Private Military Intervention & Arms Proliferation in Conflicts in Africa:

Causes, Consequences & Responses

Workshop Report

Monrovia, Liberia, 28-29 July 2000

 THE ORGANISERS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Credit for the success of the methodological/planning workshop - Private Military Companies & Arms Proliferation in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Responses - and the production of this report goes to several individuals and organisations.  So many factors combined to make the workshop a memorable occasion.  Who could forget the moving accounts of the young war victims from Liberia and Sierra Leone, whose bitter experiences had matured them beyond their tender ages? Or the informed and rich contributions of human rights and security experts from NGOs and research institutions from Africa and beyond? To them, we say that we very much appreciate your contributions.  In line with their policy of engaging both the state and society in constructive dialogue, the organisers extended invitations to Liberian government representatives.  We are grateful that they graciously took up the offer and actively engaged in the deliberations.  That no participant came to harm despite the precarious security environment is cause for gratitude. Travelling around West Africa can be a nightmarish experience. We are therefore most grateful to the efficient manner in which Eddie Dunn and his travel agency, BiSIT Services, handled the flight arrangements for many of the delegates between London, Abidjan and Monrovia.

Ultimately, however, the responsibility for the success or failure of the workshop lay squarely with the four convenors - CDD, CEDE, AFSTRAG and CGG.  As host organisation for the workshop, colleagues at CEDE left no stone unturned in their efforts to ensure that logistical and other organisational needs were in place and that the scores of participants from across Africa and Europe felt as much as possible at home in Liberia, despite the very difficult political and economic conditions at home.  To this end, it is appropriate to applaud the contributions of CEDE Executive Director, Conmany Wesseh and his team of professional and enthusiastic colleagues led by Daniel Gbardoe and Chenapoh Wesseh.  AFSTRAG and CGG also contributed in many ways.

The CDD team took the lead role in coordinating the efforts of the partner organisations, the raising of funds and arranging travel for the many participants.  It is impossible to mention everybody who made the experience worthwhile, but the team put together by Abdel-Fatau Musah, the Head of Research & Advocacy, acquitted itself very well. Remi Ajibewa, who served as head rapporteur at the workshop, compiled the initial report with the help of other colleagues - Olayinka Oludipe, Michelle Spearing and Olly Owen.  Abdel-Fatau Musah edited this report.

In conclusion, the organisers would like to express their profound gratitude to Comic Relief - Africa Grants for their generous financial support for this project.

J. 'Kayode Fayemi  

Director, CDD  

(On behalf of Workshop Organisers)  

 PREFACE

Mercenary¹ activities have been a feature of conflicts in Africa since colonialism.  Since the mid-1980s, however, a combination of factors has introduced new and sophisticated dimensions to the organisational and operational aspects of the trade.  Among the factors, one may mention the increasing retreat of the State from its traditional functions, the ever-swelling pool of retired/retrenched soldiers globally, corrupt local elite and transnational corporate greed.  The unlimited access to the latest surveillance and communication equipment and, above all, the alarming rates of small arms proliferation have further facilitated the development of corporate mercenary activities.  Taking advantage of the paralysis in several African states, these angels of death interpret conflicts as a market issue, paving the way for them to profit from the misery of war-torn societies.

Aims and Objectives of the Workshop

The phenomenon and effects of corporate mercenary activities that are undertaken by private military contractors, has been well documented.²  In particular, the inextricable link between mercenary activities, the protracted nature of internal conflicts, illegitimate resource appropriation and arms trafficking has been proven conclusively by a number of researchers and investigators.  For this reason the planning/methodological workshop - Private Military intervention in Conflicts in Africa: causes, Consequences and Responses - that took place in Monrovia, Liberia on 28 and 29 July 2000, did not set itself the task of analysing today's mercenary activities.  Rather, its object was to deliberate on response mechanisms, including field engagement and advocacy, to the direct and indirect effects of the trade on lives and livelihoods. On the agenda were the following items:

• To highlight issues surrounding mercenary activities, broaden the debate and map out areas for targeted local field engagement and research.

• To identify key local partners and training needs by listening to local experts and representatives of community-based organisations.

• To discuss the viability of local observation centres and design training requirements for local staff.

• To deliberate on documentation of the movement and activities of mercenaries/PMCs in the region.

• To design tracking mechanisms for arms flows and other early indicators of conflict escalation.

• To flesh out the basis and principles of joint fieldwork and advocacy by the organiser and local partners.

• To flesh out ideas contained in the CDD Stability Monitor - a tracking mechanism for conflict analysis and response options.

 Participants

The initiative was a joint venture by the Centre for Democratic Empowerment (CEDE), Liberia, the Centre for Democracy & Development (CDD), London, the African Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG), Nigeria and the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), Sierra Leone.  In attendance were not only individuals and organisations that have encountered the effects of the phenomenon in their work, but also young victims of violence with whom the organising NGOs and other invited organisations have been working in the Mano River region. The Planning/Methodological Workshop assembled over sixty participants from all over the world. These included experts in civil-military relations, the arms trade, private security companies, human rights and development. Also represented were module designers, ex-combatants, child soldiers, youth groups, women's organisations, and other non-governmental and community-based organisations. Furthermore, representatives of the Liberian Government and the UN were also in attendance.

