The sustenance of democracy requires the existence of certain conditions, which may be social, economic or political in nature. Of these, the focus of the present paper is on the political factors in terms of institutional development as essential for the continuance of democracy. In the case of developed countries though the economic and social conditions helped in the sustenance of democracy but it was primarily the political institutions, which had evolved over a period of time that democracy was a success. Seeing its successful operation in the West, that a number of developing countries that attained liberation in the mid 20^th century opted for it. The primary reason for imitating this model of government was-a) that it was linked to development and b) it was regarded as a form where values like freedom; liberty and equality could be realized. The model was therefore adopted without taking into consideration the contextual differences. The result was that in the case of some, where favourable social, economic or political conditions existed that the experiment was a success while in the case of others it collapsed. Of the two experiences, the present paper studies the issue of failure by taking the classic example of a country i.e.; Nigeria where democratic experiment has faced numerous hurdles and in the process has not succeeded in consolidating itself. But before getting into the case study of Nigeria, it becomes important to have a conceptual understanding of the term and also identify factors, the presence of which create viable conditions for the continuance of democracy. The paper therefore consists of 3 sections-section 1deals with the meaning of the concept; section II identifies factors, which create viable conditions to consolidate democracy, and section III deals with the case study of Nigeria.

The word democracy is coined from Greek words: Demos (people) and Kratos meaning peoples rule. It is one of the concepts in political science on which there is no agreement on definition. Joseph Schumpeter, defined democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote."(Diamond, 1999,p.8). Dahl talks of the conception of polyarchy, which has 2 overt dimensions: opposition (organised contestation through regular, free and fair elections) and participation (the right of virtually all adults to vote and contest for office). The 3^rd dimension embedded is that of civil liberty. Polyarchy encompasses not only freedom to vote and contest for office but also freedom to speak and publish dissenting views, freedom to form and join organizations and alternative sources of information. Democracy therefore can be regarded as a governmental system that involves the widest spectrum of participation, either through elections or through the administration of the accepted/adopted policies. It is a government founded on the principle of rule of law; is against arbitrariness, highhandedness and dictatorship/autocracy; is an antithesis of military governance or militarism; is associated with accountability and transparency. Toward this end, there must be credible opposition capable of replacing an incumbent government by offering an alternative outline of politics and strategies that is likely to appeal to the electorate.

Etymologically, democracy means government by the people and there in lies the problem. Today there is hardly any country that can make a public statement that it is not government by the people. But the big question is: what do we mean by ‘the people’? For people is not a homogeneous category. There is not and there has never been a state or city where ‘the people’ means every individual in the state or city. Even in the Athenian city direct democracy did not mean that every person in the city had the right to participate in decision-making. For Athenian democracy excluded slaves, children, women and resident aliens. Thus out of a population of between 300,000 to 400,000 inhabitants only about 20,000 to 40,000 men were citizens. Even today, people’s participation therefore is determined by numerous factors, which may be social or economic in nature. Socially, race, religion, ethnicity, gender may play a role in determining participation. Economically, the access to resources may influence participation. Thus, certain groups on the basis of social or economic factors may be deprived of participation in the political process of the country and this is true not just in the case of developing countries but can be seen even in the developed nations. Therefore, it can be said that democracy in its true form is a utopia. But this however does not prevent one from striving for it. It therefore becomes essential to arrive at a consensus where everyone at least gets a feel of the system. This inculcates a sense of satisfaction and therefore creates viable conditions for sustaining democracy. In the literature, many scholars have identified factors that support democracy. The details follow in Section II.

Some scholars have argued that movement toward democracy depends on the existence within society of certain preconditions that may be economic, social or political in nature. There are scholars who in their approach have regarded economic factors as essential for democratisation. The development paradigm proposed by Daniel Lerner (1968) and S.M. Lipset (1959 and1960), which connect democratisation to economic growth, and modernization seems to have been the most influential approach in the field. Their studies have confirmed the association between stable democracy and indicators of national wealth, communication, industrialisation, education and urbanisation. S.M. Lipset explains this association by a hypothesis according to which ‘the level of a country’s economic development independently affects the orientations conducive to democracy of its citizens.’ (Vanhanen, 1997, p.15). Though he lays stress on economic development, he nevertheless does not undermine the significance of political culture, legitimacy and suitable institutions as conditions of democracy. However, he still regards economic development as the dominant explanatory factor.

The classic thesis of S.M. Lipset was supported by the comprehensive statistical analysis of Adam Przeworski. In his findings, he pointed out that the expected life of democracy increases with per capita income up to the highest income level of over 6000 dollars and democracies are more likely to persist when they experience real economic growth (especially rapid growth in excess of 5% annually). Prezeworski points out that democracy is much more likely to endure in countries where income inequalities decline overtime than where it increases (Prezeworski, et al, 2000)

The strong relationship between economic development and democracy was also supported by Larry Diamond and Garry Marks. They assert that the level of economic development continues to be the single most powerful predictor of the likelihood of democracy. Diamond re-evaluated Lipset’s thesis and tested it by new empirical evidences and came to the conclusion that "the more well to do the people of a country, on a average, the more likely they will favour, achieve and maintain a democratic system for their country" (Vanhanen, 1997, p.12).

