COLLECTIVE REGIONAL SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

Conference Report

Introduction

This conference of security scholars, military practitioners, diplomats and civil society activists was held at the Volta Hotel in Akosombo, Ghana from July 21 - 24, 1999. Organised by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in collaboration with the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CENCOR), the conference had as its main purpose the identification and promotion of best practice mechanisms aimed at enhancing practical co-operation among the ECOWAS states in peace and security activities.

This summary report highlights the main points raised during the very exhaustive discussions which took place over the three-day period in the belief that it will bring some clarity to and if possible consensus on how Africans should prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The conference was opened by a member of the National Council of State, Lt.General (Rtd) Arnold Quainoo on behalf of the Vice President, Professor Atta Mills. General Quainoo traced the history of collective regional security and commented on the significant changes that have taken place in the region since ECOMOG was set up in response to the Liberian civil war emphasising the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. More importantly, General Quainoo emphasised the need to see security beyond the use of military force by strengthening democratic institutions and investing in social capital to generate opportunities and consensus in divided and conflict-ridden societies.

By bringing together those who have been involved in the political and military aspects of current regional security mechanisms in West Africa for the purpose of dissecting their experiences and analysing their work, the organisers placed an emphasis on lessons learnt and experiences shared with a view to highlighting best practice approaches for peace building and conflict transformation. Towards this objective, the conference focussed on three key areas – conceptual, legal/political and operational dimensions of the regional security experiences. In this regard, the conference benefited from the careful mix of experts whose contributions combined theory and practice because of their rich personal experience in the areas of collective regional security under discussion. These include: Conceptualising regional security; Legal basis of collective regional security; Conditions for effective peace support operations; new approaches to sub-regional security; the role of civil society in peace building, women in peace building and conflict management. On the basis of the consensus reached on the above, the conference drew together conclusions and made substantive recommendations.

I. Conceptualising Regional Security

A number of conceptual issues were examined to clarify what is meant by regional security from the perspectives of different actors – state, sub-state and international actors. This was done in relation to three central questions: (1) the nature of the post-colonial state in West Africa and its capacity to singularly provide security for its citizens; (2) the dimensions of threat and threat perception and definition of security and, (3) the structure and features of effective regional mechanisms for peace support operations. In addition to these three central questions was an overriding one of defining the region for the purpose of national security. What, for instance, is the coincidence between national interests and regional imperatives? These questions were discussed extensively in historical and comparative perspective.

Participants agreed that the artificial nature of the African state was a major factor in the perpetual instability of the nation-state and the variegated views and lack of consensus amongst different sub-state actors. They noted the difficulty in defining national interest in the context of culturally homogenous peoples lying astride two or more nation-states, a standard feature in most West African countries. This primary factor has been exacerbated by the appalling pattern of governance, the violations of fundamental freedoms, and social stratification in the rulers’ quest for regime security – all of which resulted in the prevalence of internal conflicts in Africa. According to Dr Olonisakin – the lead presenter in the panel, it was this conflation of regime security with national security that allowed the confusion in previous attempts at defining whether to intervene in internal conflicts or not, and if so, when. Participants noted the difficulty in defining national interest in the context of culturally homogenous peoples lying astride two or more nation-states, a standard feature in most West African countries.

In a region where efforts to build homogenous nation-states on the basis of artificially constructed boundaries led to the refusal to promote objective collective interventions on the basis of the principle of "non-interference", aggrieved sub-state actors felt they had little or no choice but to resort to violence to redress perceived or real disadvantages, leading to a widespread questioning of the legitimacy of the nation-states among those who inhabit the territorial space. Participants noted that the extent to which sovereignty of the nation-state should be regarded as sacrosanct and non-derogable in the context of gross violations of human rights ought to be reconsidered.

Whilst agreeing with the prevalence of internal conflicts in the sub-region, some participants called for a more nuanced understanding of the complexities surrounding these conflicts. In the view of one discussant in particular, wars are ‘glocal’, not ‘local’ as they involved a range of different actors: national, sub-national and trans-national interests. They have international and regional dimensions and the dialectics of globalisation and localisation of contemporary conflicts remains a key factor in understanding the political and economic causes of conflict, the intertwined connections between warlords and mercenaries, between the plunderers of African mineral and natural wealth, small arms proliferators and narco-drug dealers. The nature and extent of this linkage goes to the very root of understanding the privatisation of the nation-state and its inability to organise and control state power. In its most worrying impact, this erosion of state power has resulted in the rise of shadow economies. It has also created a fractured state system in which existing basis of political co-operation among states can no longer be assumed as states shift loyalties between sub-regional initiatives and personal projects.