What follows is the proceedings of the two-day event as captured by the rapporteurs.

Abdel-Fatau Musah,

June 2001, London.

The Monrovia Communiqué

We the representatives of civil society organisations in Africa and Europe, having come to the end of our  workshop on the theme 'Private Military Intervention & Arms Proliferation in Conflicts in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Responses' in Monrovia, Liberia from 28-29 July 2000;

Having noted with alarm the exacerbating impact of local and mercenary armies on conflicts in Africa,

Convinced in particular that the privatisation of security is having a domino effect on the proliferation of sub-state and non-state war-fighters, including child soldiers;

Sickened by the unending cycle of violence in the Mano River Union in particular, and the death, carnage, mutilations and sexual violence engendered by it;

Gravely concerned about the devastating social, economic and psychological impact of the wars on lives and livelihoods, the nomadic flows of refugees and internally displaced persons;   

Appalled by the role of private military companies and their associated mining companies, rogue airlines and arms brokers in illicit arms transfers, illegitimate resource appropriation and reproduction of violence and poverty;

Strongly disapproving of the actions of governments who engage and/or condone the lethal services of mercenaries and arms brokers, and the inactions of weapons supplier governments from whose territories these companies operate;

Reminding governments of their cardinal responsibilities to global peace and security, and their ultimate responsibility for the activities of mercenaries and illegal arms brokers based in their territories;

Determined to work with unity and purpose to end the cycle of violence in Africa,

We hereby:

On Private Military Activities and Small Arms Trafficking

* Affirm the need for civil society organisations in the South to intensify their networking efforts with counterpart organisations in the North for a coordinated and unrelenting campaign against gross abuses in the weapons supply and demand chain.

* Declare the need for the international community to take further steps to tighten regulations governing official arms transfers, and even more so, to control brokering firms, including private military companies based in their territories.

* Demand that West African Governments go beyond a political declaration of support for the West African Moratorium on Small Arms and take practical steps to abide by the principles of the Moratorium by setting up mechanisms for implementation and monitoring with a major role for civil society organisations.

* Also demand that Governments that deploy private military companies or host the same in their territorial jurisdiction be made to also take full or partial responsibility for the conduct of such firms in foreign conflicts, especially in relation to war crimes, gross human right abuses and illegal mineral exploitation and illicit arms trafficking.

* Urge African Governments to take practical steps to discourage the activities of indigenous civil defence forces and militias, and where they operate, make them abide by a Code of Conduct in the spirit of the Geneva Convention articles that govern armed conflicts.

 On Ensuring Good/Accountable Governance

We demand:

* That Governments and Civil Society engage in critical collaboration to strengthen the rule of law with particular emphasis on building and strengthening state institutions, ensuring the independence of the judiciary, the legislature and independent electoral systems, as well as the development of impartial media.

* That the international community, in collaborative efforts with civil society organisations, strengthen the capacity of community organisations to enable them take greater ownership of local developmental processes through practical decentralisation.

* That the efforts to ensure civil liberties be underpinned by practical efforts to promote economic and social rights.

On Tracking Danger Signals of Conflict Escalation

We:

* Express the need for the setting up of participatory monitoring mechanisms with the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and experts to track and diffuse conflict-laden signals in war-prone communities.

* Urge that mechanisms, such as the CDD's Stability Monitor project, be developed in a collaborative NGO framework, and tailored to fill gaps in, and add value to existing mechanisms.

* Propose that such mechanisms monitor and report on developments such as the influx of weapons into conflict region; economic injustices, dynamics within the armed forces, the rule of law, inclusiveness and the manner of internal resource and poverty-burden distribution among the populations.

* Urge that, in order to arrest escalation of conflicts, the time lag between warning and response be enormously reduced.

Adopted this day, 30 July 2000, in Monrovia, Liberia

Signed on behalf of Participants by:

Conmany Wesseh, CEDE

Abdel-Fatau Musah, CDD

Patricia Dimoh, CGG

Celestine Bassey, AFSTRAG

DAY ONE - OPENING SESSION

Chair:            Conmany Wesseh, Centre for Democratic Empowerment

Panelists:      Dr Abdel-Fatau Musah Centre for Democracy & Development

Professor Togba-Nah Tipoteh, Susukku, Liberia

Minister Blamoh Nelson, Director-General of the Cabinet, Government of Liberia

Setting the Scene: Private Military Intervention in Conflicts

Abdel-Fatau Musah

On behalf of the organisers, I would like to warmly welcome all participants to this all-important workshop. Important, as it were, in terms of issues, space and timing. CDD and its partners believe that many factors (both causal and inflammatory) have contributed to the acute physical and social insecurity that have made West Africa the epicentre of conflicts in Africa.  Among the causal factors are poverty, illegitimate resource appropriation, irresponsible governance, impunity and gross abuse of group rights (against women, children, ethnic/religious minorities etc.)  Key inflammatory factors are illegitimate resource appropriation, sub-state and foreign combatants and the proliferation of weapons.  The link between these and increased impoverishment of ordinary people is obvious.  Private military companies, hitherto neglected in conflict management policies, contribute a new dynamic to the conflict escalation/de-escalation complex in the manner that it impacts on impunity, illegitimate resource exploitation, weapons proliferation and the culture of violence.