The existence of a direct relationship between democracy and development was not accepted by the supporters of the dependency theory like A.G. Frank. He claimed that global capitalism was the cause of underdevelopment in the Third World countries and implicitly of the lack of democracy in the Third World. Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) bureaucratic authorization model challenged the development theory by claiming that modernization coincided in Latin America with the emergence of a new type of authoritarian regime. Raymond Gastil (1985) argues strongly that democratisation may depend on the diffusion of democratic ideas more than on any socio-economic factors (Vanhanen, 1997, p11). The correlation was weakened somewhat by the democratisation of a number of very poor Third World countries like Peru and the Philippines and by the rapid economic growth of a number of authoritarian countries like Singapore and Thailand. There are also certain states in the Middle East, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that have per capita incomes on a par with Europe or North America, but are not democratic. Moreover many countries that have experienced democratic revolutions in the past generation, including Spain, Portugal, Greece, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, all made the transition from being predominantly agricultural countries at mid century to being industrialized, urbanized ones at the time of democratisation (Diamond, Chu and Tien, 1997, p.99). It can thereby be said that by merely focusing on the economic factor, one cannot understand the democratisation process.

The theorists supporting the social factors regard homogeneity prevailing in society as essential for maintaining stable democracy. According to Aristotle, "a state aims at being as far as it can be a society composed of equals and peers"(Lijphart, 1977, p. 1). J.S. Mill maintained that for democracy to endure there must be some shared values, a "consensus". The heterogeneity prevailing in terms of religion or ethnicity were regarded by him as factors that make regimes less stable (Prezeworski et al, 2000, p.125)

The viewpoint of scholars maintaining a direct link between social homogeneity and democracy is also not free from criticisms. For there are societies, which have diversity but are still able to maintain democracy like in the case of India, where diversity prevails on the basis of religion, region and language but still democracy has been able to sustain itself. Therefore one cannot regard diversity as a sole factor responsible for the collapse of democracy.

Apart from the emphasis on economic and social factors, there are other theorists who regard the prevalence of political institutions as essential for sustaining democracy. Increasing scholarly attention has been paid in recent years to the strength and character of political institutions as a key factor affecting the viability and stability of democracy. Scholars like T.R. Gurr (1980) and S. P. Huntington (1968) have supported this view. The political institutions prevailing in the society provide viable channels through which people can express their dissatisfaction mainly through resorting to non-violent means. The political system is protected from any direct attack by the political institutions. These institutions therefore serve as shock absorbers and hence protect the system from crumbling down.

The study maintains that for the success of democracy, the prevalence of the 3 factors is essential but nevertheless considers the existence of strong political institutions as the most important factor for sustaining democracy. If democracies are to weather the storms of history and limit the self-aggrandizing impulses of human actors, then what is needed is strong and well designed political institutions. However, it may be emphasized that it is not mere the presence of institutions that lead to stability. What is also essential is that they must be developed to a level that other ties of associations become less important as was seen in the West, where democratisation took place after the nation state has been formed. Secondly, within the process of institutional development, no one particular institution should become so powerful that it overshadows the other institutions. In other words, there should be a balanced development of institutions, with each institution performing the role specifically assigned to it.

By taking into account the above-mentioned 3 factors, let us now examine the case of Nigeria.

Section III: Case Study of Nigeria

The democratic experience of Nigeria can be understood by utilizing the economic, social and political factors. If we take the economic factor i.e.; the issue of development, then one finds there were some phases like during the First Republic, when the nation experienced an increase in Gross Domestic Product by 5.3%(Oyediran and Asbaji, 1999,p.167) but the benefits of this increase did not percolate down to the masses and a focus on the masses is very essential mainly because when we understand development along with economic connotation, it has a social dimension too. The development should enable the masses to fulfil their basic needs. So if one views development by focusing on the social dimension then one finds that development did not take place in Nigeria. This idea becomes clear if one focuses on sectors like agriculture, which occupies a very important position mainly because nearly 70% of the population depends on this sector for its source of livelihood. Their economic activities are basically limited to the production of food crops. To improve their economic conditions, certain steps were undertaken like the setting up of the marketing boards. But the study of their operation shows that they underpaid the peasants and sold at high prices at the world market before passing on the surplus to capital and other classes that controlled state power. Other measures that were undertaken were modernizing agriculture to increase productivity. But it was the rich farmers, which were in a position to go for modern techniques of production owing to the access they had to the resources. This helped them increasing their profits, which contributed to their upward mobility. The small farmers did not experience similar improvements in their economic position. Another development that was seen was that land acquired unprecedented commercial importance, which resulted in the passing of the Land Use Decree of 1978. This again had a negative impact on the small farmers for they were deprived of land, which was put in the hands of wealthy farmer (often absentee) and companies that had wealth and connection to influence the Land Allocation Committees established under the decree (Nnoli, 2000, p.566-569).

