Briefing on Nigeria's 2003 Elections

Please note that this document is not intended to be an in-depth analysis, but rather a comprehensive and concise guide to the salient issues in the upcoming elections

Why are Nigeria’s 2003 elections so important?

With a population of over 120 million and many expatriate communities across the globe, the largest economy in West Africa, and great political importance in the region, the African continent, and the global stage, events which affect the stability and future of Nigeria affect the entire world. Nigeria is also of global strategic importance as a major oil producer, supplying around 10% of the US market. In the recent past, Nigeria has been in the news mainly in the light of several sad incidents of ethnic and communal violence, and this has led to a perception of heightened tensions as we approach the 2003 elections. Elections, interrupted as they have been by periods of military dictatorship, have always contained potential for civil unrest, and so the good conduct of the forthcoming polls is a matter not only of international concern but also of symbolic importance for the citizens of Nigeria.

Like so many other African states, Nigeria is a colonial construction, uniting various previous national units and kingdoms. It is estimated that there are between 250-450 ethnic groups in the country. When Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the golden era of Africa’s liberation, it lacked much in the way of indigenous capital. As is typical for many African countries, access to the state thus became the only tool to acquire wealth, which in its turn was used to acquire social status. More importantly, wealth was transformed into political power, a prerequisite for which was also the continued federal grip on each separate part of the country. In this politics of allocation, it is therefore not surprising that electoral politics assumes a do-or-die posture as it is tied to the all important question of who gets access to the state as an avenue for wealth accumulation and conferment of status, and who is kept out of that privilege. Elections have typically been marred by distrust, apathy, and usually violence that have resulted in losses of lives and properties and ultimately increased the odds against the establishment/consolidation of democracy and a democratic ethos.

Nigeria’s domestic political scene has relatively recently shifted from authoritarian military regimes to a democratically elected one. However, the so-called ‘democratic dividend’ has hardly materialised in terms of any improvement in ordinary people’s living conditions, and the incumbent regime, although democratically elected, has lost a substantial degree of trust.

The history of democratic elections in Nigeria

The most free, fair and peacefully conducted elections in Nigeria were those in 1959, 1979, 1993 and 1999, and the most chaotic, violent and disputed were those in 1964 and 1983. The reason for this is that the first three were ‘transition’ elections, in which the regimes in power and responsible for organising the elections had to hand over power to a democratic civilian regime. So, in 1959 the British colonial regime wanted a smooth transfer of power to Nigerian self-government, in 1979 the military government of General Obasanjo viewed itself as an interim fixture to ensure stability and then hand over to elected officials, in 1993 a combination of internal and external pressure forced General Babangida to organise the elections and in 1999, after the disastrous rule of General Abacha, the military had no political credibility and wanted only to disengage as quickly as possible. In contrast, the other elections can be viewed as potential ‘consolidation’ elections, in which an elected civilian government was responsible for organizing elections to hand over power to a successor regime. The failure of these elections to consolidate democracy (each led in fact to disruption and eventually a return to military rule) was due to the reluctance of the incumbent regime to allow a level playing field, in case they lost their grip on power. The current PDP regime has devolved conduct of the 2003 elections to the Independent National Electoral Commission, although there is considerable debate as to whether this body is vulnerable to political pressure. It can be seen, then, that a second consecutive peaceful and successful election would be an important symbolic milestone in Nigeria’s history.

Politics, wealth and power

It is a problem common to many developing countries that traditional patterns of obligation – to close and extended family, to friends and to those from the same region – clash with the ethics of open, equal and transparent government. This is especially true when access to wealth is largely via access to the state. But the logic of privilege and patronage in Nigeria goes beyond this. Professor Richard Joseph calls the system ‘prebendalism’, in which state officials use their position as a kind of fiefdom by which to divert public wealth to their own enrichment or to maintain a network of clients. Politics then becomes a closed competition in which established ‘brokers’ vie for position and divide up potentially lucrative jobs between themselves.

Political parties in Nigeria

In order to stop the Federal government being dominated by one particular ethno-regional group to the detriment of others (which was one of the fears behind the coup which led eventually to the Biafra war of 1966, the constitutions of Nigeria right from the second republic stipulates that to win power a party must achieve a spread of majority votes across the different regions of the country. But this in turn leads to massive political parties which are less ideological policy-driven groups, and more coalitions of players – perhaps with one particular ethno-regional clique at the core – deemed likely to be able to deliver the vote in their home areas, either through their established public standing, or their ability to plentifully fund their campaigning. Such were the characteristics of the ruling NPN and others in Nigeria’s last period of democracy from 1979 to 1983, of the ‘a little to the left and right SDP and NRC of the third republic and also of today’s ANPP and ruling PDP. But these coexist with a range of small political groups and parties offering a radical ideological critique of Nigeria’s problems, as for example some of the new parties like Democratic Alternative, the Nigeria Conscience Party, Movement for Democracy & Justice, Peoples Redemption Party, and Party for Social Democracy.

Local rivalries and political violence

The process of political competition is replicated in miniature in all 36 states of the Nigerian federation, in battles over governorships and state assemblies, and even more locally, in competition over who dominates the councils administering the 774 Local Government Areas. Even at this level, political power means the ability to put friends and clients on the state payroll as council employees, thus ensuring them a secure salary, and the ability to preferentially divert development initiatives, such as new schools, to one’s own home community. Much of the vicious localised violence of the recent past, for instance the vicious small-scale war in Benue state in 2001 and in Warri, Delta State more recently have been largely driven by competition between ethnically-based factions over domination of Local Government Councils.

