Beyond Elections - 
From Transition to Transformation in Nigeria:
    Options and issues for the new Government        

 "Democracy is a process…
Election is just an important event in that process…
Under my leadership, we shall continue the process of deepening 
and widening the democratisation  process, through dialogue…"

(General Olusegun Obasanjo, March 1, 1999)

  Overview of the Transition in Nigeria

The relentless media focus on the Nigerian elections was understandable – even if a little over the top - given the country’s recent sordid past under the brutal regime of General Sani Abacha and the desperation in the international community to get rid of another albatross nation. But concerned observers cannot but ask the more legitimate question: Is democracy really dawning in Nigeria? Or is the current transition just another false start? Scholars of democratic transition in countries emerging from prolonged authoritarian past have stressed the virtues of sequencing and correctly argued that any opening for democracy can, at best, be a means to an end, an instrumental response to a multi-faceted crisis.1 Unfortunately, this position often assumes that the process is irreversible and it inexorably leads to democracy. In the light of the numerous false starts that Nigeria has witnessed in her past attempts at democratic experiments however, there ought to be a growing realisation of the need to think less teleologically about democratic transitions. This understanding should be common place following the experience of post-Co War democratic transitions in Africa in the last decade.2 Indeed, while democratic transitions may lead to democratic development, pacted transitions have not necessarily led to consolidated democracies nor stem the tide of democratic reversals, especially in places where the ethos, language and character of public discourse have been completely militarised.3 Arguably though, one recognises some merit in occupying, rather than boycotting, an emerging space, no matter how limited, but we caution against misconstruing re-packaged space for controlled clientelistic politics as a new space for democratic endeavour.

Without seeking to dismiss optimistic views about Nigeria’s on-going transition therefore, there is a need to critically interrogate it if only to aid a realistic assessment of where Nigeria is headed in the aftermath of the elections, what the role of the military will be and indeed, whether we are witnessing a real false dawn. In our view, there are two ways to approach the problems of military control and domination of the body politic. The first is to adopt cautious and incremental steps. There is merit in the arguments of its proponents, who have posed the question thus: "how, given the existing forms of military domination and acute social stratification, can the military be ignored if conflict is to be averted and democracy consolidated in a fractious setting such as Nigeria’s?" The second approach is to tackle the issue more comprehensively: what transformations and institutional mechanisms relative to social compartmentalisation, ethnic relations and power sharing will be required to ensure conditions of lasting peace in Nigeria? An innovative use of both approaches would certainly work better than an isolated use of either, but any approach that fails to recognise that what Nigeria needs is transformation, not management, is unlikely to deliver sustainable democracy. This becomes crucial in an atmosphere where the growing orthodoxy is the retrenchment of the State and its replacement with the market. Clearly, this orthodoxy is gaining ground in the current transition and General Obasanjo is already facing pressure to take "…bold measures, especially the reduction of government’s stake in the oil industry, so as to allow in foreign capital which Nigeria badly needs."4 With the intense pressure to privatise existing state institutions in a setting where the only people with unlimited resources are the retired military officers and those close to the military, this is bound to exacerbate Nigeria’s already fragile civil-military relations.

It is plausible to argue that retired military officers are first and foremost citizens of Nigeria and have the right to contribute their experience and expertise to the vital sectors of the economy. However, three decades of military stewardship of Nigeria’s political economy has heightened skepticism among Nigerians about the military’s competence or modernising characteristics in management and national development. If anything, they perceive the clamour for the privatisation of state enterprises against the backdrop of the current military financial muscle on the one hand, and the ongoing attempts to collapse the military top brass and capitalist classes in society under military hegemony on the other, as an explicit agenda aimed at promoting social stratification between the military profession and the rest of society. However debatable such apprehensions may be, one fact remains obvious: there will be considerable "behind the scenes" influence by the military after the new government comes into office in May 1999. This is based on an objective assessment of the sheer weight in numbers of active and retired army officers in the ranks of the victorious People’s Democratic Party and the considerable investment they made in ensuring its victory. In addition, the dispute over the conduct of elections that have returned Olusegun Obasanjo, a candidate with a military background, to power is bound to further poison the climate of suspicion.