The condition of the peasantry further worsened with Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The devaluation of the Naira meant increased hardships for the majority of Nigerian peasantry. Their earnings had not changed while the prices of the goods and services they did not produce could not be purchased by them (Egwu, 1998,p.79) The SAP was perceived as an attack on the workers basic interests and aspirations, relating to wages, health education of their children and general struggle for survival.

Besides, the agricultural sector, the problem of economic disparities prevailed even in the industrial sector. Economic differences existed at 2 levels-1) between the capitalist class as a whole and the working class 2) between comprador bourgeoisie and the Indigenous bourgeoisie.

So, as a result of neo-colonialism it was mainly the comprador bourgeoisie, which aligned itself with foreign capital that was in a position to benefit the maximum. The worst effected was the working class. The devaluation and removal of subsidies resulted in spiralling inflation and reduced purchasing power of the subordinate classes, gave wageworkers one of the lowest levels of purchasing power in Africa (Diamond, Green and Oyediran, 1996,p.556)

Therefore, it can be said that the attainment of liberation did not provide any solution to the economic problems of the masses. The economic deprivation in the post liberation period worsened with the operation of neo-colonialism. This has generated a sense of discontentment amongst the masses, which has found its outlet not just in the form of challenges to the political system, which created a negative condition for democracy but has also played an important role in giving form to ideas like ethnicity, which has created a sense of hostility amongst the various groups prevailing in the society.

Besides the economic factors, the social factor can also be utilised to understand the democratisation process in Nigeria. Socially one finds heterogeneity prevailing for there are more than 250 ethnic groups that exist in Nigeria. Of these the predominant ones are the Hausa-Fulani, Ibos and the Yoruba’s. Each one of these predominate a specific region of the country. The Hausa-Fulani dominates the northern part, the Ibos dominate the eastern part and the Yorubas inhabit the Western part. Of these 3 predominant groups, the hostility is very sharp between the Hausa-Fulani and the Ibos. The roots of this hostility can be traced back to the colonial period when the Britishers pursued the policy of divide and rule. As a result of the differential policy pursued, it was the southern region owing to its direct contact with the colonizers that it was able to benefit in arenas like education and development whereas in these arenas the northern region owing to its being indirectly ruled lagged behind. Thus when it came to opportunities, it was the Ibos who fared well. This was seen even in the post –liberation period. The better capabilities of the Ibos was not viewed positively by the Hausas and in situations where the Ibos in spite of their capabilities were deprived of opportunities, then it generated a feeling of frustration amongst them, which found its outlet in various forms of conflicts. These conflicts between the groups, which can be seen from the time of First Republic, have created instability. It can therefore be said that diversity prevailing in the nation has made the task of democratic consolidation a difficult one.

In addition to the economic and social factors, the political factors also can be utilised to understand the issue of democracy in Nigeria. Politically the country did not have strong institutions that could enable the political system to face challenges in a systematic way without breaking. This can well be seen in the details provided later.

From the above explanation, it can be said that all the three factors – economic, social and political did create negative condition for democracy to sustain itself. But the present study without undermining the role of economic and social factors, nevertheless gives more importance to the political factors. The main reason for giving importance to the political factors in terms of political institutions is primarily because if these institutions were strong then the challenges posed by the economic and social factors would have been easily tackled in a systematic way, without leading to the breakdown of the political system. This is well seen in the case of countries like India, which in spite of numerous problems like poverty and social diversity has not collapsed primarily because of the strong institutions it had it terms of political party, civil service and the judiciary. Besides the existence of these institutions, what other important thing that was seen in the case of India was there a balanced development of these institutions, where each institution played its respective role without interfering in the working of other institutions. These things however were not seen in the case of Nigeria. This can well be understood from the details of some of the institutions like the political party, armed forces, and the judiciary, which follows:

In a democracy the existence of political party is very essential owing to the important roles played by them. They are essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests, aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, organise the electoral competition for power; crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy making agenda, forming effective governments and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process. To play these roles effectively what is needed is a strong mass base, which by extending its support helps the party to legitimise its existence. This is made possible, when the party’s evolution has taken place in a slow and systematic way and when it has the presence of leaders. This was what seen in the case of India where democracy has continued, in spite of numerous ups and downs. The success of the democratic experiment in India can be attributed to two main factors. First, the nation had the advantage of a party, which had a strong mass support. This it was able to build over a period of time for if one studies the party evolution, then one finds that it had a long history for it started as a movement in 1885 but with widening mass support, it was able to take the shape of a party. Secondly, the nation had leaders like Mahatma Gandhi who played an important role in bringing together the people belonging to different religions, regions, languages and walks of life. The national movement, one can say though led to loss of numerous human and material resources, it nevertheless helped in building strong political institutions like the party.