To proffer permanent solutions that do not re-ignite war, a broader conception of security that does not limit security to narrowly defined military notions of security currently predominant in security studies and practice was advocated. This broader conception must articulate security in a manner that the individual, the group as well as the state may relate to its fundamental objectives of promoting and ensuring the right to life and livelihood in a sub-region where poverty remains the greatest threat to security and stability. However, one participant noted the dangers that might also accompany too broad a conception of security. He noted that the military aspect of security was an important factor to take into account in any broad formulation of regional security mechanisms. In this vein, some participants who saw conflict as a fact of life agreed that war might sometimes be necessary, especially in circumstances where all peaceful avenues for removing despotic regimes had been exhausted. Acknowledging this fact, according to its proponents, might help in to address some of the policy challenges posed for conflict transformation and regional security. One, under which circumstances, if any, is war necessary to remove bad governments. Two, how do you build political co-operation between and among states to make peace support operations effective. Three, how can we de-emphasise state-centric definitions of security and increase the civil society role in peace building. Four, how do we build democratic control of the military in states undergoing political transition or moving from war to peace, through parliamentary oversight, effective institutions of governance and genuine interaction between the military and the rest of society.

Whilst it was generally agreed that the solution to the crisis of the nation-state might well be a supra-national arrangement in which countries in the sub-region submit some sovereignty to the supra-national entity, most participants were of the view that security must be seen as a public good – the concern of all citizens and states must be prepared to provide security on negotiated terms with the citizens. In the contest between what one participant referred to as ‘national patrimony’ and ‘community patrimony’, greater economic integration through ‘people to people’ interaction and the free movement of goods is seen as one of the more sustainable ways of achieving this objective. This is without prejudice to the pursuit of sustainable peace support operations.

Although a permanent sub-regional organ for peace support operations was seen by some as an effective vehicle for the conflict management and transformation objectives, it was felt by some participants that we must first identify and develop the political institutions that would use an institution like ECOMOG as the instrument for peace-building. The increasing retrenchment of the nation-state in the post-cold war era, according to some participants, makes the prospects for a viable security mechanism increasingly bleak. But many participants were of the view that the preference for the nation-state in the conceptualisation of security is responsible for creating a false sense of security, which only promotes regime, rather than individual and group security. For example, some participants referred to the manner in which independent African states embraced standing armies as a symbol of sovereignty even when it was clear that some had neither the capacity nor the desperate need for standing armies at independence.

This led to an extended discussion and calls to revisit the need for standing armies in West Africa. For participants urging the retrenchment of standing armies, the individual or group conception of security seemed to offer the most plausible way of attaining a stable and secure future in the sub-region. The proponents of this view referred to Costa Rica and Switzerland as countries that continue to enjoy an appreciable measure of stability without standing armies. It seemed logical to think in terms of demilitarising the state as a means of encouraging the people to see security as their responsibility. As an extension of this, other participants urged the conference to think seriously of conceptualising "military-less" situation without standing armies. According to these participants, the pendulum must move from the permanent notion of "militarising the state" to one of "militarising the people" or, "demilitarising society" through policies that empower individuals to take responsibility.

In all, participants agreed that there could be no "one size, fits all" approach to security. Since stability remains the ultimate objective of the search for collective regional security, the search for stability must be based on notions of individual liberty and national efficiency to be meaningful and a holistic approach to security will take West Africa nearer that goal.

2. Finding a Legal Basis for Collective Regional Security.

Discussions in this session centred around a number of separate but inter-related questions, namely: (1) What is the legal basis for ECOWAS’ peace support operations (PSOs) or military interventions? (2) How relevant are the Protocols on Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance in Defence?; (3) What should be the relationship between ECOWAS, the OAU and the UN? (4) In particular, what is the role of ECOWAS under Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter and, finally, (5) Does the new ECOWAS mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution provide a sufficient legal basis for peace support operations. (6) Is legality the only consideration or should we be considering moral, ethical, humanitarian and other issues?