Challenges Facing the New Government

In the light and in spite of the apprehensions and controversies outlined in the preceding paragraphs, the in-coming administration has an opportunity to prove the sceptics wrong. Its response to the need to move from transition to social and political transformation may well placate the constituencies that have voiced visceral opposition to the declared victory of PDP because of the dubious legitimacy of the elections. The litmus test for General Obasanjo’s administration will come on four major fronts, namely its responses to:

 
Below, we discuss the most sensitive challenges the new government will confront and look at what it needs to do in the light of the admittedly sensitive environment that cries for urgent public policy reform.

In our view, the most immediate reform process that the new government needs to embark upon is the military reform project. The overriding fact that the Nigerian military has now become entrenched in all facets of Nigeria’s civic and economic life is one that the elected authorities should readily acknowledge. Finding an appropriate role and mission for a streamlined army, developing a civilian, democratic defence policy expertise and creating the necessary opportunities for networking and dialogue between military representatives and civil society workers are the areas that need serious policy attention. Although the retired General Obasanjo has been cast as the acceptable face of a civilian cloak for continued military rule, ultimately, he could turn this to an advantage if he embarks on an even-handed treatment of those committed to professionalism within the military, whilst insisting on the subordination of the military to civilian, democratic control; not just to the presidency, but also the legislature and the people.

In ensuring civilian supremacy and a democratic pattern of civil-military relations, the civilian leadership in any post-authoritarian State must define the role of the military in a clear and precise manner. A ‘missionless’ military poses a serious threat in relation to the its primary role as defender of the nation’s territorial integrity. In the past, the political usurpation of military talents has proved dangerous in areas where the military was needed to function like a fighting force either at home or abroad. While the Nigerian military has a somewhat fine reputation in its commitment to and participation in international peacekeeping duties, the professionalism of its soldiers on peacekeeping missions has been found wanting on many occasions. The recent losses suffered by the Nigerian armed forces in the hands of a rag-tag rebel force in Sierra Leone underscores this point. Within reason therefore, this military mission must be restricted to its traditional external combat role as a means of strengthening civil-military relations. If it must get involved in any internal security operations, proper criteria would need to be developed for evaluating the involvement of armed forces in such non-combat operations.

Without being prescriptive about this, any attempt to redefine the role and mission of the Nigerian military, given the declining external security threats faced by the country, must consider security in its holistic manifestation. It must also pay particular attention to the protection of offshore interests and promotion of a professional peacekeeping command. If peacekeeping and peace enforcement are identified as the primary external role of the Nigerian military, then there would be the need to work out a clear strategy to govern conditions for involvement in external missions, extent of commitment, conditions for withdrawal of troops, rotation of soldiers, training and doctrine as well as legislative oversight.

The second major issue for consideration is the separation of broad policy decisions from operational control over matters such as size, shape, organisation, force structure, equipment, weapon acquisition and conditions of military service on the one hand, and administrative control over the army on the other. The professional military loves a civilian head that understands their predicament, values unrestricted access to the President as well as autonomy over their internal organisation and operations. Any redirection of the defence policy process will inevitably require a different kind of expertise, which must be composed of a mixture of civilians and military professionals. There should be constant exchange and redistribution of knowledge between the military and civilian political elite and a significant increase in contact between the military and the larger civil society. The process of agreeing an appropriate role for the military can only be successful in a climate of sustained dialogue and full consultation with the larger population. At the moment, the level of contact is non-existent or where it exists, only at an unstructured social level. In introducing civilian input into military matters however, care must be taken not to substitute military incompetence with civilian inexperience. A good bridge might well be a presidential advisory unit that will serve as a buffer between a civilian presidency and the military professionals.

Equally, the incoming leadership must respect the professional autonomy of the military in spite of the temptation to want to display superior knowledge of the institution. The immediate challenge is for the civilian, democratic leadership to make the right choice of military chiefs to lead the military restructuring/re-professionalisation project. When the military left the scene in 1979, General Obasanjo and his colleagues showed some commitment to professionalism by appointing service chiefs who were widely respected across the board. The appointments - Lt.General Alani Akinrinade as Army Chief (although he was not the most senior army officer), Rear Admiral Akin Aduwo for the Navy and Air Vice Marshal Bello for the Air Force – were made in consultation with the then incoming civilian president. Unfortunately, the president changed the bequeathed military hierarchy barely six months into his rule by ‘promoting’ Lt.General Akinrinade into the newly created Coordinating Office of Chief of Defence Staff. This decision was perceived in some military circles as politically motivated and a ploy to get rid of an "independent" officer from the all-powerful role of the Chief of Army Staff. Yet, it could also be argued that it was important for the civilian government to exercise control over the choice of service chiefs with professional, military advice from the military hierarchy.