Party Politics and violence

The competition over position is intense at a national as well as local level, and some will use any method at hand to remove their rivals. Party primaries featured shoot-outs and attempted assassinations between different factions of the same party in order to win coveted nominations to run for office. In some states there are ongoing low-level factional wars over such issues. In others, the hostility is between parties, as when three were killed in ANPP/PDP clashes in Yobe on January 18th. A spate of killings of high-profile politicians and candidates culminated in the assassination in his home on March 5th of Marshall Harry, the ANPP National Vice Chairman for the South-South zone. He had become increasingly vocal about the unfair restrictions on campaigning in states dominated by other parties, and his death has caused such an outcry that it is to be hoped that it will act as a check on others seeking to use violence to get elected.

Nigeria’s contested nationhood

Throughout its history, the Nigerian nation has been in a tension between the centralising tendencies of the ‘state class’; those politicians, military men, bureaucrats and businesspeople who benefit from being players on a national stage, and on the other hand regional, ethnic and faith communities who feel stifled within the state and wish to keep as much autonomy as possible. Today this debate exists not just between Nigerian nationalists and ethnic nationalists, but also between the Federal administration and State governments. One of the most hotly contested issues is that of resource control, and the correct proportion of oil revenues to assign to the producing states, as against the Federal government. Most recently the Legislature and Supreme Court have debated whether coastal states should share in offshore oil revenues, and to what extent. Control over state agencies and budget allocation are also bones of contention.

The Federal system: constitutionalism and alternatives

As the military was departing the political scene in 1999, it hurriedly put together the 1999 Constitution. As at the time candidates were contesting for elective positions, no one had seen a copy of the constitution. The Constitution was promulgated into law a few days before the new civilian regime was sworn in. The 1999 Constitution has been criticized by both government officials and civil society alike for being an imposition by the military. Furthermore, the constitution is a bundle of contradictions and it is very unitary despite consensus among Nigerians that the best form of government for the country is a federal system. Civil society organizations led by the Citizens Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR) have been advocating for a process led and participatory approach to Constitution Making in Nigeria. Although the present regime initiated a process to review the constitution, the popular participation was not as the people had anticipated. In addition, the process has not been concluded. The reform of the Constitution will therefore be a major election issue.

Separatists and ethnic nationalism

Although ethnic-nationalism has generally stopped short of attempts at armed secession after the hugely destructive Biafra war of 1966-1970 (in which perhaps 1 million people died from violence, starvation and disease during the attempt to establish the Biafran Republic), there are currently a wide variety of groups voicing dissatisfaction with the way they are treated within the Nigerian state and pursuing various strategies to remedy this. The Niger Delta Republic Movement are one such; motivated by past violent oppression under the military dictatorship and in the first year of the current administration, by what they see as unfair appropriation of natural resources, they advocate a separation from the Nigerian state. The Egbesu movement in the Delta holds a similar position of complete disengagement, and resort to this strategy is often threatened by those – such as the Tiv Progressive Movement after the recent disturbances – who fail to find solution to their problems in the Nigerian state. More common are broader-based organizations which exist to extol and protect the cultural heritage of a particular ethnic group or area such as Ohanaeze Ndigbo for the Igbo in the South-East. Afenifere, a Yoruba organisation in the South-West, mixes this cultural assertiveness with political discussion of issues such as regional autonomy and local resource control. And there are a range of groups whose agendas overlap with these but are pursued in a more vociferous way, such as the Odua People’s Congress, which has itself split between the factions led by Dr. Frederick Faseun and a breakaway more militant faction led by Gani Adams. The Arewa People’s Congress and its malcontents campaigning under the banner of ‘one North’ mirror this in the Northern region.

Militias and vigilantes

Youth wings of political movements have on occasion been involved in violent civil disturbance, as on the streets of Lagos in 1999. This points us towards the activism and vulnerability to manipulation of youth generally. Care must be taken not to understand ‘youth’ as meaning teenagers. While it certainly includes these, it also refers in the West African context to men and women without families of their own, those who are still dependent on the resources or favour of others, and as such can refer even to those in their thirties. Such youth, in search of a role and employment, can be either protectors or disruptors of the social order. Sometimes this depends on where you stand, as with the Ijaw youth who see themselves as protecting their communities, fighting against oil companies and Federal domination using both violent and non-violent means, whilst to others they are disruptors of social and economic life. There is similar debate over the helpfulness of the self-appointed ‘Shari’a enforcers’ who patrol the streets of Northern cities, punishing petty crime and breaches of public morality. In the South-East, in cities such as Onitsha, the wave of crime affecting traders and citizens was responded to in a similar way, by the formation of a vigilante militia known as the Bakassi Boys. It has shown success in controlling crime in cooperation with police, but concerns are now being raised at its often violent methods and its closeness to the political leadership of Abia and Anambra states. In some areas of the country even quite minor local politicians have personally loyal youth followings which have been implicated in disruption, intimidation and arson attacks.