In discussing these questions, the conference was fortunate to have the former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr Abbas Bundu, who played a leading role in the formation of ECOMOG, as the lead resource person. His participant observer status in the formation of ECOMOG and the monitoring group’s pioneering work in Liberia illuminated the discussion. In leading the discussion, Dr Bundu pointed out that going by the provisions of the 1975 Treaty of Lagos, which established ECOWAS, West African leaders were more concerned about the non-military aspect of regional integration, hence the treaty said nothing about regional co-operation on peace and security. Although regional security issues were important and the issues were present on the agenda of West African leaders, there was a widespread feeling that the continental body – Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations will take full responsibility for security matters.

Even when the need for a security umbrella became obvious and the Protocol relating to Mutual Defence was launched in 1981, the protocol concentrated on inter-state or border related issues and pointedly prohibited involvement in internal matters with the clause on non-interference. Yet in the context of post-cold war West Africa, in which the triggers of instability manifest themselves in internally driven, even if externally exacerbated conflicts, the inadequacy of the protocol became obvious. The Liberian civil war and the Sierra Leone internal crisis convinced the regional security leaders of the need to address internal security issues. The nature of the intervention in the two countries however raised additional questions about the need for a sustainable security architecture, rather than ad-hoc arrangements.

The discussion then focussed on the legality of the Liberian and Sierra Leone’s interventions and this produced various perspectives on the legality and legitimacy of intervention, especially in Sierra Leone where the ECOWAS intervention took a different trajectory which polarised member states more than the Liberian experience did. In examining the two interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it was Dr Bundu’s view that based on the two laws that currently govern regional action (Chapter VII and ECOWAS Protocol), no enforcement action can be taken by a regional body. Although Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows for regional mechanisms for peace support operations, this must be seen to have been done within a regional framework in which the United Nations delegates regional action. Unilateral, precipitate and unauthorised action by individual states cannot be seen as a legitimate basis for military intervention.

In sharp contrast to this viewpoint, some participants felt that any action aimed at preventing humanitarian disaster could not be described as illegal and for this reason laws guiding intervention should not be cast in stones. According to one proponent of this view, customary international law, which also regulates the conduct of states, is made by the practice of states, by convention rather than by laid down guidelines. He explained that at least in four cases – unilateral interventions had received retroactive endorsement from the United Nations. In pursuit of this line of argument, the participant explained that the intervention in Sierra Leone could be justified as a military assistance package, a humanitarian intervention or in the context of a threat to regional security. It was the view of some participants that ECOWAS while customary international law may indeed allow intervention of a type i.e. in cases of self defence, human rights violation cannot vitiate the illegality of the action taken by a group of states in the name of humanitarian intervention.

Even if this may not be legal in the context of the current international law, its legitimacy was unanimously endorsed. One participant expressed the strong view that by sanctioning unilateral action of states and/or regional institutions, especially where capacities within the region are not even handed, proponents of unilateral action may be promoting states intent on using intervention as an opportunity to eliminate legitimate but uncooperative governments rather than for the purpose of a security umbrella. Nigeria’s role under a regime such as that of General Sani Abacha raised the spectre of this scenario graphically and it also pointed out the difficulty some states had in condemning the internal problems of the country whilst it was exporting democratic principles elsewhere in the region.

In spite of this caution, many participants expressed strong sentiments for the possibility of ECOMOG serving as a basis for a new collective security arrangement in Africa since it was time for Africans to take responsibility for African security. The regional body, according to some should not be modest about its trail blazing efforts at ensuring a paradigmatic shift in international law, especially now that regional intervention is becoming the norm in the world. Consequently, the recently ratified ECOWAS mechanism was described as the most comprehensive in contemporary international law, not only because it takes internal security issues as legitimate cause (s) of intervention, but also in spawning new forms of international law for collective regional security. Another participant stressed the need to see the trajectories of ECOWAS’s role in regional security as an evolving one. He described the original ECOWAS that de-emphasised security issues as "first generation" ECOWAS, the one that has conducted intervention by ad-hoc arrangements as "second generation" ECOWAS and the "third generation" ECOWAS as one in which ECOMOG operates under the clear mandate of the regional body, not outside of it. The newly produced protocol, according to this participant, offers the opportunity for this type of regional security mechanism with a legal basis.

For other participants though, the legal challenge should not focus exclusively on the ECOMOG or the security mechanism per se. Since regional collective security refers to values, interests and norms that transcend the military element of security, the challenge is how to frame the law to ensure that illegal overthrow of legitimately constituted governments will not be allowed. This will emphasise the preventive element of conflict management, rather than the current emphasis on conflict resolution after the fact.