For the past decade the Mano River Region, comprising Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry, has experienced spiraling violence culminating in virtual state collapse, small arms/narcotics proliferation, loss of thousands of lives, amputations, sexual violence and abductions.  Private military companies/mercenaries are intrinsically linked with this state of instability.  Politically, they take over an essential function of the state by providing regime or partisan security cover.  They deprive vulnerable sectors of the community of vital livelihood by appropriating mineral resources.  Finally, being primarily armed groups, the very presence of PMCs in society fosters a culture of impunity and violence and encourages the recourse to exclusively violent options of conflict management.

The history and politics of West Africa show that, until recently, the region was arguably the most peaceful in the continent (with the possible exception of Guinea-Bissau).  However, since the mid-1980s, the region has been caught up in spiraling violence and state disintegration and it now competes with Eastern and Central Africa as the least stable spots in Africa.  The Mano River and Guinea-Senegambia regions are being torn apart by fratricidal wars while other hitherto nominally peaceful states, such as Côte d'Ivoire, are knocking on the doors of instability.  Mali has only just pulled back from the brink of civil war even as Togo inches closer to one.  Even in the societies that are nominally at peace, the peoples are grappling with shaky democracies amidst worsening impoverishment.

Private Military Intervention in Conflicts

For the past two years, together with our partners in West Africa, we have grappled with causes of these conflicts, such as issues of governance, resource appropriation, and private military intervention in conflict and arms proliferation. Today, talk about the privatisation of security brings into sharp relief the activities of private armies which are set up in Europe, the US or South Africa and which are deployed on a partisan basis in conflicts in Africa for pecuniary gain.  This phenomenon is not new.  Mercenaries have been a recurrent decimal both in the anti-colonial and post-independence struggles for sovereignty and statehood in Africa.  What is patently different about mercenary activities today is the transformation of this trade from its shadowy, ad-hoc and politico-ideological nature into an up-market corporatised and multi-purpose enterprise, which has become a permanent feature of civil wars.  For conceptual purposes, let me begin by saying that several armed groups in the conflicts in Africa share most or all of the characteristics of mercenaries.  For this reason, we can identify several categories within the privatised security sector. Among them are:

Private Military Companies: these are military and intelligence entrepreneurs who contract the services of mercenaries for deployment in internal conflicts on behalf of client-parties to the said conflicts in return for cash and resource payments.  Often they have been known to have close ties with extracting firms.  The activities of the now-defunct South African-based Executive Outcomes, the UK-based Sandline International, the US-based DynCorp and the Belgian-based International Defence and Security (IDAS) all fall into this category.  These companies have been most active in the civil wars ravaging the Mano River Union, Angola, Sudan, Uganda and the DRC.

Private Security Companies: Others, such as the US-based Military Professional Resources Increment (MPRI) and the UK-based Defence Systems Limited (DSL) may not hire mercenaries to engage in direct combat, but instead provide equally conflict-exacerbating military intelligence services such as training, intelligence gathering, militarised communications facilities, weapons and guard duties to clients.  They often maintain close links with intelligence services, which outsource potentially controversial contracts to them. 

Indigenous Private Military Groups:  In the context of today's conflicts, groups of homegrown security structures, by virtue of their partisan allegiances and better service conditions, could be categorised as private armies or mercenaries.  Among these, we could mention the late dictator, Sani Abacha's murder squads in Nigeria, the Cobras in Congo Brazzaville and similar formations in the Mano River Union states.  They are a consequence of what has been termed the African 'ruler's dilemma'.  Political leaders, who have lost faith in, or the trust of, national armies, create special security structures for their personal protection and for terror against their opponents.  Yet still, regimes at times convert whole battalions of their national armies into commercial armies to fight in foreign wars for gain.  Examples include the late General Abacha's army units in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the forces of Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe in the DRC and Burkinabe army units in the Mano River region who are actively involved in mineral exploitation and rare animal poaching in the Congo.    

Civil Defence Forces: A third category under indigenous private armies are armed groups that have transformed their services from community defence to partisan support of local strongmen or political factions in civil wars.  The lack of resources and strong commitment render such groups as the Kamajors, Kapras (Sierra Leone), the Dozzo (Côte d'Ivoire) and the Bakassi Boys (Nigeria) vulnerable to manipulation by powerful political interests.  Once these groups become beholden to strongmen, political factions or powerful criminal bosses, they lose their original purpose - community protection - and take on a mercenary character, doing the bidding of individuals and groups for pecuniary gain.

For over two years, CDD has been developing a Conflict Management & Peace building Programme for West Africa.  CDD's experts in the field and those of its partner organisations have become increasingly convinced that the deployment of PMCs in West African conflicts negatively impacts on peaceful conflict management.  CDD has published its initial views on PMCs, as well as those of partners and independent researchers, in a full-length edited book entitled 'Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma' which was launched in London in November 1999.