The politics of religion & Shari’a law

The first term of the Obasanjo administration has been marred by the outbreak of periods of rioting and civic strife over religious issues, which have been of major concern in the country and internationally. Some estimate a death toll as high as 10,000 in such incidents over the past four years – though this is unconfirmed. Violence between Muslim and Christian communities is nothing new in Nigeria, although there is also a less reported story of long and peaceful coexistence. Due to the repressive nature of military regimes, such religious tensions have tended to boil over when Nigeria is in a period of democracy, with freedom of speech opening the way to public debate over contentious issues. The Constituent Assembly of 1978 which began Nigeria’s last period of democratic rule was marked by a debate over the possibility of a national Shari’a Court of Appeal to stand alongside the civil courts. There are multiple reasons for the prominence of religion in politics: Religious allegiances can mean international support, such as the Babangida regime hoped it would gain from the Middle East by joining the Organisation of Islamic Conference. And electoral politics also motivates unscrupulous politicians to play the religious card for votes. The institutionalisation of Shari’a law in 11 of Nigeria’s northern states, begun in Zamfara by Governor Sani, might be seen as a cynical ploy to seem to be representing the interests of Muslims, with the ulterior motive of bolstering individuals’ local power-bases in the face of a loss of power at a national level. But this would not be the full story; the reasons why Shari’a has been so popular in the areas where it has been introduced include the devout beliefs of many citizens, their perception of God’s law as a way to rectify the morally corrupt state of the nation, and the embracing of a hard-line system of corporal and capital hudud (punishment) in reaction to the rocketing crime rate. Shari’a is also an emotive matter of Islamic identity, and so when it introduced into the political world it is very difficult for even a Muslim politician to oppose it, for fear of seeming anti-Islamic and therefore unelectable in the North of the country. Religious violence is not just Islamic; militant groups in some areas of the country speak the language of Christian fundamentalism.

And there are two important things to bear in mind: Religion can be more the excuse than the root cause for violence, as the Miss World Riots in Kaduna illustrate. Violence against Christians was also violence directed at outsiders, including southerners, and members of minority groups from central Nigeria, who are perceived as increasingly encroaching upon economic life and local government structures in the important Northern city. A more sinister interpretation is that such events are part of a deliberate campaign by powerful figures to discredit the Obasanjo government as being unable to manage Nigeria’s religious tensions. Whatever the motivation, there is evidence that youths were paid to initiate rioting and destruction in the city.

The other important thing to bear in mind is the very large contribution made by leaders of both religions to resolving such tragedies: Imams and priests are engaged in interfaith dialogues, and as leaders of civil society, in cooling tempers on both sides in many cities.

Ethnic-regional tensions and power-sharing

Since even before independence, Nigerian politics have been characterized by the jostling of three large and two small ethnic-regional blocs. Though often over-simplified, it is true to say that the political elite of the Northern region is based around a Muslim, Hausa-Fulani identity built on established pre-colonial Emirate states, and that through the large numbers of its members in the Armed forces, this establishment has often dominated political life. The Yoruba Western region, while home to many businesspeople, professionals and civil servants, is religiously mixed and at times deeply divided between its various cities, in the past the capitals of warring states. And the Igbo-populated Eastern region has thriving commercial hubs but has often expressed a feeling of exclusion from power at the central level, currently expressed by the gathering campaign for an Igbo president.

Between these three politicised ethno-regional identities sit sizeable numbers of smaller groups – of mixed Muslim, Christian and Animist heritage in the central ‘Middle-Belt’, and numbers of small kingdoms and communities in the Niger Delta. Middle-Belt cities such as Jos have been the site of ethnic-religious riots in the recent past, which should not be seen solely as the manifestation of the North-South divide, but also of the area’s own specific problems. The communities of the Niger delta have grown more assertive in demands for an equal share of national wealth, given their position on top of the oil deposits which supply it. To manage tensions, ethnic quotas have been introduced governing recruitment and promotion in state service.

In electoral politics, the desire for access to national power and wealth by the elites of each bloc, and the fear of rule by a national government dominated by another group, has led to a kind of unofficial ‘consociationalism’, whereby a candidate from one major group will choose a running-mate from another, and a party chairman from the third, with minorities playing for a stake as a kind of floating constituency. Thus the PDP is led by Obasanjo from the South-West with Atiku Abubakar, a Northerner, as running-mate. The ANPP has chosen former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari as presidential candidate representing the conservative Northern interest, coupled with Chuba Okadigbo from the South-East to allay that region’s fears of exclusion.

The army in politics

The Army has had a chequered career in public life. From being hailed (outside the Eastern region) as the saviours of the Federation in the Biafra war, it moved to a situation where, after relinquishing its long tenure of power, it could step back in after the chaos of 1983’s elections and claim with some credibility to be rescuing the management of the nation from corrupt, incompetent and ethnically partisan civilians; a kind of national unity or caretaker government. But the rewards of incumbency led the officer corps to become too fond of power to contemplate giving it up easily, as was seen from General Babangida’s endlessly deferred transition to democracy. After Babangida’s annulment of the 1993 election, his second-in-command General Sani Abacha pushed aside the appointed transition government and began to loot the national wealth at gunpoint with comparatively little effort to disguise the process. Incidents such as the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 and revelations about the scale of Abacha’s looting after his death seem to have discredited the military. However, because of their long access to State resources, retired military officers continue to have prominence in the political scene, as can be gleaned from the number of ex-military aspirants in the 2003 elections. President Obasanjo’s main rival is another ex-Military Head of State, Muhammadu Buhari, who took power in a coup in 1983 and was deposed by another in 1985. But the Army is still politically relevant in other ways: it is used as a tool of internal repression, as shown by brutal reprisals for attacks on military personnel in Odi in 1999 and Katsina-Ala in 2001. Even as it remains the most national in outlook and orientation, it is to an extent divided by ethnic rivalries and sympathies: during the communal violence in Benue and Taraba states in 2001, there were reports of the partisan involvement of some locally-stationed Army units. Some retired generals and other officers have come to assume prominence as non-elected politicians and spokesmen for their ethnic communities, and questions have been raised as to the roles of some of these in linking militant ethnic movements with those who have supplied arms and training.