Although consensus was not reached on the distinction between international law and customary international law as they affect the legal basis of collective regional security, the conference agreed that the Protocol of 1981 sets the legal basis for peace support operations, but the current mechanism under discussion is set to enhance that position, hence the need for policy oriented institutions to work with governments and the ECOWAS secretariat in shaping the final outcome of the mechanism.

III. Conditions for Effective Peace Support Operations

This session was geared towards addressing what an effective peace support operations should look like – its command structure, doctrine and other operational characteristics and, secondly, to review the extent to which current ECOMOG operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau fulfilled these benchmarks. Professor Herbert Howe introduced the subject by looking at five issues that are critical to the success of any multinational force: mandate, political acceptance, composition, military capability and accountability.

On mandate – while it is appropriate to ensure that the mandate of any multinational operation is clarified, peace-keeping and peace enforcement should not be mutually exclusive. The specific situation should determine the relative value of peacekeeping versus peace enforcement. To be successful, the inter-positional force must be ready for both contingencies. However, the presenter was of the view that peace enforcement should not be used as an excuse to avoid negotiations. To be effective, any peace support operations must enjoy political acceptance both in terms of its missions and its composition. Limited acceptance within the conflict zone suggests the need for peace enforcement capability. Additionally, acceptance cannot be forced in circumstances where the operations may become embroiled in a politically charged situation or have an "illusion of neutrality". The legitimacy of peace support operations could also be called to question if it has limited acceptance internationally. Acceptance could however be enhanced by the strict enforcement of personal conduct, especially in issues of extortion and human rights violations.

The composition of a peace support operation is also a critical factor to the success of the operation. For example, a maximum number of supporting countries enhances political legitimacy of the mission and reduces accusation of hegemony or expansionist proclivities by the main supporter. It was the view of the lead presenter that a smaller number of forces from different countries are likely to help compatibility of doctrine, strategy, tactics, equipment, training and greater protection of intelligence. In this regard, it was argued that a permanent ECOMOG composed of designated battalions from various countries could address this dilemma. On military capability, any effective peace support operations needs a designated force concept, in which designated battalions could agree on inter-operability and complementarity of weapons systems. This would help co-ordinate their efforts better. Accountability becomes a critical condition for an effective peace support operation to avoid claims and counter-claims of various stakeholders. To avoid the problems of hegemony that might arise, there is need for alternative power centres or countervailing influences in the civil society and perhaps through the creation of a West African parliament.

ECOMOG can only be an effective security wing of a thriving integrative political structure. Ironically, ECOWAS remains a weak organisation, which lacks, among other things, adequate financing and enforcement authority with its sixteen members. Since the institutional arrangement is currently lacking and the structures are absent in individual states, staff colleges cannot develop or simulate scenarios that can be adapted into practical operations. Neither has ECOMOG developed a doctrine of peacekeeping in spite of the extensive experience acquired over the years.

Participants agreed that a permanent regional peace-keeping capability makes sense when compared to non African forces like RECAMP and ACRI not only because of the greater political acceptability, intimate knowledge of the conflict and the conflict terrain, more relevant military capabilities and, most importantly, greater commitment especially in the post-Somalia era in which external players show little interest and find it difficult to justify involvement in external operations to their local constituencies.

Whilst in agreement with the five conditions highlighted by the lead speaker, there was an extensive discussion of the different trajectories in which these factors may manifest themselves and how they may affect the effectiveness of peace support operations. Participants keenly stressed the point that the idea of peace support operations should not be seen as a substitute for weak national militaries. Equally, the need to acknowledge the necessity of a peace-war continuum as a feature of the current international system, was stressed. By extension, understanding peace support operations as a continuum from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement to peace making was also underlined.

To enable ECOWAS develop an effective peace support operation therefore, it was agreed that the regional body must move away from current ad-hoc arrangements to a more permanent structure for sustained military co-operation. This should include among other things: joint training and field exercises and agreement on common equipment and doctrine. A more permanent structure will however require greater regional rather than single country influence and also in terms of burden sharing. The challenge that this poses is one of sustainability. Will Nigeria, for instance, be as willing to fund a future ECOMOG if it has less control? Some participants were however of the view that ECOWAS should not be too driven by a desperate effort at achieving complementarity since there is no sub-regional mechanisms without its own hegemon. To proponents of this view, proportionality is what should be aimed at, either through the sharing of tasks among countries just as the East Africans have managed to do in the recent past or through proportional contribution to a permanent regional peacekeeping force.