The purpose of this workshop is unique in one regard: It will not discuss private military intervention in conflict per se, but will deliberate more upon the consequences of private-sector security and the responses of non-governmental organisations at the action-oriented working sessions and brainstorming discussions.  We shall hear testimony from our grassroots partners on the impact of violence - much of it generated by PMCs and mercenaries - on their physical security and livelihoods.  The focus of this workshop is on the consequences of PMCs activities and the responses that civil society organisations, in collaboration with Northern counterparts and respective governments in war-torn countries, can put in place to discourage the proliferation of these mercenaries and PMC groups across the continent and to achieve lasting solutions to these wars. It is our belief that the activities of private military groups and mercenaries seriously impact upon social and economic dislocation, arms proliferation, destruction of infrastructure & resources, the phenomenon of child soldiers, governance and security.  If a ruler has exclusive rights to PMCs, what are the consequences? A ruler may act with impunity and without consultation because he knows that personal security is guaranteed. There is also the question of responsibility: Responsibility of the governments that hire mercenaries and of the governments from whose territories mercenaries operate, for their conduct in wars.  These are issues that will fit into the discussion to enable us to find workable solutions and concrete projects on the ground that can tackle not only PMCs but also monitor the other triggers to conflict on the continent. Some factors, until now, have had no real expression in the various monitoring mechanisms prevalent in the world. We need holistic approaches and tailored early warning networks to gather and process critical information more quickly, and to create mechanisms for rapid response.

Our partner organisations in West Africa are exploring and supporting alternative means of peaceful conflict resolution at grassroots levels and promoting a democratic culture in which dialogue on transformative processes is expanded to include all those affected by conflict. More widely, NGOs and CBOs in this field support means of reconciliation, trauma healing and empowering communities by giving them the space to question their own understandings and responses to conflict.  Both governments and civil society groups are concerned with developing effective responses to the challenges of demobilisation and reconstruction.  In promoting dialogue and exploring the complex issue of PMCs (as well the wider issue of small arms and the culture of violence), this project will support and make a critical contribution to existing efforts. It is also hoped that one outcome of this workshop will be the identification and prioritisation of areas that require urgent action, based on real life issues.

Keynote Address

Professor Togba-Nah Tipoteh

Scientific explanation of violent conflict in Africa is indispensable in comprehending causes, consequences and responses relating to private military intervention. Explanatory factors for violent conflicts in modern African history span the acquisition of human and natural resources. Before the 19th century, acquisition was dominated by the export of human resources (the slave trade). Since the 19th century, the export of raw materials has predominated.

Mr Edgar Pisani (EU Development Commissioner during the early 1980s) pointed to this dominance when he observed that Europe most needed, in terms of relations with Africa, an environment in which raw materials were exported from Africa to Europe, and manufactured products were imported by Africa from Europe. He also stated that, whether in human or natural resources, the trade was always characterised by an unequal partnership of African and foreign elements, in which the foreigners, mainly European/North American, dominated and controlled decision-making. At the level of the economy, the philosophical tenet was ''free market''.  In practice, the market was not free, with access reserved only for a relatively few multinational corporations engaged in frequent mergers that limited access further. At the level of politics, the philosophical barometer leaned on liberal democracy.  In reality, dictatorship became the order of the day.

Thus, we witnessed the coexistence of free markets and democracy on paper, and monopoly and dictatorship in practice. The dismal state of Africa is not due to the lack of adequate financial resources as maintained by African ruling elites and their allies. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has concluded that it would take less than 8 billion dollars to effect progress in human development in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas more than 2 billion dollars have been discovered in the Swiss bank accounts of Liberian ruling elites, and over 3 billion dollars are already attributed to the coffers of the late Abacha of Nigeria. Furthermore, in 1995 alone, Sub-Saharan governments spent 8 billion dollars buying arms.

The African people make just demands upon their governments to create enabling environments for generating better living conditions. The principal response to peaceful demands continues to be state repression, mainly of students, workers and leaders of opposition political parties. As living conditions worsen in an unprecedented manner and peaceful initiatives run into walls, fake revolutionaries take advantage of the people's suffering to enthrone coups d'etat and violent civil conflicts.  Invariably, masses of people support the coups d'etat and the anti-government civil conflicts not because they know the record of the fake revolutionaries and admire it, but because they know only too well and detest vehemently the record of the government.

Both repressive governments and fake revolutionaries are committed to producing raw materials for export (with attendant social and political consequences). Foreign military intervention is carried out to assist allies on each side.  The distinction between state and private military intervention is often an artificial one. Invariably, private military interventions are made with state support, just as there was state support for the slave traders, colonial traders and settlers.  In the post-World War II period, light weapons have been the biggest killers in violent civil conflicts. The relationship between rebel activities and light weapon supply has bred conscious actions to bring an end to the fighting, but light weapons still remain the biggest killers in violent conflicts.

The majority of African states have experienced private military interventions and the culture of violence. 31 African heads of state or government have been violently killed since independence, some 300,000 child-combatants have become involved in conflicts worldwide (nearly half of them from Africa), and six million refugees (almost 70 per cent of the world-wide figure) are in Africa, largely due to violent conflicts. There is a tendency to focus on physical repercussions of the conflicts but, arguably, the most severe consequences are seen in the erosion of moral values, especially the value of life itself. Dismal living conditions and repressive responses result in violent conflicts essentially characterised by diminution of the value of life. Under a state of trauma, this assault on life itself becomes institutionalised in all segments of society. Rebuilding war-torn societies calls for reconciliation-oriented de-traumatisation processes involving former combatants as well as non-combatants.