While it is not entirely clear how new service chiefs will be chosen, General Obasanjo’s in-depth knowledge of the military institution that has often lacked inputs from the civilian political elite is a big plus. He stands to gain a lot if he takes bold measures in relation to the military that combine emphasis of unequivocal change with some elements of continuity. The concern here is that General Obasanjo’s much revered knowledge of the military officer corps does not quite extend to the current officer corps, as many of them were mostly young officers barely out of the Defence Academy when he retired. This knowledge gap can, and should be, filled in the three months interregnum to his inauguration at the end of May.

Consequently, within the next three months there is the need to undertake an urgent comprehensive study of the senior officer corps. This study would assess first, the extent to which politics has eaten into the fabric of an erstwhile professional officer corps and second, the remaining level of commitment to military professionalism among the officer corps. If such an assessment is properly carried out, it will help to avoid the mistakes of the past, when thoroughly professional officers were thrown out by the last civilian government whilst officers such as the late General Sani Abacha kept their jobs simply because they were able to lie low without attracting too much attention to themselves. Whilst the incoming government must work with the outgoing military government, recommendations from them on who gets what job in the military should be handled with dignified skepticism if the danger of military politicisation in the ranks of serving officers is to be avoided. It would certainly bode ill for protagonists of genuine reform if some of those influencing change under the new administration had any remote connection to the problems of the past. Even if this were to be tackled, the incoming government will have to address the pervasive influence of politics among very junior officers too, many of whom had joined the armed forces primarily for the fast route it offers to political control.

Even, if the internal crisis within the armed forces can be addressed through a careful rethink of the force structure, retraining and demobilisation, any serious quest for military reform has to address the alternative power-centre that has been created around the security/intelligence networks used by successive rulers to undermine the institution in order to remain in power. Military professionalism has been seriously damaged by the transformation of intelligence gathering networks into gestapo units for regime security. This practice was institutionalised under General Babangida when he set up a plethora of security networks culminating in the creation of the alternative para-military service- National Guard. This process however took on pernicious proportions under the late General Abacha with the formation of the Libya and Korean trained Special BodyGuard Services for the personal protection of the dictator. Credible military intelligence sources claim that there are at least 5,000 of such soldiers within the system and General Abubakar had failed to do anything about them. As a victim of this gestapo unit himself, there is no reason to believe that General Obasanjo does not know of its existence. The key however is to ensure an institutional strategy that will streamline and ensure proper accountability and legislative oversight over security services that are not under the purview of the armed forces.

The question of recruitment into the armed forces is also one that will test the new regime as part of the military reform exercise. Tied to the size of the Nigerian military, this is an issue that will also feature strongly in the post-election debate on the structure of the nation. There is a strong perception that the disproportionate recruitment of ‘Northerners’ into the Nigerian military persists in spite of the introduction of the regional quota system during Obasanjo’s first stint as Head of State. Only recently, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) raised this as a fundamental problem. This is a political problem that cannot be resolved on a rational basis. However, central to the issue of military recruitment pattern in terms of military professionalism are three key questions: Should the Nigerian armed forces in a democratic dispensation be an equal opportunities institution? Should it be a combat effective, battle ready force recruited from the most able in the most rigorous and competitive manner? Should the manner of recruitment matter – if the training is standardised and geared towards bringing out the best in every recruit?⁵ Although the above are the rational questions to which answers must be found, there is no evidence to suggest that you cannot have an equal opportunities military that is professionally competent and up to the task of defending the territorial integrity of the nation.

Yet if we are to resolve the problem of recruitment, especially at a time of declining national resources, the size of the armed forces itself must come up for scrutiny. These are political issues that can only be resolved through a process of confidence building and conflict management mechanisms. There is no accurate figure of the size of the Nigerian armed forces, but most estimates range between 70,000 and 80,000 men; this makes an accurate headcount of Nigerian soldiers an immediate necessity. There is also a consensus that given the level of threats faced by the nation, Nigeria can make do with a significantly reduced armed forces, although it must be said that traditional assessment would consider the current size inadequate to the country’s population and its regional responsibilities. To buttress the demand for reduction in size, even the much discredited Constitutional Conference that produced the 1995 constitution agreed that the size of the military should be cut down to 50,000.