This was not the scenario in Nigeria. For first, it did not have a national struggle. The national movement that was spearheaded by the rejuvenated Nigerian Youth Movement was torn apart by mutual jealousies, suspicions and petty squabbles over party office. The golden opportunity that was offered during 1938 to 1952 to initiate and carry out the task of building the nation was just allowed to slip off. The split in the rank and file of the movement doomed not only the chances of a unified force against imperialism but also created ground for the emergence of issues of ethnicity. Secondly, though the nation had the best-known leaders like Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chief Awolowo and Ahmadu Bello, these leaders failed to provide national leadership owing to their inability to rise above narrow ties of ethnicity. Chief Awolowo in his autobiography wrote of Dr. Azikiwe: "By the end of August 1939 it seemed clear to me that his (Azikiwe) policy was to corrode the self- respect of the Yoruba people as a group, to build up the Ibos as a master race…"(Olugemi, 1987,p.254). The national leadership crisis was therefore not solved with a creation of National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon in 1944, with an objective of providing a united national front against imperialism by Azikiwe. Probably because of his explosive nature and political leadership Dr. Azikiwe alienated most Yoruba middle class and Hausa-Fulani aristocrats, who resented him because they felt he threatened their positions and challenged their own aspirations for leadership. One can therefore say that Nigeria produced "Awoists" and "Zikists" unlike the leadership in India, which produced Indians.

The result was that when the nation was born, their existed different regions dominated by ethnic groups following a different a religion of a particular type. (See social factors discussed earlier in the context of Nigeria). In the absence of unity in diversity, the state was not a nation but "… a mere geographical expression"(Ekeh, Dele-Cole, Olusanya, 1989,p.92). The situation was exploited by the political leaders of various parties in their competition for the limited political offices and associated. Rather than focusing on issues of national concern, it was ethnicity/ regionalism that was used by the political leaders to win elections. This was well seen in 1964 and 1979 elections.

In 1964 elections the two main alliances for the election were-Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) comprising the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and its client parties: Akintola’s NNDP, Niger Delta Congress, the Mid- West Democratic Front and the Dynamic Party and other alliance was the United Progressive Alliance (UPGA) formed by the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroon’s (NCNC) and Action Group (AG) as well as their national allies, NEPU, UMBC, Zamfara Commoner’s Party and Kano People’s Party.

In spite of the national cross regional appearance of the alliances- the 2 camps presented a north and south constellation of forces. The mainstay of the NNA was the NPC, whose motive force was the consolidation of northern hegemony. The party concentrated its efforts on winning in the north and did not bother to campaign outside its region. The UPGA on the other hand, was a southern coalition whose primary objective was to halt hegemony (Diamond, 1988).

During the 1979 election, 5 parties which participated were Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigeria People’s People (NPP), People’s Redemption Party (PRP) and Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and later a 6^th party, Nigeria Advance Party.

All the 5 were virtual reincarnations of the political parties that were found in 1960’s. The same applied to their leadership, which consisted almost entirely of the top leader of the 1960’s. The UPN emerged from the ruins of the AG and was dominated by the Yorubas, with Chief Awolowo as the leader. The NPP split into 2, which led to the GNPP. The NPP arose from the support base of the NPC. The PRP was a reincarnation of the old NEPU. The Nigerian Advance Party was only party without a clear ethnic or regional location. It wanted to experiment that whether a non- ethnic, non- regional new breed party could succeed in Nigeria.

It can therefore be said that with the exception of NPN, which commanded a nationally representative following, the other parties contrary to the spirit of the constitution were not national parties. They registered themselves with the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) by fulfilling the formal requirement. This was reflected in the election results. The UPN was able to exercise its control over the Yoruba dominated West; the NPP confirmed itself as true reincarnation of the NCNC by securing control of the Igbo speaking states; the PRP had its hold over the Kaduna state and the GNPP won in Borno and Gongola states and scored significant victories in the eastern minority states of Cross River and a few conservative national states. The NPN though had a stronghold in the northern Hausa-Fulani area emerged as the nationally accepted party. This was mainly because of the support that it had from the minorities. This was the most advantaged and likely to control the federal government (Osaghae, 1998,p.118-123).

Thus, in the initial years when democracy needed a suitable environment, in terms of stability, to consolidate itself, the political parties, in keeping in mind their selfish interests of obtaining power, used ethnicity to divide the masses, which generated instability and thereby eventually contributed to the distortion of the democratic process.