Leadership in rebuilding war-torn societies for the better becomes central and will be forthcoming only from societal elements committed to the protection and improvement of life. Experiences of ending violent conflicts and rebuilding societies for the better therefore remain instructive. At the level of the international community, responses to violent conflicts have been positively growing, with the United Nations Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the International Red Cross Plan of Action on Children in Armed Conflict, the International Labour Organisation Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, the Maputo, Montevideo, Brussels, and Accra Declarations, the United Nations Security Council Resolution on the Cessation of Hostilities, plus arms embargoes and sanctions, as well as the multiplicity of internationally brokered accords among warring factions.

In the midst of these international responses, state and private military interventions in conflicts in Africa persist in forms that render arms embargoes and sanctions ineffective. State support for private military interventions has become a mainstay in violent conflicts. Central to the participation of private entities in the flow of arms into areas of civil conflicts in Africa is the End User Certificate, which is relatively easy to obtain. The government engaged in buying arms provides this certificate to indicate that it will be the exclusive user of the arms purchased. The arms purchased by the government are listed on the certificate. Upon receiving a copy of the certificate, the exporting government engaged in the selling of arms can say officially that it has sold arms legally to the government with the original certificate. The End User Certificate can be bought from several African governments readily. The certificate is undated and the spaces for the list of arms to be bought are left blank, meaning that the actual buyer of the arms can fill up the spaces.

Additionally, a government or a private holder of a certificate can purchase the arms and have them resold to another party. Consider an actual case in 1995 when the United Nations Arms Embargo related to Rwanda had been declared. A large shipment of AK47s, grenade launchers and landmines was landed by an airplane at Goma Airport in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but was bound for use by the forces that committed genocide in Rwanda at the time. The arms were brought to Goma by an Israeli living in Tel Aviv upon request from a British company. The base of the airplane was Ostend, Belgium. Payment for this arms deal was made to a Caribbean Bank through banks in Luxembourg, Berne, Rome and Cyprus. The aircraft used, though based in Belgium, was registered in Liberia, owned by a Nigerian and managed by a Dutch citizen with a residence permit for Britain.  One is reminded of the UN vehicles that were caught transporting arms to one of the factions in Bosnia during the civil war.  In the Liberian situation, a direct relationship existed between shipment of relief and logistical supplies (including transport and communications) and revived rebel activities.

In Liberia, SUSUKKU (Liberian conflict resolution and social rehabilitation NGO) organised recreational training, helped the disarmament process, disengagement and reintegration processes, and established a street-to-school programme where street children who are potential combatants are assisted to return to their homes and settle in schools. The parents of these children are also provided with interest-free loans. The way forward lies in strengthening civil society capacity with respect to engaging state machinery in building sustainable democracy, and in setting up an enabling environment that will encourage people to engage in production to improve living standards and give hope for a generation without violent conflict.

Liberian Government Intervention

Minister Blamoh Nelson

I believe you would want to hear about the standing policy of the Liberian Government regarding the question of peace building.  The Government of Liberia is very much interested in this kind of workshop.  The Liberian government's standing policy on resolving conflicts in Africa among contesting parties is through dialogue and negotiations.  The use of arms cannot be an acceptable intervention, be it by private individuals, state actors or international bodies. The use of arms must be discouraged. In the final analysis, for any conflict to be resolved between contesting parties, it is those parties that have ultimate responsibility to rectify the damage done by the conflict. Any intervention should encourage the parties to come together and resolve the issues. The use of arms is not an acceptable intervention and must be discouraged. In law, negotiation and compromises are the legitimate means of conflict resolution.  In Liberia, the assistance, encouragement, and the efforts of the UN Security Council and ECOWAS, as well as the facilitating roles of private citizens were largely responsible for convincing us to go to the negotiation table. Given that we are all citizens of the same country, the actors in the Liberian civil war agreed that their differences could not be resolved by warfare but through roundtable dialogue and ultimately through the ballot.

Another question is: why the conflict in the first place?  Why were the belligerent parties fighting each other?  If you understand the reasons for the fight, then it is easier for you to intervene. Volumes have been written about the Liberian civil war. In Liberia's case, one reason for the fight was a struggle for political authority -  over who would become President. We believe that the individual who emerges as President, a Senator or an honourable member of the House Representatives through the electoral processes has the key (or at least the advantaged position) to direct the course of events in the country. It was also believed, before the war, that individuals in key position in state affairs had lost their bearing, direction and vision, which led to the power struggle and jostling for the presidency in Liberia. The answer seemed to lie in the ballot boxes, the results of which are now agreed to be largely fair, albeit with pockets of contention.  At the end of the day, most Liberians were given the right to freely choose. The other side of the story is the fulfillment of the expectations raised by the enfranchisement of the people and the end of the war. Delivering on that promise can become a nightmare.  Those who intend to intervene must be prepared to provide post-conflict support as well.