Instead of such arbitrary reduction, the new civilian leadership can conduct an assessment of the force structure in a much more objective manner. For example, if the military mission is primarily coastal – protection of offshore economic interests, and external – peacekeeping duties, are the personnel currently emphasised in the armed forces order of battle suitable for the types of missions the military may be called upon to perform? Are the manpower levels cost-effective, and most importantly, does the institutional recruitment process procure individuals that are wholly dedicated to their military duties, reliable and efficient? Put more graphically, why is the Nigerian Navy virtually dead and the Air Force almost non-existent if the real threats are as explained above? Why does Nigeria need four divisions of over 65,000 men and officers in the army, and why was procurement up till the late 1980s geared towards sophisticated equipment and modern technology, when officers are not fit enough to withstand pressures not otherwise common in their previous infantry-based experience? Although the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command of the Army,[TRADOC] has tried to address this confusion by formulating doctrine centrally, this has only slightly reduced the degree of subjectivity and prejudice hitherto prominent in policy-making because, the distortions in the career build up of officers has been largely compounded by the political encumbrances of the military, not by a lack of ideas as to what is right and proper.

Again, the incoming government has a particular advantage here if the discredited officers involved in his re-entry into politics do not draw him back. General Obasanjo was one of the four senior officers who designed the post-civil war demobilisation strategy, which was put aside by the Gowon administration. His government later implemented this policy and it is to their credit that they reduced the size of the armed forces by at least 100,000 from the 250,000 men at the end of the civil war in 1970. The lessons learned and experience gained from the demobilisation process the last time around can help them in addressing the problem, once again. The challenge here would come in the form of what to do with the demobilised soldiers – a sort of "jobs" for "guns" strategy that would ensure that violent crime do not rise exponentially in the course of the demobilisation effort. The most important point at this stage is to take a principled stand to address the crisis posed by a huge, bloated army that has become flat-footed and grossly incompetent.

(2) Resolving the Nationality Question through Restructuring of the Polity:

Military restructuring can only take its proper place within the context of national restructuring. Very little has been said by General Obasanjo and his party on this particular subject, except for the glib reference to "making every Nigerian have a sense of belonging" in the country. The depth of alienation to the concept of Nigeria is so overwhelming in certain parts of the country that this simply would not do. If the government buries the past, rather than revisit it in the name of "one nation, one destiny" and "peace and stability", popular mantra that have no meaning within the context of Nigeria’s damaged structure, the government will only remind ordinary people of the Shagari days when these words were in popular use, even as the fabric of the nation was being destroyed by prebendal politics.

The newly elected authority has an advantage in the fact that no constitution has been promulgated. As the president of all Nigerians, and not just those who voted for his party in the elections, he should seriously consider a national forum for constitutional reform. It appears the constitution likely to be promulgated by the military before its exit as a basis for civilian rule. The idea that the constitution promulgated by the military should be the permanent basis of this democratic dispensation may not necessarily augur well for the consolidation of this narrow opening.

To promote the idea of an incremental, constitutional framework in the face of opposition to political reform by conservative elements in the military, bureaucracy, political parties and the hegemonic class, any constitution promulgated by the military should be treated as an Interim Constitution. It is probably too late to ask the outgoing military regime that the process of consultation on a new Constitution after Obasanjo’s inauguration be written into the interim constitution that will be promulgated to ensure an inclusive, participatory approach in which public input is paramount. However, a new government with an elected mandate of the people can do this if it is really keen to break away from Nigeria’s sordid past. Issues that have occupied the minds of Nigerians for some time and which should form the general principles used by the incoming government (in case they are not addressed by the military constitution) include:

The idea of an interim constitution leading to a more inclusive constitutional framework is not a unique one. This was the process adopted in South Africa and it has been recently used in the formulation of the 1997 Thailand constitution. This is going to try the resolve of the incoming government, but if the government is to go beyond "business as usual", leadership requires that tough measures are taken to get the country back on track. We strongly suggest that the three months interregnum between election and inauguration should be used to prepare a fully worked out constitutional reform project to which all sections of society can subscribe.

Of all the challenges that the new government in Nigeria is going to face, the pressure from forces – external and internal – who are eager to have democracy without the State – will be the most intense. Already, the stage is set for the privatisation of several State assets under the pretext that they have been inefficiently run and many foreign interests are angling for the huge divestment programme to be unveiled as soon as possible. General Obasanjo seems to know that the resolution of the Nigerian economic crisis is not a choice between the State and the Market as he pointed out in his pre-election dinner at the Lagos Chamber of Commerce. Many Nigerians also remember his public opposition to the Structural Adjustment Programme because of its lack of a "human face."