It was only in later years that military leaders like Babangida, who tried to reduce the role of ethnicity in politics by evolving two party systems. To Babangida, the system had the distinct advantage of simplifying the choices available to the electorate and encouraging "cohesion in a land of pluralistic interests."(Bello Imam, 1997,p.148). Intellectuals criticized this attempt as an undemocratic imposition. Fears also were expressed by a significant cross- section of the citizenry that two party system even if it prevented ethnic based party politics of the first Republic, could polarize political cleavages on regional (North/South) or religious (Muslim/ Christian) bases, which could be potentially as dangerous if not more dangerous than polarization along ethnic lines. However, such a development did not take place. The 1993 elections were considered successful adjustments ever made to party politics with tremendous potentials for national integration. The M.K.O.Abiola victory therefore was not a victory for himself, the Yoruba or the south but a victory for democracy and national integration and which was possible because of the two party system which put an end to the possibility of ethnic groups, particularly the 3 major ones having their own parties mobilizing the electorate along ethnic and eventually distorting the democratic process. With the 2 party system, all ethnic interests were compelled to accommodate themselves in the 2 political parties each of which became reasonably representative of all ethnic groups. The masses could fully express their wishes, voting for the candidate they considered better of the 2 rather than for the candidate of their own ethnic party. But this positive development in the Nigerian politics was not allowed to make its headway because of the annulment of the elections. The country therefore did not get a chance to experiment a new development in the political arena rather a ground was generated for ethnic tensions. The southerners viewed it as an intentional action to prevent a southerner to assume power.

The other feature that the party politics exhibited and which effected the smooth functioning on democracy was the increasing use of violence. The parties employed violent tactics, which sometimes involved the physical elimination of opposition candidates. This was well seen during the 1964 elections when opposition candidates were harassed, prevented from campaigning and even the filing of nomination papers was made impossible. These incidents took place more in the northern and western regions, which were the focus of competition to control (Osaghae, 1998,p.45).

Apart from using violence, there is also an absence of existence of free and fair electoral process. This is mainly due to the absence of an independent and non- partisan electoral body, an independent judiciary to interpret electoral law, a free press and a well-organized police to maintain peace and order. During the First Republic, it was brought out that the members of the Electoral Commission regarded themselves as representatives of their regions, whose duties were primarily to defend and protect regional interests (Ekeh, Dele-Cole and Olasanya, 1989,p.116) The partial nature of the Election Commission was reflected even during the 1983 elections.

The Babalakin Commission of Inquiry that was set up in August 1985 investigated the activities of the electoral body, the FEDECO, which handled elections in the Second Republic (1979-83). In the report, which it submitted on Nov. 14, 1986, it was brought out that FEDECO and some of its officials had joined with the politicians to subvert the electoral process. The electoral malpractices seen included compilation of fictitious names, absence of voters revision exercise, stuffing of ballot boxes with ballot papers and falsification of election results (Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee, 1997,p.128)

The electoral process in Nigeria therefore did not serve as a peaceful means to bring about change and neither did it offer to the people to exercise their choices in a free manner. It rather reflected a Hobbesian state of affairs where each party was in war with the other party and was ready to employ any means to achieve political power. Such a state of affairs therefore created obstacles in the smooth functioning of the democratic process.

In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics, the parties prevailing in Nigeria reflected another feature, i.e.; they lack strong ideological commitment. Scholars like Billy Dudley have also observed the absence of ideological disputes as a prominent feature of Nigerian politics. According to him – ‘generally, political beliefs are characterised more by their fluidity than by any consistency with which they are adhered to and certainly for the political leadership, political beliefs are more a matter of convenience than one of commitment.’(Ekeh, Dele-Cole, Olusanya, 1989, p.166) Martin Dent emphasized this same observation, when he said, ‘The Nigerian party system has usually sought for an ideological orientation but has so far failed to achieve it’ (Ibid, p.166). This was well seen during the Babangida era, there existed 2 parties – National Republic Convention (NRC), which was "little to the right", and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was "little to the left". The former emphasised market economy and corporate capitalism and the latter emphasised a mixed economy and social welfarism. But a study of their manifestos showed that essentially both were capitalist parties and committed to the continuous of economic reform programme of Structural Adjustment Programme (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999.p.135)

Instead of ideology, it was observed that they revolved around individuals. It is because of this moving from one party to another, which is essentially done to be closer to the goal of achieving power, is a common phenomenon in Nigerian politics. This development therefore reflects not only the fragile nature of country’s politics but also the selfish attitude of the leaders. They view the entry into politics as an easy way to enrich themselves rather than providing solutions to the socio-economic problems of the masses. The masses therefore with the passage of time, loose their faith in their political leaders and look forward for any means that would enable them to put an end to their deteriorating state of affairs.