If we do not provide post-election support, it is likely that the conflict will be revived. It is equally important to focus on how the administration should be supported, how it is currently being supported and why support has not been forthcoming from the international community. In other countries, for example, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and the Congo, where war is raging and conflict resolutions have been attempted, we believe resolving these conflicts through mutual processes would ensure that similar problems like those that confronted Liberia in the wake of the settlement do not re-occur. There are considerable lessons to be drawn from the case of Liberia. We need to review this around a table in an inclusive manner with government officials, civil society and private companies. The administration in Liberia has some questions and earnestly seeks answers to them. It needs to know why the international community has been hesitant to render post-conflict assistance to Liberia in the aftermath of the war. This might be because the winning party is proving unable to deliver on its campaign promises or because some people feel neglected or left out. Whatever it may be, the government is very interested in this kind of initiative and to work together with well-meaning people. We want an enabling environment for the Liberian people and collaboration with international community that is free of harassment.

Chair's Comments

That has been a most productive session. I believe we have all taken note of the points made by his Excellency and the other distinguished contributors and we also have a better understanding regarding the complexity of the issues confronting us in this gathering and hope that we will be able to profer concrete suggestions as to the way forward. I would like to express gratitude to the speakers and hope that the Honourable Minister and Professor Tipoteh would be able to entertain comments and questions after the break.

Some military, security and justice personnel are in our midst as well as representatives of the Ministers of National Defence and Foreign Affairs. When we return, we shall give the floor to them and other distinguished guests to make a few comments.

Contributions

Col. James Samy, Liberian Army

The Defence Minister would have loved to be here but due to official engagements, he couldn't make it. I also suggest that future workshop invitations should be extended to the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) so that we all can fully participate.

Hon. Williams, Representative of the Defence Minister

I want to tender the apology of the Minister of National Defence who was unable to attend due to other pressing engagements. You may be aware of the current events in Lofa (anti-government military activity in Lofa County). On behalf of the Minister, we welcome you as visitors talking about private military intervention in Africa. We are aware of what is going on in Africa and especially in our sub-region. I hope we come out with useful and practical recommendations. The Ministry is seriously looking forward to the outcome of the workshop.

Celestine Bassey, AFSTRAG

I wish to comment on the PMC syndrome in terms of general issues of analysis, theory and comprehension. The general framework of analysis developed by Richard Little (formerly of Lancaster University) is extremely insightful; particularly the dynamics of push and pull factors. One needs to understand the nature of conflict system and the actors involved. Most conflicts have external actors either at state or non-state level.  The 'push' factor configuration of the international system and the structure of the global and ideological phenomenon, as well as the interests of external and state actors, have diminished to allow for the intervention of non-state actors. When state actors find it problematic to openly intervene in other states, they resort to informal penetration using non-state private actors. These non-state actors are referred to as PMCs.  But as Anthony Samson pointed out in his book Agent of Libya's Ghadaffi, private interventionist forces can also act on their own without invitation, especially if the region is very lucrative. Knowledge of the way these factors combine and interconnect is necessary to understand the wars in Angola and Sierra Leone.

When people talk about non-state actors in conflict, attention is generally focused on commercially organised security companies. However, it is important to examine another group of non-state actors in conflicts, a group that is potentially more dangerous, but often neglected. This group consists of the so-called ethnic militias. Today, ethnic groups in one country can easily support people of their ethnic group in another country e.g. Tamils in India supporting their kinsmen in Sri Lanka. Nigeria's Oodua People's Congress (OPC) can be located in this group as well. How dangerous the phenomenon can be, is best illustrated by the Ife-Modakeke ethnic imbroglio in Nigeria which led to the government's impoundment of arms imported by Professor Fadare of the Obafemi Awolowo University, one of the leaders in the conflict.

Unfortunately, many governments do not recognise the effect of these groups and their role in small arms proliferation. Since privatisation of security is a mode of intervention, it is essential to understand each of the underlying phenomena.

 Abdel-Fatau Musah

The fundamental issues that the workshop will address have been raised in my introductory presentation. The Centre for Democracy & Development (CDD) and its partners believe that many factors (both causal and inflammatory) have contributed to the physical and social insecurity in the sub-region.  Among the causal factors mentioned are the inequitable burden of poverty, illegitimate resource appropriation, irresponsible governance, impunity and the gross abuse of group rights (particularly against women, children, and ethnic/religious minorities).  Sub-state and foreign combatants and the proliferation of weapons have also been identified among the inflammatory factors of conflicts in West Africa.  The link between these and increased impoverishment of ordinary people is obvious.  Private military companies (PMCs), hitherto neglected in conflict management policies, have introduced a new dynamic to conflict escalation/de-escalation complex in a manner that it impacts on impunity, illegitimate resource exploitation, weapons proliferation and the culture of violence.

For the past decade the Mano River Union (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry) has experienced spiraling violence culminating in virtual state collapse, small arms/narcotics proliferation, loss of thousands of lives, amputations and abductions.  Private Military Companies/Mercenaries are intrinsically linked to this state of instability.  Politically, they take over an essential function of the state by providing regime or partisan security cover.  They also deprive vulnerable sectors of the community by appropriating mineral resources.  Finally the very presence of such armed groups in society fosters a culture of impunity and violence and encourages the recourse to military solutions.  A distinguishing feature of this workshop is its emphasis on responses of NGOs and its aim to find practical ways of bringing about a lasting solution to the incessant conflicts in West Africa.