Some participants however wondered if it is realistic to expect ECOMOG to be a security wing of a weak regional body when it might be more appropriate for ECOMOG to be a stand-alone regional mechanism for collective security like NATO. A participant who played a significant role in the implementation of the ECOMOG operations in Liberia stressed the need for unanimity of views at the political and military levels. According to this participant observer, one of the difficulties that ECOMOG encountered at the early stages was the lack of clarity in the chain of command. The idea of a Peace support operations commander not having a clue as to where final authority lay affects the direction and effectiveness of the force. To this end, mandate should be very clear, the force should be balanced and rules of engagement crystal clear.

Still on the clarification of roles, another participant observer explained that the Force Commander was actually everything rolled into one – military director, political leader, ambassador etc on the ground and the command structure makes the Force Commander directly responsible/accountable to the Chairman of ECOWAS through the Executive Secretary. However, this did not work as effectively as envisaged given the treacherous terrain that the Force Commander had to operate under and the tensions between various wings of the operations. With hindsight, a permanent structure would have been more appropriate, but at inception – the founding fathers saw ECOMOG as a one-off affair. The fact that it has now existed for nine years leaving member states with huge burden makes the question of affordability a serious one.

Specifically, it was felt that greater complementarity might be achieved through the establishment of a Peace keeping Training Centre. Developing relationship with other African-led bilateral and regional military support operations such as the Southern African Development Community’s ISDSC or the East African Community’s military co-operation arrangement as well as with non-African initiatives like RECAMP and ACRI especially in the area of training and resources as well as interoperability of peacekeeping doctrine and equipment, were also seen as viable options. Whilst participants welcomed the concept of international assistance to strengthen the capacity of African peacekeeping efforts, they agreed that greater clarity was needed concerning the motivation and interests of the supporters of ACRI and RECAMP since the selection criteria for the countries included in the training initiative has been shrouded in secrecy.

Underpinning all of these suggestions is the issue of funding for peace support operations to be effective. A participant observer pointed out that it was a miracle that ECOMOG actually got off the ground given the limited resources available at its inception. The highest contribution from a member state was $5 million, whilst two other countries gave $100,000 and $50, 000 respectively. At the initial stage, the international community never contributed more than $50,000 according to this participant. Yet, individual states contributing troops to UNOMIL in Liberia such as Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda received substantial support from the international community. One way of resolving the perennial problem of funding if ECOMOG is to continue, West African leaders should convince the UN Security Council to mandate our security efforts, and this should pave the way for a substantial relief that the financial burden places on countries in the sub-region. Some participants also suggested the establishment of Africans in the Diaspora fund to emphasise the need for Africans to take responsibility for their own security even if outsiders come in to help.

One option that the lead presenter suggested which generated negative reaction from many participants at the conference was the use of private military companies in the areas of specialised, non-combat operations. A long debate ensued on the appropriateness of what was termed ‘private military companies’ in the context of West Africa. One participant pointed out the danger of dependence on external mechanisms that are directly antithetical to the goal of peace building. In his view, the role of these private military companies can only be contextualised better if critical attention was paid to the trans-national dimension of these internal wars and the convoluted linkages between the trans-national corporations, private military companies, warlords and embattled governments.

Although there was eventually no unanimity of views on the role of private military companies, participants agreed that private security operations are essentially profit making ventures. They cautioned that West African countries should be aware of the consequences of hiring such firms, especially when the country is mortgaged by granting mineral or trading concessions to firms linked to private military operations. The fact that international protocols or conventions do not bind private security firms was also seen as a major problem that negates the whole issue. Participants indicated that the accountability of peace-keeping operations on the other hand is not in doubt, as shown by the experience and discipline of Canadian soldiers in Somalia and Rwanda. Even in the cases of private security firms, which offer training and other non-combat support services, they tend to be limited in their focus or mixed up with additional combat roles disguised as humanitarian or peacekeeping activities.