The fight for democracy in Nigeria

The extensive Afrobarometer survey of public attitudes across Nigeria shows the ups and downs of last few years reflected in public attitudes. The great majority of those questioned still valued the democratic system in itself, and preferred it to any other form of government, but at the same time expressed reservations about its current performance. But the right to live under this system has been hard-won. The military governments of the 1990s were opposed by a broad front of civil-society groups, media organs, students and activists who worked both within and outside Nigeria to open up public space for opposition and debate. The true state of affairs became apparent when Babangida annulled the results of the 12 June 1993 election due to the surprise win of M.K.O. Abiola, who was later jailed and subsequently died in detention. Under the authoritarian Abacha government activists became more vocal as their work became more dangerous, and some paid with their lives. The tradition of civil society activism, as the ‘eternal vigilance’, which safeguards civic freedoms, has become more, not less, necessary in the return to democratic rule. Human rights lawyers, environmental groups, the media, political activists and religious leaders and others continue to hold the government and politicians to account for their past and present failings.

Human Rights and the Oputa Panel

In June 1999, soon after assuming office, President Obasanjo established the Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission, otherwise known as the ‘Oputa Panel’. It had the major task of re-examining past cases of human rights violations, with a view to possibly effecting reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. Never in the history of Nigeria has any public commission or inquiry received the kind of enthusiasm that greeted the establishment of this Commission. Many Nigerians hoped then, and still hope now, that the exercise will bring succour to survivors and engender a broad process of healing and reconciliation, which in any event is vital to the health of the Country. The Commission faced several challenges; first in defining what constituted gross violations of Human Rights as indicated in the constituting document, then the co-ordination of series of public hearings during which crimes such as rape, arson and extra-judicial murder were revealed; and then in dealing with the ‘powers that be’ personified by indicted retired Army generals who refused to appear before commission.

On 28 May 2002, the full seven-volume report was submitted to the President. A committee headed by Elizabeth Pam, one of the commissioners, was set up to implement recommendations. More than 10 months afterwards, the report is yet to be officially released, even though the President had given his word that the Oputa report would not go the way of past reports – read by an inner circle, analysed for political gains or damage and then discarded. Perceptions are that the need of the incumbent regime to negotiate its way to a second term with the very same persons indicted in the report, may mean the suspension of the Oputa report until a time when it may be utilized as a suitable political pawn.

Human rights in democratic Nigeria

The curtailment of the movements of pro-democracy activists, a common occurrence during the military era, has reared its head again recently. Activists who since May 1999 had traversed Nigeria’s borders without any harassment suddenly found their names re-inserted into the security lists. Not less than three democracy activists had their passport seized at Nigeria’s International Airports in November and December 2002.

A freedom of information bill concerned with access to vital government information which has been before the national assembly since 1999 is yet to be signed into law.

A National Policy on Women was adopted in July 2000, providing for equal rights and representation for women and men. Given the patriarchal nature of Nigerian society and prevailing attitudes and practices, implementation of this Policy remains a huge challenge. The struggle to have domestic violence recognized as an issue for public concern is still far from won, though there are openings. A Bill on Violence Against Women (originated from civil society) is presently before the House of Representatives, which has passed a Bill against trafficking in women and children. In spite of the existence of this law, traffickers of women are rarely apprehended and successfully prosecuted. The gains from the trade provide a strong incentive for traffickers who bribe and subvert weak law enforcement and immigration officers while taking advantage of Nigeria’s porous borders.

In July 2002 for three weeks, women from Ugborodo (also known as Escravos) community in Nigeria’s Niger delta, occupied Chevron Texaco’s gas tank farm in Escravos. The women were demanding rehabilitation and reclamation of their community’s land, employment for their children and welfare schemes for the aged. The protesters called off the siege on Thursday 18th July after some promises were extracted from the Chevron/Texaco management. This led to a ripple effect, which saw women from an Ijaw community in Ondo state, and Abiteye flow station in Delta state, also occupying flow stations. In Warri, joint action by Itsekiri, Ijaw and Ilaje women ended with police brutally assaulting the women. Other instances of police and Military brutality were the incidents of Odi and Choba in 1999, and Zaki-Biam in Benue state in 2002, where many women were raped, killed and traumatized.

A bill sent to the National Assembly on the rights of the child was turned down on the basis that some of the issues raised were taken care of by existing laws. There is a strong belief in certain quarters that the real basis for this action is the fear that certain provisions of the Bill might offend socio-cultural practices in some parts of Nigeria. CSOs in collaboration with the Women’s Ministry and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) are engaged in advocacy towards convincing the legislature to reconsider its stance. The Bill has very recently been reintroduced. It is also noteworthy that Bauchi, Zamfara and Kebbi States in the North Western zone have enacted laws against hawking by girls under the age of 18. This is an important legal measure, which needs to be supported by initiatives to engender attitudinal change.