Kareen Pech, Independent Journalist, South Africa

In looking at the role of PMCs, I think that we need to be realistic. The rise of informal and clandestine activities of private military companies (in particular their lack of accountability, transparency, etc.) makes our understanding difficult. Over time the definition of the phenomenon has become diffused and therefore arriving at generally acceptable definitions has been made difficult. This is because PMCs of today have taken on different manifestations that transcend the traditional understanding of mercenarism. As a result, there are many voices, each with its own position. The world is now very challenging, more confusing and more insecure in the aftermath of the Cold War, with the emergence of new influences, interests and/or shift of strategic alliances, eruption of internal cleavages, and lack of accountability and transparency.

Damian Lilly, International Alert

International Alert has a policy position on the issue of private military companies. We need to point out the issue of definition and be mindful of the extreme uses of arms by these organisations and its attendant general consequences. Western European companies have come out openly about their aims and objectives. There are differences in views and some of them do not have a standing army but do employ the services of mercenaries. So many issue are involved and many of them are rather very confusing, even to the trained eye.

We at International Alert have conducted research into the uses of PMCs. There are basically two situations in which PMCs are involved, namely: conflict and non-conflict situations. In non-conflict situation, private security companies are only used for really common tasks like protecting property and safeguarding valuables in transit. But at the same time there are those of them that are brought in as guards to protect mines. In conflict situations, the services of PMCs can be contracted for use in domestic conflict (as resorted to by the Kashmir Government) or given military responsibilities abroad.  This can be in the form of 'peacekeeping' or 'humanitarian' operations. However they can also be used, in collaboration with local actors, to aid corruption or to run illegal trade operations. We will need to look more closely at some of these issues in the course of this workshop.

Conflict Management - the way we aim to resolve conflict - differs from one organisation to the other. International Alert advocates dialogue. Concerted efforts should therefore be made to improve civil-military relations. In this regard, we are to take a new look at the whole spectrum of human rights, civil and political rights and accountability. PMCs are accountable to neither the state, the government, the law nor any regulation.

 Geraldine O'Callaghan, British-American Security Information Council, UK

A new dimension is associated with the misuse of small arms. In looking at conflict resolution, we need to look at the weapons used by these actors. What are the problems and why are they difficult to control? Why do we talk about small arms? An estimated 7 million small arms in circulation in West Africa, for example, help escalate conflict, prevent post-conflict reconstruction, undermine sustainable development initiatives, and of course, play a key role in violent crimes. It has caught the attention of governments because many in the North are concerned about these linkages.

The governments' responses include, among others, communiqués issued by ECOWAS, OAU and the UN. All West African states have ratified a moratorium on the export and importation of small weapons, or are in the process of doing so, but none seems to be enforcing the ban on small arms. Why do people continue to want weapons? We need to look at ways of controlling weapons circulation.  We need to know who the actors are.  We need this information in order to know how to address these issues. Admittedly, it is a complex problem and the solutions advanced differ among regions and countries. However, there is a consensus that there has been a series of violations that necessitates extending the emphasis beyond the question of arms sales and transfer alone.  For example, it might be useful to look at the behaviour of police and military personnel in the country.

The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) are forging ahead to address the trafficking of weapons and controlling the brokers. But beyond this, there is a need for a code of conduct that regulates the sales, transfer and brokerage of weapons.

To successfully resolve security and disarmament issues, advocates should collaborate. Networks of international organisations are looking into the arms issues i.e. International Alert (IA) and British American Security Information Council (BASIC).  We need to move forward from the paper level to real action that is workable in Africa and any other region.

Contributor 1

Fragmentation of PMCs has been observed. Since 1996, many things have changed and the original identifiable companies have changed as well.  Before 1996, many companies openly advertised themselves but they no longer do so.  Today, the general public is interested in and informed about these issues. We need to understand these changes in order to move on. The essential difficulty at this stage is that we are confusing an informal issue with a formal one.

Contributor 2

When Dr Musah made reference to something he called "alternative means" while he was talking about peaceful conflict resolution earlier on.  What did he mean by this 'alternative means'? (Cf. supra, p. 3)

Abdel-Fatau Musah

The alternative means being proposed here is multilateral intervention. Regions/countries involved in conflicts are much more likely to be committed to resolving local conflicts and to be familiar with the complexities of the area of conflicts, the conflicts themselves and the multiplicity of problems they have engendered.  And no amount of external intervention, however its quality, can compensate for their useful insight. The ECOMOG is an example of such multilateral intervention. ECOMOG, of course, has deficits; it nevertheless has some positive points. And one of these positive points is that its operations cover the whole spectrum of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building, which is in contradistinction to PMCs' sole act of peace enforcement.