Given the importance of this particular issue, participants agreed on the need to investigate the issue more critically to achieve a clearer understanding of the various dimensions of private military companies’ operations. The organisers of the conference informed the meeting of their forthcoming book and conference on the subject matter, which will attempt to explore the issues in depth. (The book, Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, was published in 2000)

Given the overwhelming military focus of the discussion of peace support operations, several participants drew attention to the importance of the human security element and the need for public support gained through the involvement of people in humanitarian activities during peace support operations. It was noted that certain basic human elements like political will and confidence building will be needed in efforts at demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of various elements in society. For example, a participant stressed the importance of mainstreaming gender in peace support operations to effectively maximise the benefits of women’s power of concentration, which has proved useful in intelligence gathering, guard duties and road blocks as well as in support services in the medical field. To be effective therefore, peace support operations must establish sustained linkages with the local community and at the same time network effectively with various sectors of the traumatised community in order to build confidence and trust. In stressing support for human security through humanitarian support, some participants cautioned against the negative aspects of humanitarian support, which sometimes manifests itself in the prolongation of conflicts rather than its abrogation. Several examples were give of how this has exacerbated conflicts in the Great Lakes region as well as in West Africa.

In conclusion, participants agreed that ECOMOG’s mandate should retain enough flexibility and dynamism to enable enough room to shift from peacekeeping or enforcement to transformation especially when parties are agreed to cease-fire. ECOMOG should, under these circumstances, play significant roles in reconstruction and development activities, disarmament, demobilisation, full integration of the citizenry, training of a disciplined and loyal force and general confidence building measures.

4. The Role of Civil Society in Peace Building

In this session, the key questions that came up for discussions include the following: What are the responsibilities of the civil society in ensuring peace and stability? What should be the interface between civil society and the state in the maintenance of peace? What roles should civil society actors play in the different phases of peace support operations? How should the activities of civil society groups be co-ordinated with those of the peace force? How can civil society improve the understanding of regional forces in peace support operations?

Dr E.Gyimah-Boadi led the discussion. He defined civil society as the realm between the household and the state, populated by voluntary groups and associations, sharing common interests and largely autonomous from the state. Lying at the core of the concept, according to him are intermediate institutions and private groups that thrive between the realm of the state and family such as voluntary associations, charities, choral groups, religious associations, social clubs, professional groups and trade unions. They include NGOs and CBOs but not coextensive to it. It also includes the media.

Dr Gyimah-Boadi indicated that civil society can be organised or not, progressive or conservative, civil and uncivil, and can be for good or evil. Over the last decade, organised civil society has played a significant role in the promotion of good governance in the region. They have also been involved in specialised sectors like gender and the environment. The security sector is one area where the African civil society has not been very active but in arguing for their involvement, Dr Boadi cautioned against unrestricted roles even as all participants agreed that the energy and dynamism of the civil society can be cultivated in security issues for the purpose of peace building. The lead presenter gave the examples of the oversight functions that certain sectors of the civil society might be able to play. The press and media were seen as having an important role to play, and the need for more non-governmental organisations both at the urban and grassroots levels to engage in peacekeeping and security issues was emphasised.

Several participants agreed that the involvement of civil society in security and peace building issues at an organised level has been minimal. They however stressed the importance of contextualising this lack of involvement properly. First, some participants observed that members of the civil society have always played and continue to play important peace building roles in countries in conflict. If peace-building is taken as the sum total of activities that will support peace making and conflict transformation: demobilisation, re-structuring of the local security system – police and the military; resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced persons; removal of dangerous weapons – mines and other unexploded firearms, reconstruction of shattered infrastructure and humanitarian and disaster relief – civil society is key to the successful implementation of these various aspects of post-conflict peace building process.

Although participants agreed that the civil society can be critical to all of the elements of conflict transformation mentioned, civil society involvement in peace building and security issues will only become substantial if various sectors of the civil society overcomes the psychological barrier between the civil society and the military. Whilst this reluctance to disengage from security issues is understandable, given the military antecedents in West Africa, participants agreed that improving civil military relations is a key challenge for most West African countries. It was accepted that this could only happen through a process of demystifying the military and through the provision of countervailing sources of information about the military. Several participants, including parliamentarians noted that an evident lack of knowledge of the military has made it impossible for an informed discussion of issues relating to the military and peace building and precluded oversight functions necessary for democratic control of the military and security issues.

