Commentary on Cote D' Ivoire Elections:
The Politics of People's Power
  Abdel-Fatau Musah

The October 22^nd presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire went very much according to the script but threw up welcome surprises.  Having twisted the arm of the Supreme Court to disqualify the candidates of two of the three parties with mass following, General Robert Guei had ensured a two-horse race with the only credible candidate remaining – Laurent Gbagbo of the Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI).  Laurent Gbagbo could not have been too unhappy about the disqualifications either since, by eliminating his (Gbagbo’s) most formidable opponents from the race, the General had done the dirty work for him.  He stood to receive a windfall of Northern and protest votes.  The General, on the other hand, had hoped to inherit the vast constituency of the Parti Démocratique de La Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) in the absence of their official candidates.  After all, he has been a card-bearing PDCI party stalwart and an avowed admirer of its founder, the late Felix Houphouet Boigny (see briefing in the centre pages). 

What General Guei did not seem to take into consideration in his chicken-count was the response of the party faithful and the electorate of the North to the call by the disqualified Alassane Ouattara of the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) and Konan Bedie and Emile Bombet (PDCI) for a boycott.  Between them these parties control about two-thirds of the 5.5 million electorate.  If he did, then he had developed a back-up strategy: to lose the ballot but win the count.  He clearly gambled on two crucial issues: his tenuous control over the army and the reaction of civil society to his antics.  He lost on both counts.

In the event, 37% of the electorate turned out, out of whom 59% gave their vote to Gbagbo, according to the National Electoral Commission. However, the next day after the elections when he found out he was trailing badly, General Guei dissolved the electoral body and declared himself the winner.  This provoked mass protests after Gbagbo had called on his supporters to take to the streets.  The rank and file of the army refused to come to the aid of General Guei, who had led the 24^th December 1999 coup d’etat.  By the next day, the self-declared President-General had fled the country, leaving a political vacuum.  Gbagbo stepped in to fill it, provoking intra-civil society clashes between his supporters and those of the disqualified candidates.  When the dust had settled, 150 people lay dead and tension continued to hang over the country.

Current Situation: Gbagbo is a worthy leader, but major challenges remain.

Laurent Gbagbo has formed what he terms a National Unity Government, even though Ouattara’s RDR has shunned the power-sharing arrangement.  Of the 23-member cabinet, Gbagbo’s FPI has grabbed 18 portfolios.  The arduous task of national reconciliation and economic recovery begins here.

Nobody can deny the fact that, of the candidates paraded in the last elections including those disqualified, Laurent Gbagbo was the most worthy and the one who signified a paradigm shift in Ivorian politics.  All the other main candidates were linked to the old state party in one way or the other.  That General Guei did not ban the party he overthrew and that he touted Houphouet Boigny as his mentor and model owed more to his PDCI roots than any other consideration.  Konan Bedie and Emile Bombet presided over the economic downturn and ethnic polarisation that brought the country to the brink of civil war.  In the case of Alassane Ouattara of RDR, his position as the Western countries' choice candidate owed more to his position within the international financial system and his pro-democracy rhetoric than to his ability as a leader in times of crisis.  Furthermore, it was he who laid the foundations for xenophobia during his stint as Prime Minister under Houphouet Boigny.  He also masterminded the introduction of national ID cards and the freezing of workers’ salaries, policies that came back to haunt him under the neo-fascist reign of Konan Bedie. 

In contrast the veteran opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to be co-opted and over the past thirty years he was the only politician who could dare Houphouet Boigny, a deed tantamount to sacrilege in Boigny’s Côte d’Ivoire of personality cult politics.  That notwithstanding, the decision by Laurent Gbagbo to participate in the presidential elections was regrettable.  It was obvious from the outset that General Guei was using the transitional programme only as a façade for democratic legitimacy.  Consequently, a victory that would have been regarded as the crowning glory of Gbagbo’s long, principled and honourable struggle for democracy has lost some of its sparkle.  The legitimacy of his presidency can also be questioned for the manner in which the elections were conducted and for the fact that over 60% of the electorate stayed at home.