The Judiciary

The assassination of Justice Minister Bola Ige last year may seem to point in a dramatic way to the weakness of the rule of law, but there are also several reasons to consider the robustness of the judiciary. The Supreme Court has made significant rulings over constitutional issues such as the registration of political parties, resource and revenue allocation, and the extension of terms of elected officials, in which it has overruled decisions by legislators and the Independent National Electoral Commission. Several Judges have also been sacked for misconduct following extensive investigations.

The role of the media

The media, as the most visible manifestation of civil society took the brunt of repression during the military dictatorship. Journalists, editors and funders of outspoken magazines and newspapers lived in fear of their lives, Copies were regularly seized and offices attacked, leading to the phenomenon of ‘guerrilla journalism’, in which secret production offices moved every week and journalists exchanged copy in the cover of bus-stop crowds. Dele Giwa, founding editor of Newswatch, was the highest-profile victim of this period, due to his death by a letter–bomb allegedly sent by agents of the state. Nigeria’s press culture is now free and extremely vibrant, but free speech issues remain problematic in a country which includes many different cultures and moral standards. This became clear at the time of the Miss World contest after Isioma Daniel of This Day made comments interpreted as offensive by some Muslims, which led to riots in Kaduna and the pronouncement of a fatwa (since retracted) by the Zamfara State deputy-governor. Partisan reporting by more sensationalist publications has also been blamed for inflaming political and religious tensions at other times.

Rich and poor

The annual per capita average GNP of $260 masks a huge gap between rural peasants and urban underclasses on one hand, and the wealthy internationally-oriented elite on the other. It is also less – by $120 a year – than Nigeria’s resource-poor neighbour Benin. Although Nigeria has thriving small businessmen and women, economic power and opportunity is overwhelmingly in the hands of those with access to state revenues and influence, including serving and retired civil servants and ex-military personnel. Avenues taken to wealth by such persons are sometimes within the law, and sometimes not, a fact reflected in Transparency International’s rating of Nigeria as one of the planet’s six most corrupt countries. Inequality in landholding is also on the increase, with large-scale commercial farmers expanding at the expense of smallholders in traditional tenure arrangements. This is despite, or perhaps because of, the Land Use Decree established in the 1970s, which vested control of all land in the State, thus replacing the feudal control of traditional rulers with the partisan decisions of state officials.

The centrality of oil to the whole nation is reflected in the long-running historical debates over formulas for revenue allocation between the Federal Government, the oil-producing areas, and Nigeria’s other states. The latest chapter in the slow resolution of this debate has been over whether coastal states should be given a share of offshore discoveries, in which at present the Federal Government is the winner.

The environment

As Nigeria covers a variety of ecological zones, from arid Sahel in the north to tropical forest in the south and mangrove swamps in the delta, it has a full range of environmental problems. The vulnerability of the Sahel zone to drought was highlighted in the 1980s and steps to insure against this by irrigating with the waters of Lake Chad have led to issues at an international level with Nigeria’s northern neighbours. Land degradation is not only a problem due to desertification in the north, but also because of decline in soil quality in other areas, due to the intensification of farming, and the decline of shifting cultivation and fallow practices due to commercial incentives and pressure on land. This, combined with the decline in international terms of trade for agricultural products, and the neglect of the sector in the oil-dominated economy, has meant a constant decline in agricultural production, which has not been prevented by experimentation with Asian-style ‘green revolution’ techniques. Population pressure, habitat loss (5% of forests annually through the 1980s) and environmental pollution have all led to losses in bio-diversity: 926 of Nigeria’s 6,583 native species of plants and animals are threatened or endangered. And urban environments also suffer, from water and air pollution, human and industrial effluents. But the main environmental issue in Nigeria is the oil industry.

Oil and ecosystems in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta in Nigeria is one of the few major deltas in the world, and the largest in Africa. It has a vast area covering over 30,000 square kilometres and approximately 3 percent of the total land area of Nigeria. It is larger than the famous Nile Delta of Egypt, accounting for 77.4 percent of Nigeria’s wetlands. From 1956 to 2000, about $30 trillion worth of oil has been produced from the Niger Delta (calculated on the average of $20 per barrel). The Niger Delta has a very fragile ecosystem and is one of the most polluted and neglected areas in Nigeria, even at the same time as it is home to a dense population of people relying on the forests, land and water for their survival. Successive regimes in Nigeria have contributed to the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta, and there are many problematic issues in the development of the region. These include environmental degradation/pollution, resource allocation and distribution, widespread poverty, climatic change, gas flaring, corruption, environmental laws, lack of infrastructure and social services. There is no doubt that the way the various political parties intend to address the Niger Delta question will be a central issue in the 2003 elections.

Health and human development

Nigeria’s vast oil wealth sits uncomfortably alongside its ranking as 148th in the UNDP’s Human Development Index, based on life expectancy, educational opportunities and income growth. Dangers come from socially-related causes such as lack of access to clean water or inadequate nutrition, as well as older established diseases such as malaria. The AIDS epidemic has not taken root in West Africa as it has in the South of the continent, due in part to good fortune and in part to sensible policies, but Nigeria’s role as a leading regional peacekeeper points to one vector for possible infection and spread of the disease through soldiers deployed abroad. The Government has taken some measures on adolescent health by approving the National Curriculum on Sexuality Education, and in the form of National Policies on Reproductive Health, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS. Prominent figures in Nigerian society, such as Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka and the musician Femi Anikulapo-Kuti, are fronting popular media campaigns on HIV/AIDS awareness and the government agency – National Committee Against Aids (NACAP) is growing in its influence on policy making.