The trouble that many observers notice is that those who have invested in General Obasanjo’s election want divested state assets in return for their support. Equally, Western diplomats have backed him in the hope that he can unleash the magic of the market in a country that has been bedraggled by the strictures of SAPs over the last decade.⁶ None of these constituencies are particularly bothered by the fact that what they are urging upon the new government in Nigeria is anti-democratic even as they promote good governance and democracy. To suggest the parceling out of the Nigerian State assets as the only option for saving the State without adequate consultation with the citizenry for a national consensus on such an action is a travesty of democracy. The idea of privatising the State’s oil assets as has been suggested in several circles for example, without adequate consultation with the Niger-Delta people can only result in democratic reversal, rather than democratic consolidation. It cannot be disputed that the crisis of political economy in Nigeria is a serious one requiring serious attention. In grappling with the economy however, the experience of other African countries whose democracies have been undermined by the unrestrained market orthodoxy is particularly apt⁷ and the challenge is how to carry out economic reform without undermining democratic governance.⁸; As Olukoshi argued, "in sticking to the neo-liberal reform project, several elected governments have presided over the undermining/dissolution of the coalition of mostly anti-adjustment forces that propelled them to power in the first place."⁹ It is possible that the people might even be prepared to go farther than the regime is willing to in respect of economic reform if all the options are put before them and national consensus is sought widely. This is even more so in an atmosphere where they are convinced that institutional corruption and personal graft will be stopped and a realistic development plan is in place.

The problem with the incoming government in Nigeria is that its campaign manifesto was very thin on ideology or issues and little is known in terms of what it seeks to do to redress the country’s economic crisis. Setting up a government and an institutional system that are broadly accountable and transparent may be the best place to start, but even this will not succeed if those involved in past graft were to escape any punishment for the crimes perpetrated against the State. For example, it would be necessary to revisit the Okigbo Report into the account of the Central Bank between 1988 and 1994 as well as conduct investigations into the finances of the Abacha Government between 1993 and 1998. It is therefore worrying when General Obasanjo says his government is not interested in probing previous regimes for corruption, even though his resolve to "seek, to search, to find internally and externally" ill-gotten wealth deserves commendation. Simultaneously, the government can put together a team of independent experts to review the proper state of the Nigerian economy as part of its transitional arrangement in the three-month period preceding its inauguration. If set up, this team should seriously consider the economic agenda as one of the issues to put forward before a National Consultative Forum.

Several of the reported statements by the incoming President seem to suggest inclinations towards burying the past. Yet, he has been cited in the past as endorsing a Truth Commission of sorts in the country. There are several people in Nigeria who believe a Truth Commission and a National Conference should constitute key preoccupations in the country today. The need to negotiate a process of reconciliation (Argentina/Chile) or restitution (South Korea) between the military and the civil society that takes into account what is in the long term best interests of human rights and fundamental freedoms in consolidating democracy is more crucial than ever. In Nigeria, where the military has had a long and chequered history of political intervention and built up immense economic clout, assuaging the fears of the military in a consolidating democracy by a declaration of amnesty for past misdeeds poses a serious challenge to the strengthening of a stable civil-military relations. Already, several people in Nigeria are yearning for the day when the military would be brought to account for past actions and any attempt to stop that process happening will be opposed by those important opinion leaders.

Yet the question must be asked, as others must have asked themselves in Chile, Argentina and Philippines: Although restitution may be a necessary, even cathartic exercise, located in terms of a sustainable, civil-military relations, is it the best way to promote stable, civil-military relations or is there a way to achieve a balance between restitution and reconciliation? This is one of the areas where the right balance must be found between the search for immediate justice and the need for long term stability. Clearly, any new government that refuses to acknowledge the scale of abuse and injustice in Nigeria over the last decade would be confronted with the pressure from the civil society. Equally, any attempt to rush into issues bordering on the role of the military in the last decade would raise serious concerns in military circles         

                                              What role for the International Community?

Given the challenges that have been highlighted above, the international community has a critical role to play if Nigeria’s democratic product is to measure up to the hype that has surrounded it. Understandably, the international community has played a prominent role in encouraging Nigeria’s leadership since the death of General Abacha not to renege on its promise of democratic transition. One is however worried that while the rhetoric of the international community is one of relief and excitement that Nigeria is on course for democracy, a careful deconstruction of the actions of the critical countries reveal an unprecedented bias towards a particular outcome in the democratisation project, an outcome which promotes "stability" and "management of chaos", rather than genuine democratisation leading to social and political transformation of Nigeria’s sordid past. It would appear that the international community has somewhat concluded that what Nigeria needs now is a crisis management programme entrusted in the hands of a good leader, not an agenda for comprehensive transformation of the status quo that is inclusive of all her citizens.