Therefore it can be said that political parties by sidelining the national interest and the interest of the people have not served as true representative of people. They therefore have swayed the masses away from them and have created obstacles in their legitimisation process. This has generated numerous challenges before the political system, which ultimately has led to the collapse of the democratic process and has facilitated the entry of repressive institutions like the military into the political sphere of the country.

B) Armed Forces:

The understanding of Nigerian politics is incomplete without a focus on the armed forces. This is mainly because of the 41 years of country’s independence; the nation has been under military rule for 29 years. Their entry into the political affairs was made possible by the operation of certain factors the most important being that of the inability of the political leaders to live up to the expectation of the masses. The people had great hopes that the leaders will help them to resolve numerous problems experienced by them. But such a thing did not happen, the leaders on the other hand utilized their power to perpetuate their own selfish interests. Not only this they even pursued policies that sidelined the national interest. The result of all these developments was that a sense of frustration emerged amongst the masses, which found its outlet in various forms of conflicts that ultimately led to the breakdown of the political system. It is then the military got an opportunity to intervene in the country’s politics. The intervention was therefore justified by perpetuating ideas like - "…But what we do promise every law –abiding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field of human endeavour both nationally and internationally…" "The federal military government will preserve Nigeria as one strong nation. We shall give firm, honest and discipline leadership. The federal military government will stamp out corruption and dishonesty in our public life with ruthless efficiency and restore integrity and self respect in our public affairs" (Banjo, 1996, p. 3).

Opinions however differ on the role of the military in political and economic change. The question normally asked is –are the military midwives to progress or do they simply act to spill the lava of people’s revolutionary fervour. Scholars like Huntington doubt the ability of the military to spearhead political and economic progress. According to him, military is incapable of making real efforts towards building political institutions, not least because among other considerations, their skills make them least suitable for such tasks (Caron, Gboyega and Osaghae, 1992, p. 239). Other scholars like Lieuwen and Bienen support this viewpoint of Huntington. These scholars agree that military regime is not capable of fundamental changes. The military’s ability to bring about political stability and stimulate economic development is therefore doubted.

The neo-Marxists too perceive the role of the military in the creation of meaningful, political, economic order as essentially negative, for the military aligns always with forces of reaction and the middle classes to defend the status quo and is often used in the conspiracy to abort efforts at engineering real change in their countries. (Caron, Gboyega and Osaghae, p.240)

However, some scholars while studying the role of military in the context of Nigeria have come up with different conclusions. Akin Iwayemi credits the military with rapid economic growth the country witnessed since 1970(Caron, Gboyega and Osaghae, p. 240-41)

If one studies the role of military in the context of Nigeria, then one finds that some of the military leaders did pursue some positive policies. The Ironsi government in search of national cohesion banned over 80 political associations and parties and dissolved the Federal Structure replacing it with a unitary structure through the Unification Decree 34. The government therefore made its effort to save the country from drifting away into destruction.

The Gowon military government did release political prisoners, abrogated the Unification Decree thereby returning Nigeria to a Federal set up, created 12 states in May27, 1967 thereby gave recognition and sense of belonging to the minority groups, pursued national unity like National Youth Service Corps established in 1973 and the establishment of Unity Schools in states. A good deal of infrastructure Nigeria has today were planned or executed under the Gowon government. Indigenisation Decree 1972 gave Nigeria and Nigerian greater participation in selected business, while the import substitution strategy boosted industrial development especially in the arenas of automobile assembly plant, machine tool factories and food processing factories.

But if one studies the overall role of the military, then one finds that it too was not different from the elected regimes. Their policies did not cater to the socio- economic needs of the masses. Some of the policies like the SAP, acted as catalyst in worsening the economic conditions of the weaker section like the peasants and the workers. The problem of corruption which the military promised to wipe out, not only continued to persist but rose to unprecedented heights. Their operation created a negative environment for return of democracy for while in power they put curbs on institutions like the political parties. To the military leaders, good politics is essentially non-party politics. Keeping this idea in mind, number of military leaders like Gowon during their period of rule, banned their operation. Restrictions were also imposed on the independent functioning of the mass media as was seen during the Buhari regime. Under Decree4 of 1984, two Guardian journalists were jailed and the newspaper fined 50,000 Naira. The officials of the State Security Service killed Editor in Chief of Newswatch Magazine. The circulation of Newswatch was prohibited for six months in Nigeria. In the subsequent four years, Nigeria witnessed the closure of more newspaper houses than in all of the years put together since independence (Diamond, Green and Oyediran, 1996, p. 398-399) They established their authority even on the judiciary and therefore effected its independent functioning (See the section c on judiciary). These repressive measures were accompanied with a promise to bring back democracy. Like General Ironsi promised to effect certain constitutional changes after which he would consult the Nigerian people and ‘with the consensus of various representatives of public opinion’ he would re-establish a system of democracy for the country. The military leaders that succeeded Ironsi also gave similar assurances to the people of the interim ness of military rule and therefore of hopes for a return to democratic politics. But these promises essentially were false for they were merely given to gain time to strengthen their own positions.