Desirable Next Steps

The decision by all parties to field candidates in the December legislative elections will restore some of the lost credibility to the transitional process, and should be welcomed.  It is now imperative that all the political parties intensify their efforts towards reconciliation and compromise.  ECOWAS and the international community should continue with their praiseworthy efforts to nudge the parties towards dialogue with the aim of diffusing residual tensions and finding a formula for democratic consolidation.  This is also the time for the International Community to help in resuscitating the ailing economy.  It should be borne in mind that poor service conditions and non-payment of salaries and allowances started the military mutiny that snowballed into the present crisis.  West Africa can ill-afford another civil war, more so in a country that hosts millions of the sub-region’s migrant workers.  Finally, given the precarious state of the Ivorian economy, it would be irresponsible on the part of political parties to call for immediate fresh presidential elections.  At the top of the list on the Ivorian crisis agenda should be:

·         The security situation

Everything possible should be done to ensure the immediate return of the army to the barracks and the strengthening of civilian democratic control over the military.  All non-state military formations, including the ousted General’s special militia, the Brigade Rouge, and the Dozo militia should be disbanded. Internal law and order should be maintained by the Gendarmerie backed by the judicial system.  To be fair, a large section of the 7,000 strong Ivorian army demonstrated a high sense of professionalism in the crisis that was sparked by General Guei.  Without the determination of large sections of the army to act as protectors of the nascent democratic process, it is inconceivable that the fledgling civil society could have turned the tables on the political section of the army led by Guei.  It is therefore necessary that the new political authorities and civil society in Côte d’Ivoire strengthen civil-military relations through a constructive programme of engagement.

·         The Liberian connection

There are credible reports to the effect that mercenaries linked to President Charles Taylor from the Gio ethnic group (Yakouba in Côte d’Ivoire, the ethnic group from which Guei hails), ‘volunteered’ in the personal militia of General Guei and that many were responsible for the death of several anti-Guei protestors.  That Côte d’Ivoire served as a springboard and arms transit route for Charles Taylor’s war in Liberia is beyond doubt.  An unfavourable change of political direction in Abidjan would definitely heighten Monrovia’s sense of isolation and Charles Taylor will try to evaluate the current situation, and in particular President Gbagbo, in the coming weeks.  If it is true that Liberian combatants were active in Côte d’Ivoire in the recent crisis, it will be important to arrest them as mercenaries with a view to investigating the veracity of the accusations against Charles Taylor.  Beyond that, this is the time to interrogate the causes of the disproportionate influence Charles Taylor exerts on the security of West Africa.  It is implausible to attribute this influence mainly to Taylor’s desire to amass other countries’ natural resources.  For example, why does Nigeria seem to have a special relationship with Taylor?  Since coming to power in May 1999, President Obasanjo has made no less than five flying visits to Monrovia.  Furthermore, nobody seems to know the exact position of France on Charles Taylor or for that matter, the conflicts he is masterminding in Sierra Leone and Guinea.  At the height of Sierra Leone’s civil war, the UK and France publicly showed a united front in seeking solutions to West African conflicts.  However, as recent events show, they seem to be slipping back to cold war policies of proxy politics and territoriality.  This is unfortunate.  It is inconceivable that Liberia would seek to destabilise her more powerful Ivorian neighbour if the authorities in Monrovia were not assured of support from powerful external forces.

·         Legitimising the transition

All political parties and civil society organisations need to revisit the Ivorian Constitution that General Guei bastardised through manipulation in his bid to legitimise his seizure of power. In particular, there should be a review of the contentious nationality clauses with a view to starting a national healing process.  The legitimacy of the Gbagbo administration can only be enhanced if all the political parties agree to a timetable for fresh presidential elections, possibly within the next two years.  In the mean time, it would be desirable for the FPI to broaden the base of the National Unity Government to reflect the diversity of Ivorian society.  Finally, this is not the time for parties to engage in the politics of boycott as practised by Ouattara.  Lauren Gbagbo did not mid-wife the current crisis.  If anything, the FPI led the fight against the junta from the front.  This is the time to present a united civil society front based on compromise and understanding.  Moreover, squabbles among the parties could paralyse the society and open the door to a new military intervention.

·         ECOWAS and the International Community

Throughout the Ivorian crisis, ECOWAS, OAU and sections of the International Community demonstrated a high sense of responsibility.  In a welcome departure from past practice, the International Community initiated a pro-active conflict-prevention programme aimed at pressuring General Guei to quit and extending solidarity and support to the Ivorian people.  This approach should be intensified and aimed at easing economic hardship within the country and ensuring the peaceful resolution of conflict among opposing parties.  

Conclusion

For further information on this and all other briefings, please contact the Research & Publications Department of CDD,  e-mail: cdd @ cdd.org.uk

                      Dr Abdel-Fatau Musah is CDD's Head of Research and Advocacy