The burden of institutional memory was also commented on by participants as a key problem in trying to increase the role of civil society in peace building in post-conflict situations. Although civil society is needed to help heal the wounds and atrocities of war and the process of rebuilding in post-conflict situations, it is often difficult for the population that had suffered untold hardships to easily embrace their aggressors. Clearly, considerable attention ought to be paid to issues of demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants and child soldiers in post-conflict situations. To accomplish this, civilian institutions can facilitate the reinsertion of ex-combatants into mainstream society through traditional and non-traditional approaches of dealing with the past.

Ultimately, all participants unanimously agreed that until the civil society develops its countervailing capacity for independent oversight in security issues, reliance on military solutions in conflict management would continue to take a pride of place. Yet, evidence from recent efforts in West Africa clearly suggests the need for a multi-track approach to peace-making, one which promotes non-governmental, people to people efforts to conflict resolution, in spite of, rather than at the instance of governments. Participants stressed that democratic control of the military and security establishments would be the first line of action towards efforts at demilitarising public order.

V. Role of Women in Peace Building

Taking a cue from the discussions in the last session, the session dealing with the role of women in peace-building benefited from the rich and variegated experiences of two women leaders - Elise Ndoadoumngue Loum, President of the Tchadian Forum for Women in Peace and Theresa Leigh-Sherman, President of the West African Women Association, (Liberia chapter).

The two women leaders discussed women’s roles prior to, during and in post-conflict Chad and Liberia. The discussion brought out the clear tendency to underestimate the role of women in conflict management and peace building, primarily on the grounds of biological differences even where the evidence appear to suggest a result that is contrary to this assumption. Second, there emerged a tendency for discussions about women and conflict to emphasise or focus almost exclusively on the view that women are only victims of conflict, desperately in need of assistance and in no position to proffer solutions or offer assistance in the peace-building process. From the case studies presented by the two speakers, it was clear that women were central to the peace building process in the two countries. Not only did women display the capability and resourcefulness required for conflict transformation and leadership when the men were still stuck in the warring mode, as the Liberian women did when they summoned seven faction leaders to as meeting, they were also key in the re-integration process in post conflict situations and often the sole providers for the family in the course of conflicts.

Some participants however cautioned against a blanket impression of women as automatic peace-builders. Citing the example of Liberia, it was suggested that women combatants were very brutal towards their opponents just as the men and child soldiers were. Without disagreeing with this participant, it was the overwhelming view of the conference that the roles played by individual women should be properly contextualised since women often have little choice over whether they are taken to the war front or weapons of war since they are hardly in any decision-making positions in the conflict situation. Consequently, a progressive approach, which seeks, the presence of women in decision-making roles, structures and institutions of states, might reflect a new reality that encompasses women’s involvement in peace-building.

Soldiers and diplomats who had been involved in peacekeeping operations acknowledge the significant roles that women can play in peace support operations, especially in the post-conflict and reconstruction phases. Women can assist in the reintegration of combatants and displaced persons. Given their demonstrable skill in the art of reconciliation, peace making and diplomacy, women have been known to resolve otherwise sticky situations. Equally, as active players in conflicts, their local knowledge becomes a useful tool in any effort at bringing together belligerent parties, former combatants and estranged communities with a view to addressing the underlying causes and ensuring conflict transformation.

As the example of the women in the Casamance region has revealed, women have an excellent capacity to develop early warning mechanisms and intelligence gathering roles through their superior knowledge of, and understanding of their local communities. They also possess admirable skills at forming and managing effective pressure groups through the use of strategies that the communities can identify with. This way, participants agree they are able to develop effective channels through which community groups may air their differences, arrive at possible solutions before they develop into larger, uncontrollable conflicts.

In conclusion, participants were in agreement that the potential that women have to play a critical role in peace building could only be enhanced through strategies that encourage institutional structures in post conflict situations. It was accepted that the capacity of women can be enhanced through the following activities: Leadership training and empowerment at policy and decision-making levels; mainstreaming gender in all spheres of governance; awareness and consciousness raising activities for men in leadership positions and their successor generations; seeking greater participation of women at all levels of peace support operations; improvement of their mediation and reconciliation skills, and training in mainstream/alternative media for conflict prevention and deliberate inclusion strategies to empower disadvantaged and under-represented sections of society at policy and decision making levels.

In conclusion, participants acknowledged that while experiences vary from country to country, it is clear that the skills of women in peace building have been under-utilised. The need for a systematic restructuring and transformation of current efforts to enhance the overall search for sustained peace in the sub-region was thus emphasised.