In the light of the above, it is critical for the international community to see developments in Nigeria beyond elections and personalities. To be helpful, the international community must examine how any assistance would promote the yearning of Nigerians for real democracy based on social consensus. In particular, external input should be directed towards the resolution of such crucial issues as military and polity reform, as well as the transformation of the entire political economy to enhance structural stability. The following, in our view, represent the nature of assistance necessary in the quest for a consolidated democratic order:

First, there is a need to recognise the Nigerian elections only as a beginning of a long walk to freedom, a first step in the move towards a democratic order, and one, which is not irreversible. While this may seem trite, it requires recognition of the entrenched nature of military interests, the militarisation of the national psyche and the need to assist the new government and civil society in exorcising the damage of years of military rule. While the reform of the military is a wholly internal project, the international community should realise that military reform is a condition for improved civil-military relations. The holistic nature of security now requires a development assistance programme that treats security as a pre-requisite for development. Since military reform may result in downsizing, Nigeria’s civilian administration would need technical support for such activities as demobilisation and reintegration, rebuilding civilian authority for improved civil-military relations, developing the capacity of the police and civil defence agencies to enable the military concentrate on its primary duties of national defence. Immediate assistance is also needed to strengthen Nigeria’s capacity for regional security responsibilities, assessing objective national security needs and promoting greater transparency in the military budgeting process with greater civil society involvement in security and defence matters;

Second, a benchmark for national reconciliation and progress towards genuine democracy must address the increasing demands for equity and innovative federalism in Nigeria. It is a far easier option for the international community to avoid the clamour for a restructured federation under the pretext that this is an internal matter which should be left to Nigeria’s elected government. However, a more durable solution ought to promote a return to genuine federalism if the newly elected government is to have legitimacy in certain areas, particularly in those with a huge presence of transnational corporation involvement such as Nigeria’s Niger-Delta. The idea that an election can be the sole defining characteristics of Nigeria’s democratic future will be a misreading of the brittle fabric of this diverse nation, and an underestimation of her peoples’ growing desperation to resort to other means to resolve the crisis of nationhood. It is for this reason that a well-meaning international community must support the call by Nigerian civil society organisations for an inclusive national forum on a new constitution. The most immediate challenge to the new government is not just going to be about its legitimacy but its responses to the threats to the sustainability of the Nigerian State itself; only an unequivocal support for a genuine restructuring of the polity to deepen the democratic project beyond its current fragile state can enhance the legitimacy of the government.

Third, Nigeria’s dire political economy constitutes another major threat to current moves towards democracy. The international community should support civil society’s fight for a redefined partnership in Nigeria through the promotion of transparency and accountability in government. This need not be seen as a justification for the privatisation of the State since privatisation does not necessarily equate to an efficient and functioning State. The re-certification of Nigeria by the United States is certainly welcome since this would unblock multilateral assistance flow which the country has hitherto been deprived of. The European Union is also eager to resume development aid to Nigeria and this is also welcome news. Yet, to redress the past legacy of corruption and venality on the part of politicians, any assistance that is not linked to development of the ordinary people in a quantifiable manner should be discouraged. Nigeria’s debt burden should also come up for serious review in this context, but this should also be tied to critical performance by the government in its delivery of social services to its citizenry. Democracy will only be deepened and widened in Nigeria if it has a direct meaning to the toiling masses who have suffered years of abuse under the military. It is important to recognise that attempts to reify the market and retrench the State will ultimately affect the capacity of the government to improve the quality of life for the ordinary people, and this may not augur well for democracy and the stability that the world wants to see in the country;

Finally, an essential benchmark of democratic promotion is the strengthening of the civil society. The lesson of development assistance is that donor agencies often tilt towards elected governments emerging from prolonged authoritarian past to the detriment of non-state actors. If democracy is to endure in Nigeria, the international community would have to direct efforts towards democratic consolidation mainly through democracy advocacy groups, the media, labour unions, human rights groups, community based organisations, women’s organisations, independent research, advocacy, policy institutions and academic institutions working in the areas of democracy, development, social, human and economic rights.

Conclusion