Current domestic issues in Nigeria

As well as the world of political intrigue and deal-making, Nigeria’s voters, like voters all over the world, want to see their politicians deal with the pressing issues of everyday life. Foremost among these is crime, which is increasing nationally, helped by wealth disparity and aided by the ready availability of light weapons in the West African sub-region. Highway robbery and large-scale gang burglaries are the most notable manifestations, and are often alleged to take place with police collusion. Corruption and mal-administration are recurring concerns, as highlighted by the meaningless waste of life in the explosion at the Ikeja barracks last year, which happened despite long-standing (but delayed) plans to relocate the ammunition dump. Some state agencies have been praised from all quarters; for instance the Food and Drug Administration under Dora Akunyili, which has made great progress in combating fake pharmaceuticals. Other agencies show mixed signs; the fight fire-with-fire approach of the police may be welcome in combating armed robbers, but is less laudable when applied to unarmed protestors. And police corruption, while addressed at the top, is still endemic at the lower level. The performance of the economy in the aftermath of structural adjustment is of concern, as is the progress of privatisation and the slow improvements to service-users. The state of the nation’s infrastructure is another much discussed issue: government at both the state and federal level is under much pressure to make discernable improvements. Notable advances have been made in telecoms provision, possibly due to the involvement of the private sector, and NEPA, the state-run power authority, has improved the regularity of its supply. But this picture is counterbalanced by the state of roads: not only is the buck passed between state and federal governments, but accusations have been made that budget allocations for road improvement have been redirected to re-election campaigns.

Current issues in Nigeria’s foreign affairs

Nigeria continues to be a leader in the region and the continent, by virtue not only of its size and economic weight, but also by its traditionally active foreign involvements. In addition to its increasing economic role in the ECOWAS regional organization, Nigeria has been involved in leading ECOWAS’ peacekeeping role since the Liberian crisis of the early 1990s, and is currently occupied with the search for a peace settlement in Côte d’Ivoire. President Obasanjo has also held a central role in creating and steering the NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee. His relationship with the West has been ambiguous and less popular within the country. Of late, his publicly stated opposition to the war in Iraq and attempts to rally Africa behind the UN in resolving the impasse has increased his popularity in Nigeria, as well as the entire continent. Globally, Nigeria’s importance as an oil supplier increases, with increased consumption especially from the US, and in the face of likely disruption to Middle Eastern supplies. African oil is now looked upon in Washington as the answer to reliance upon supplies from the Persian Gulf and Venezuela, and the US government has been putting pressure on the Nigerian state to quit OPEC, the oil producing cartel. This increasing reliance brings issues of the unwillingness of consumers like the US to voice their objections to possible future human rights abuses or undemocratic actions. Nigeria’s global diaspora is becoming more important, both for its positive achievements, and for the negative security and crime connotations of illegal migrants and organised gangs trafficking drugs and human beings. Closer to home the long-running dispute with neighbouring Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula is no closer to resolution following Nigeria’s rejection of the decision of international arbitrators.

APPENDIX: Representative incidents of violent conflict in Nigeria

S/N	Date	Place	Nature of Crisis	Casualties
1	May 15, 1999	Niger Delta	Struggle for Local Government Headquarter	200 dead
2	July 18, 1999	Shagamu	Clashes between Hausa and Yoruba over traditional rites	60
3	July 22, 1999	Kano	Clashes between Hausa and Yoruba a retaliation to Shagamu conflict	70
4	Aug. 5, 1999	Niger Delta	Clashes between Ijaw & Ilaje over oil rich land	N/A
5	Aug 11, 1999	Taraba	Conflicts between Kutebs and Chambas (causes unknown)	200
6	Sep. 9 1999	Lagos	The Yoruba separatist and the Odua People Congress	16
7	Oct 4, 1999	Niger- Delta	Fight over the control of land near Nigeria’s biggest oil Refinery at Port Harcourt between Okrikas & Elemes	30
8	Nov 21, 1999	Niger Delta	Ijaw Youth accused to have killed 12 Policemen	60 Civilians and 12 Policemen killed.
9	Nov 25, 1999	Lagos	Riot between Yoruba and Hausa over the control of a market in Lagos.	100
10	Feb 21, 2000	Kaduna	Fight between Muslim and Christians.	100
11	May 20, 2000	Kaduna	As Above	150
12	May 27, 2000	Niger Delta	Crisis between the Urhobo and Itsekiri near the oil rich town of Warri	N/A
13	June 21, 2000	Kano	Proclamation of Shari’a Laws adoption	N/A
14	June 25, 2000	Nasarawa	Fight between Tiv and Hausa speaking ethnic group	N/A
15	Oct 15, 2000	-	Four days fight between OPC Muslim of Hausa Fulani	100 Check Newspaper
16	Oct 18, 2000	Lagos	Three days fight between OPC and Muslim Hausa Fulani	100
17	Nov 26, 2000	Kano	Implementation of Sharia Laws	-
18	Sep 7, 2001	Jos	Conflicts between Muslims and Christians	165 dead, 900 injured
19	Oct 12 & 23, 2001	Benue state	Communal fights between the Tiv and the Military intervention	19 Soldiers killed and 200 Civilians killed
20	25 Oct 2001	Niger Delta	Clash between Itsekiri and Uhrobo	5 Killed
21	Nov 2001	Kaduna State	Relocation of Sanga Local Government Headquarter	10 People Killed
22	Feb 2002	Lagos State	Bloody clashes in Lagos between Hausas and Yorubas.	100 people killed (See BBC Timeline: Nigeria A chronology of key events)
23	May 4, 2002	Plateau State	Political parties crisis	See Punch newspaper of May 4, 2002 p.4
24	Nov 2002	Kaduna State	Four days of rioting in Kaduna relating to Muslim fury over Miss World beauty pageant, triggered by newspaper article.	More than 200 people killed (See BBC Timeline: Nigeria A chronology of key events)