We can therefore say that role of the armed forces in Nigeria is not just limited to defence and security of the country but over a period of time it has widened its sphere of action by interfering in the political sphere. Once after resuming the political role it has intentionally operated in a way that has destroyed the independent functioning of representative institutions. By doing so it has not only assumed an important position but has created hurdles in the process of democratic return.

In a democracy, judiciary has to play an important role for it is not just the custodian of people’s fundamental rights, guardian of the constitution but also helps in maintaining a balance between the various wings of the government. These functions can well be performed if the judiciary is independent and free of any control. However, such was not the position of judiciary in the Nigerian context. The independent functioning was curbed under the military regime. The overthrow of the Second Republic on 31December 1983 brought about the suspension of various provisions of the 1979 Constitution. The passing of decrees limited the authority of the courts to interpret the law and adjudicate disputes (as reflected in Section 5 of Decree1). It declared: " No question as to the validity of this or any other Decree or Edict shall be entailed by any court of law in Nigeria."(Diamond, Greene and Oyediran, 1996, p.393). To further affirm the supremacy and unquestionable status of military decrees in Nigeria, the government promulgated the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree 13 of 1984, which provided:

"No civil proceedings shall be or be instituted in any court or on account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done or purported to be done under or pursuant to any Decree or Edict, and if any such proceedings are instituted before, or after the commencement of this decree, the proceedings shall abate, be discharged and made void (Diamond, Greene and Oyediran, 1996,p.393)

The above provisions effectively ousted the competence and jurisdiction of the courts from enquiring into the validity of decrees made by the military government. These provisions are found in all decrees affecting human rights made by the military since 1984. A further provision that features in all military decrees affecting human rights is the suspension of fundamental rights.

In violation of the cardinal principle of the rule of law, the power of the military to make laws was expanded to include the promulgation of retroactive decrees Thus Decree1, the State Security Decree 2, the recovery of Public Property Decree 3 and the Banking Decree6, which were all promulgated in the first quarter of 1984, were made retroactive to commence on 31 December.

The Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offence) Decree 20, promulgated in July 1984, turned out to be the most draconian and unjust piece in Nigeria’s legal history. It provided the death penalty for a wide range of offences including arson, tampering with oil pipelines or electric and telephone cables, importing or exporting mineral oil or ore etc.

The military also annihilated the principles and practices of due process recognized by the nation’s legal and judicial systems. First, Decree 1 of 1984 suspended the provisions in Section 32(3)-7of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria entitling an accused person to remain silent on arrest until he consults his lawyer to be informed in writing within 24 hours of the reason for his arrest, to be charged to court within reasonable time and to be compensated for unlawful arrest. Second, military tribunals were set up to co-exist with the ordinary civil courts in the administration of criminal justice. The first of such tribunals was the Recovery of Public Property Tribunal set up under Decree 3 of 1984"to ascertain whether any public officer has been engaged in corrupt practices or has corruptly enriched himself or any other person or has by virtue of abuse of his office contributed to the economic adversity of Nigeria. "The Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Tribunal was set up under Decree 4 of 1984 "to try persons who publish in any form whether written or otherwise, any message, rumour, report or statement which is false in any material particular or which brings or is calculated to bring the federal military government or the government of a state or a public officer to ridicule or disrepute"(Diamond Greene and Oyediran, 1996,p.395)

The military also set up the Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal and the Robbery and Firearms Tribunal to try persons accused of various other criminal offences including drug trafficking and armed robbery. The decrees setting up the tribunals forbid judicial appeal against their decisions. Appeals could be made only to a special appeal tribunal, whose decisions were subject to confirmation by the ruling Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC).

A look at the tribunals set up the military since 1984 reveals that the tribunals cannot either legally or in practice be considered independent or impartial. For most of their duration, the tribunals had military personnel in their membership. Most of the military officers lacked knowledge of legal issues and proper orientation towards the administration of justice. The military officers saw their mission on the tribunal as enforcement of the decrees promulgated by their colleagues in the AFRC and times saw the conviction of an accused person as a victory for the military government.

Thus, the Guardian editorialised on 20 July 1991 that "the continued existence of the special tribunal, demilitarised or not, represents the perpetuation of the parallel judicial system which impedes confidence in the regular courts. It is ultimately detrimental to our hope for an improved and uniformed system of laws"(Diamond, Green and Oyediran, 1996,p.397)

The deteriorating position of the judiciary can be explained by the amendments that were brought out in the appointment of judges. The AFRC was virtually vested with powers to appoint judges to the State and Federal Courts. According to the Decree 1 of 1984, the Chief Justice of the of the Supreme Court of Nigeria was appointed by the AFRC entirely on its own discretion, while justices of the Supreme Court were appointed at the of the AFRC, but acting on the advice of the Court of Appeal sitting jointly. The President and Justices of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judge and Judge of the Federal and State High Courts were appointed by the AFRC acting on the advice of the Advisory Judicial Committee. In essence, the nation’s judicial officers were appointed at the pleasure of the military government. While making appointment, the military, the military government appointed into judicial offices only those who were unlikely to engage in undue radical decisions.