I crave the indulgence of all of you here to bring us back to the issue of PMCs. It is vital to fully understand some of the crucial issues surrounding the phenomenon and its modus operandi. The activities of Executive Outcomes and other private armies in Sierra Leone and Liberia make it imperative to ask pertinent questions. For example, much has been said about the cost-effectiveness of private military intervention in conflicts, but the questions that need answering are: 1) For whom is this sort of intervention cost-effective - the PMCs themselves or the people in the war-torn countries? 2) Who actually foots the bills of this private military intervention? Is it the UN, private individuals or, again, the poor victims of war? These questions, as far as we know, have not been adequately answered. PMCs argue that their presence helps to end conflict but this has not been the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is an objective fact that one of the reasons why these wars continued was the proliferation of private armies, combatants and small arms. Crucially, it is noteworthy that they are not interested in countries that are poor in resources. PMCs co-operate with mineral and oil companies to expropriate domestic natural resources of states in conflicts. Our aim is to wage war against the myths being spread in Africa regarding the usefulness of PMCs. 

PLENARY SESSION ONE

Opening up the Debate

Chair: Sarah Meek, International Alert

Una McCauley, UNICEF, Abidjan

In both the Congo and Sierra Leone, shifting alliances built around the interests of particular Minister(s) or Deputies dictated access, not only to power, but also to resources. The situation arose where soldiers were compensated not with power but with jobs, and this led to retributive justice where some got others arbitrarily arrested while consolidating security around key public figures rather than defending public interests. Local issues were distorted along ethnic lines. For example there was a distortion of the role of the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, especially the authority created around a secret society that cut across whole tribes.  In Sierra Leone, we saw the consequences of PMCs. The Kamajors became a force. A cynical view of how the Kamajors manipulated others is through initiation of people from other tribes within two days without any understanding of the modus operandi. They were able to manipulate military recruitment rules. Children as young as 13 enlisted in a standing army.  Security forces that should be there to protect the citizens broke down. Traditional structures were abused to get around international legal standards. We need people to look at these steps.

Minister Nelson

One aspect of the continuous struggle in Liberia is the quest for political power. It was agreed among the actors that elections must be the last resort to determine who should become President. There is hope in Liberia but, if care is not taken and if we do not provide post-conflict support, there might be war again. A serious concern now centres on the question of whether or not the winner of the election can deliver on the promises made. Our focus should be to understand those issues that keep conflict going and to appraise the kind of support that should be given to the administration in order to keep these in check. The instruments of war have changed. We must find a way to stop those producing arms and put pressure on those arms brokers, who trade weapons for resources as is happening with the sale of Sierra Leonean and Angolan diamonds. In Sierra Leone's case, Liberia has been made a culprit, but it is informative to ask to whom Liberia has been selling the diamonds. Similarly, who is producing the arms and who is buying the arms? The Liberian government has been accused of illicit trade in diamonds and arms, allegations, which the government has emphatically denied. Can you, the international NGO community, please provide proof of Liberian complicity in arms and diamond trafficking?  If not, can you urge the international community to stop picking on Liberia?  It might be necessary to have legislations in place that requires the sales of diamonds to be channeled through governments.

Abdel-Fatau Musah

I think the Honourable Minister has asked some pertinent questions and we should try to answer them to the best of the knowledge available to us.  Concerning the complicity of Liberia in the MRU conflicts, several researchers have conclusively proven the assistance in combatants and direction that the Liberian government has been giving to the RUF since 1991.  Sam Bockarie, one of the key commanders of the RUF is based in Monrovia, together with other RUF combatants.  On gems and arms trafficking, the fact that Liberia actively supports the RUF, which in turn occupies key mining centres in Sierra Leone, leaves Liberia open to understandable suspicions.  Besides, documentation compiled by international investigators indicate that Liberia produces roughly 100 000 carats of diamonds annually but has, over the last four years, been exporting some 7 million carats annually.  On the contrary, and diamonds/arms trafficking, I will have this to say.  Meanwhile, Sierra Leone used to export close to two million carats annually but exported only about 900 carats annually over the last few years.  Finally, I believe that the onus falls on Liberia to prove to the international community that it is innocent, and not the other way round. 

Contributor 1

Doesn't the Geneva Convention state that non-state actors in fighting should not use children?

Una McCauley

In theory yes, but it is becoming extremely difficult to enforce those rules.

Liz Hughes, UNICEF, Liberia

Practical re-integration programmes are needed on the ground. Liberian children have a challenge and need war-affected children's programmes. Available statistics paints a clear picture of decay and reckless abandon of children: Illiteracy hovering at 75 per cent, school dropouts at 40 per cent, and teenage pregnancy at 23 per cent. All these children need vocational training. There are many areas for them to find productive roles and, particularly in agriculture, we could capitalise on the availability of land.  We need an open dialogue with youth on an arms moratorium and we need to positively engage the youths. In fact, the lesson learnt is that we need to actively engage the community more.

Herbert Boh, UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament, Lome

The UN Centre for Peace and Disarmament is interested in collaborative work and wishes to play a bigger role. We all see the consequences of these conflicts and they need to be stopped. We are aware of a moratorium on arms proliferation signed by the 16 ECOWAS States. It is remarkable that only 4-5m dollars was used to procure these weapons, whereas the UNDP spent $300m to mitigate the effects of the war in Liberia. It is clear that the consequences are enormou