List of Political Parties Competing in April 2003

22 parties registered by INEC on 3 December 2002 (parties in bold are the 6 previously registered parties):

1. Alliance for Democracy (AD) Alh. Ahmed Abdulkadir, Chairman

2. All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) [previously All People’s Party (APP)] Alh. Attahiru D. Bafarawa - Chairman

3. All Peoples Liberation Party (APLP) Alhaji Umar Mohammed, Chairman

4. All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) Alhaji Said Abdullahi

5. Better Nigeria Progressive Party (BNPP) Mr. Nwachukwu Chukundi

6. Community Party of Nigeria (CPN) Alhaji Musa Bukar Sani

7. Democratic Alternative (DA) Mr. Bamidele Aturu; Dr. Abayomi Ferreira, President

8. Green Party of Nigeria (GPN) Mr. Olisa Agbakoba (SAN), Chairman

9. Justice Party (JP) Chief Ralph Obioha, Rev Kris Okotie, Flagbearer.

10. Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria (LDPN) Mr. U.T. Turaki

11. Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN) Major Isola Adekunle Obasanjo (rtd), National Founder

12. Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ) led by former Inspector General of Police Alhaji Mohammed Dikko Yusufu, and Alhaji Kalli Algazali

13. National Action Council (NAC) Dr. Olapade Ogoro

14. National Conscience Party (NCP) led by Lagos lawyer, Chief Gani Fawehinmi

15. National Democratic Party (NDP) Mr. Kenny Martins, Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu

16. National Mass Movement of Nigeria (NMMN) Alh. (Dr) Zanna Bukar Mandara, Chairman

17. National Reformation Party (NRP) Mr. Ken Enahoro Chief Anthony Enahoro, Chairman

18. New Democrats (ND) Professor Isa Odidi, Chairman (www.ndnigeria.com/)

19. New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) Dr. B.O. Aniebonam - Chairman

20. Nigeria Advance Party (NAP) Dr. Tunji Braithwaite, founder and Chairman

21. Nigerian Peoples Congress (NPC) Alhaji M.I. Attah, Chairman

22. Party for Social Democracy (PSD) Comrade Sylvester Ejiofor, Chairman

23. Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Olusegun Obasanjo; Chief Audu Ogbe, Chairman

24. Peoples Mandate Party (PMP) Chief Arthur Nwankwo, party leader

25. Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) Alhaji Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa, Chairman

26. Peoples Salvation Party (PSP) Alh. Lawal Maiturare, President General

27. Progressive Action Congress (PAC) Chief A. C. Nwodo

28. United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) Mal. Saleh Jambo, Chairman, Dr. Ukeje Nwokeforo, Secretary

Plus two parties registered on 17 December 2002:

29. African Renaissance Party (ARP)

30. United Democratic Party (UDP)

Table 2: A profile of Governments since independence; political, military and economic changes

Dates	Type	Main Protagonists	Salient Military, Political and Economic shifts
Oct ’60 – Jan. ’66	Elected, civilian with strong regional bias	Prime Minister Balewa, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (Premier of the North), Chief Awolowo (Premier of the West), Dr Okpara ((Premier of the East), President Azikiwe	First post-independence government led by an alliance of the Northern Peoples’ Congress; small military (10,000) Colonial in orientation, but professional in character, drawn into internal security by rising political tension, especially in the Western and North-Central region; Economy largely agrarian.
Jan – July ’66	Military junta after first coup	General A. Ironsi	Period of high political tension arising from the assassination of prominent political leaders – especially in the north; Destruction of the military espirit de corps and professionalism.
Jul ’66 – Jul ’75	Collegial Military junta, weak at inception, but strengthened by civil war victory.	General Gowon and members of the Supreme Military Council	Broad-based support of all armed forces for military junta in spite of earlier problems, gained legitimacy in the aftermath of civil war; largely ignored restructuring of the post war military institution.
July ’75 – Sept ’79	Military junta	Generals Mohammed, Obasanjo, Yar'Adua, Danjuma, and middle-level officers who overthrew previous junta	As above, but with more credibility and more emphasis on professionalism and political change.
Oct ’79 – Dec ’83	Elected civil rule under 1979 constitution	President Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria; multiparty political structure, presidential style of government	Limited control of the military; creation of alternative base in police force as well as patronage to ensure loyalty to government.
Dec ’83 – Aug ’85	Popular military junta	Generals Buhari, Idiagbon	Professional-political prerogative; nationalist and authoritarian regime with a largely inward looking agenda.
Aug ’85 – Aug ’93	Transition from junta to personalised dictatorship in a palace coup	General Babangida was the main player with 'bit parts' to close civilians and military 'politicians'	Co-optation of the military in the ruler's personal project via patronage and deft political manoeuvrings, Structural adjustment and preference for capital.
Aug ’93 – Nov ’93	Interim government representing an interregnum after the annulled elections and exit of Babangida	Chief E. Shonekan, Head of Interim Government, and General Abacha, Defence Minister	Clear military control of a government that lacked legitimacy and popular support in a period of high political tension.
Nov ’93 – June ’98	Full-blown military dictatorship	General Abacha	Undermined military professionalism, increased use of intelligence and security outfits, especially death squads, against political and military opponents.
June ’98 – May ’99	Military dictatorship with a human face - under pressure to reform politically and exit gracefully	General Abdulsalami Abubakar	Focus on political transition and preparation for withdrawal from government.
May ’99 – ?	Elected civilian government	General Obasanjo civilian government with a non-ideological, centrist notion of politics but weak party structure and a militarily imposed constitution	Authoritarian residues, rather than democratic control of security structures; commitment to military professionalism but increasing privatisation of security in the wake of organised crime, ethnic and religious disaffection and economic challenges.