It can therefore be concluded that judiciary in Nigeria, is a weak institution for neither did it safeguard people’s fundamental rights nor it has succeeded in maintaining a balance between the various organs of the government. In fact, it has succumbed to the increasing pressures of the military and in the process lots its autonomy.

Therefore it can be said that the democratic process in Nigeria has to face challenges from the socio-economic and political arena but it is mainly due to the existence of weak political institutions that the sustenance is been made a difficult task. The weakness of the institutions can be attributed to the certain features that they exhibit which thereby has hampered the development of institutions to a level, where they cannot manage social or economic crisis smoothly without breaking down. Even in situations where the political institutions responded by initiating some measures, such measures were undertaken to promote not the general interests of the masses but only for a section of the society. The large section was therefore alienated and did not share the benefits of such positive measures; the result was that a sense of disillusionment emerged, which found its reflection in various kinds of political conflicts that brought down the democratic process.

Another political reason that can be utilized to understand the failure of democracy is that in Nigeria there has not taken place a balanced development of the institutions. Some institutions which do not reflect people’s aspirations and which are repressive in nature like the army, is so overdeveloped, a ‘leviathan monarch’ that it has effected the proper functioning of the representative institutions. Thus the institutions like the judiciary have not been able to deliver the best owing to its subordination to the army.

Thus if the political institutions were strong and developed in a balanced way, they could have succeeded in meeting any crisis emerging from the social or economic sphere but in the absence of such a situation democracy in Nigeria has not been able to consolidate itself. In its 41 years of independence, it has had democracy for 12 years. The memory of the past should not however lead to a state of despair. The country has tremendous potential both human and material for building a state on solid foundation. The reshaping of the country’s future needs some efforts and some of these-

First, there is a need to solve the leadership crisis, without which the country’s future is bleak. The idea that virtually anyone without any form of adequate training and exposure can become a head of state in Nigeria must be seriously called to question. To survive and progress, the most competent individuals in the country, irrespective of ethnic or religious inclination need to be selected, to lead the country. Scholars like Diamond, Linz and Lipset have also pointed out the significance of leadership. According to them "even structures and institutions, especially political ones, are shaped by the actions and options of political leaders. The more constraining and unfavourable the structural circumstances, the more skilful, innovative, courageous, and democratic committed political leadership must be for democracy to survive." They further argued, "even when the obstacles are formidable, democratic breakdowns are not inevitable but are accelerated by poor leadership and bad choice."(Bello-Imam, 1997,p.140)

Second, political democracy can be strengthened if its important counterpart that it is economic democracy accompanies it. The political system needs to undertake steps that would provide solution to economic problems like that of poverty with which a large section of the society is struggling. Since this struggle against poverty is a multi- faceted and long term one, what is needed is evidence of a concerted effort to wage this struggle as the highest priority project. This step would also help in bringing under control other problems like that of ethnicity for ethnicity is essentially a reflection of feeling of economic deprivation.

Third, the linkage between the political parties and ethnicity or religion is not to the best interests of the Nigerian people. This is an arena where de-linking is necessary and appropriate. This can be made possible if people have political education. The people should understand their rights, responsibilities and the role of the state. They should be educated to demand accountability on the part of those elected office. They should be in a position to recall those who have failed to deliver. A proper understanding of the various political issues will therefore prevent them from being used as pawns by the leaders in name of ethnicity.

Fourth, the way the parties are constituted and legitimised has bearing on both the scope and content of democracy in the country as well as on the capacity of government to be responsible and accountable to the electorates. The parties need to be internally democratic and should be interested in deepening the content of democracy in the country.

Fifth, the survival of democracy is dependent to a large extent depend on the ability of the electoral body to conduct free and fair elections through a transparent process. For this to take place what is needed is the existence of an electoral body which is independent in its functioning.

Sixth, the judiciary is another organ of democratisation. It can play an important role in promoting good governance. It should therefore be an independent institution.

Seventh, there is a need for accountability and transparency in governance. This will help fighting the problem of corruption for apart from destroying the moral fabric of the society; it also leads to the drain of national resources, which are needed for development.

Last but not the least, the role of the army should be limited to the defence and security of the nation. It should not look for opportunities to jump into politics as it has done in the past years for this development leads to the curbing of people’s freedom and also leads to the destruction of the institutions which can democratise the nation.

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