. Against this background, it is pertinent to ask whether its acquiescence to the putsch is promoting or frustrating the cause of democracy in Africa within the framework of the EU Conflict-Prevention package for Africa.

What Must Be Done?

In analysing the remote and immediate causes of the brewing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the Centre for Democracy & Development has put the current situation in perspective, with a view to proposing sustainable conflict-management strategies for the country. Even as it exposes the irresponsible governance under the Konan Bédié regime, the Centre wishes to register its unreserved condemnation of the coup led by General Guei. We call on the Ivorian people, ECOWAS, OAU and the rest of the international community to condemn the coup and isolate the Guei junta till such time that it restores constitutional order in the country. Concretely, CDD calls for the following:

1. The non-recognition of the Guei junta by all state entities and the immediate suspension of Côte d’Ivoire’s membership of ECOWAS, the OAU and La Francophonie pending the restoration of constitutional order.

2. Non co-operation with the junta by the Ivorian people and their community/civil society organisations.

The minimum basis for limited co-operation with the junta should be its acceptance of the following demands:

The formation of a national unity government to organise the following:

a) A national conference/Assemblée Nationale by the Ivorian people to put together a new governance arrangement that ensures genuine participation, association and representation.

b) An investigation into past violations and corruption in the country.

c) The holding of fresh elections by the original date of October 2000.

CDD, London, 26 December 1999.
for more information contact cdd @ cdd.org.uk