Source: Fayemi, J.K. 2001. Entrenched Militarism and the Future of Democratic Transition in Nigeria. In: Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (eds.) Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy. London: Zed Books.

Useful web resources

Afrobarometer survey on Public Attitudes. www.afrobarometer.org

Official Nigerian Government website: www.nopa.net

All Africa news service: www.allafrica.com

BBC World online: www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice

This Day (Nigerian newspaper) online version: www.thisdayonline.com

The Guardian (Nigeria) online: www.ngrguardiannews.com

Citizens Forum for Constitutional Reform: www.cdd.org.uk/cfcr

Map resources on the Web:

Detailed map of Nigeria and its State borders.

http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/CIA_Maps/Nigeria_19877.gif

Geographical map of Nigeria

www.allafricatravel.com/images/atlas/nigeria.htm

Maps showing details of Nigeria’s constituent States.

http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Maps/Nigeria_States.html

http://www.ngex.com/nigeria/places/default.htm

For a more extensive appreciation of the Nigerian conundrum, readers are urged to read:

Adejumobi, S. & Momoh, A. (eds.) 2002. The National Question in Nigeria: Comparative Perspectives. Burlington, VT; Aldershot: Ashgate.

Achebe, C. 1982. The Trouble with Nigeria. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

Diamond, L.; Kirk-Greene, A. & Oyediran, O. (eds.) 1997. Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida. Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner.

Ihonvbere, J. & Shaw, T. 1998. Illusions of Power: Nigeria in Transition. Trenton, NJ; Asmara: Africa World Press.

Ihonvbere, J.O. & Shaw, T. 1988. Towards a Political Economy of Nigeria: Petroleum and Politics at the (Semi) Periphery. Avebury, Aldershot.

International IDEA, 2001 Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building. Stockholm & Lagos: International IDEA.

Joseph, R.A. 1987. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge University Press, New York; Cambridge. (republished for the Nigerian market by Heinemann Educational Books, Ibadan).

Lewis, P.M., Robinson, P.T., and Barnett, R.R. 1998. Stabilizing Nigeria: Sanctions, Incentives, and Support for Civil Society. New York: The Council on Foreign Relations.

Maier, K. 2002. This House has Fallen: Crisis in Nigeria. Penguin Books.

Okonta, I. & Douglas, O. 2001. Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta. Random House.

Omotosho, K. 1988. Just Before Dawn. Saros International Publishers; Safari Books.

Osaghae, E. 1998. Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence. London: Hurst & Co.

Paden, J.N. 1986. Ahmadu Bello, An Autobiography. Hodder & Stoughton Educational.

Soyinka, W. 1996. The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Contact

The Centre for Democracy and Development specialises in research, analysis and advocacy on security, governance and development issues in the West African sub-region. We are happy to respond to enquiries, provide comment, analysis and media interviews when possible from our own extensive expertise, and when this is not possible, to redirect questions to a more suitable source. An independent CDD team will be monitoring the elections in six selected states across the country which we have been engaged in monitoring for the last four years.

This briefing paper was prepared by Olly Owen with Morten Hagen, Otive Igbuzor and Amina Salihu.

For further information on the Nigeria elections 2003 please contact us as listed below:

CDD in London:

Dapo Oyewole, doyewole@cdd.org.uk, Tel: +44 (0)20 7359 7775
Morten Hagen, mhagen@cdd.org.uk, mobile: +44 (0)7905 139 415
Olly Owen, oowen@cdd.org.uk

CDD in Lagos:

Otive Igbuzor igbuzor@cddnig.org, Tel: +234 (0)1 493 4420 / 473 0705 mobile: +234 (0)802 303 9797

CDD in Abuja:

Amina Salihu, asalihu@cddnig.org, Tel: +234 (0)9 4130729 mobile: +234 (0)80 330 56245
Michael Utsaha, michaelutsaha@yahoo.com

BRIEFING ON NIGERIA’S 2003 ELECTIONS

Contents

Current issues in Nigeria’s foreign affairs