VI. New Approaches / Way Forward for Sub-Regional Security

Discussions on the new approaches to sub-regional security and the final session on the way forward for sub-regional security focussed on the same issues. All the panellists in the two sessions have been responsible (and some are still) responsible for policy making in their respective countries. They were therefore able to offer insights on the following core questions: Is there a need for a permanent sub-regional force in West Africa? What are the benefits to be derived from external assistance programmes like the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)? What are the opportunities and challenges of the current mechanisms – ANAD and ECOWAS’ Mutual Assistance Defence Protocol?

The discussion on harmonisation benefited tremendously from the presence of several participant observers - Admiral Diam, the Secretary-General of ANAD, Major General Nelson of the President’s office in Senegal, General Williams of AFSTRAG and Ambassador Cheriff Diallo of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Guinea. Lt.Gen (Rtd) Arnold Quainoo of Ghana and Dr Abbas Bundu, also gave useful insights into the difficulties encountered at the political and operational levels and proffered concrete solutions. Again, even though the focus was on inter-governmental relations, the outcome emphasised people-to-people initiatives aimed at overcoming the artificial divides, triggered by the sub-region’s colonial heritage.

Although ANAD remains a security bloc of Franco-phone African countries, many participants learned, perhaps for the first time that it is not funded nor supported by France. Neither was it created with the aim of undermining the effectiveness of the ECOWAS’ security arrangement. Indeed, according to ANAD’s Secretary-General, all ANAD members are also member states of ECOWAS, which are bound by the decisions of the regional body. Although several participants agreed that the intention behind ANAD might have been what was described, the reality has been somewhat different from that rhetoric. Having acknowledged this, many also felt that ANAD currently possesses the structure for a permanent regional security mechanism that is currently lacking at the level of ECOWAS. As observed by many, although the MAD protocol of 1981 identified a Deputy Executive Secretary for Military/Security issues, that position has never been filled. It was on the basis of the above that it was suggested that perhaps one way of harmonising current efforts would be to incorporate the existing structure of ANAD if the idea of a permanent peacekeeping force gains ground. No consensus was however reached on this proposal, although many participants saw it as worthy of investigation and further debate.

In the alternative however, it was explained to conference that there are on-going discussions with respect to ANAD taking responsibility for policing smuggling and narcotics proliferation in the whole of the sub-region. It was however not clear the stage at which the discussion had reached. Some participants suggested that the new organ for conflict prevention, management and resolution should have this incorporated before it is ratified.

On current foreign military assistance programmes like ACRI, RECAMP and BMATT, participants believed that the motives behind these initiatives required careful interrogation. In the view of these participants, the manner in which the United States, for example, had introduced these initiatives with little or no regard to the views of the African governments and military even when they consult these governments underlines the necessity for wariness in embracing these initiatives. Another observer expressed concern on the new fad, which promotes training as an end in itself. According to this participant, the idea that African militaries are not professional has been over-flogged as a means of providing jobs for retired officials of the US military. Yet, no one ventures to argue that the US military is unprofessional simply because it was humiliated by a rag-tag rebel force in Somalia.

Two prominent examples of this linkage were cited. First was the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS), currently being promoted by the US government plans to have virtually its entire faculty from the United States, with a few adjunct faculty from Africa. Additionally, in spite of the repeated advice of several African security scholars that a permanent Centre located in one country was the wrong way to promote the objective of regional security, it is believed that the United States government still plans to do this. In the same vein, another participant cited the example of a planned military restructuring assistance to the recently elected government of Nigeria. According to this participant, this military assistance programme has been tied to the hiring of a prominent US’ private security firm – Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI) without due consideration to the long-term security interests of the country. The arbitrary choice of countries in the ACRI programme without any substantial input from the OAU or sub-regional institutions was seen as another manifestation of this top-down approach to military assistance.

Some participants observed that this top-down approach is not unique to the United States. They argued that the United Kingdom’s current security sector reform programme suffers from the same kind of arrogance, which comes from the mindset that Africans don’t know what they want, unless they are told by some higher authorities who is also willing to pay for this received wisdom.

There were however contrary views to the above. Some participants did not see anything wrong in the United States or any other country for that matter using their resources to promote their national security interests. The onus, according to them, lies with the African leaders, who plunge their countries into a mess and go cap in hand to beg outside interests for assistance. One participant said that if the newly elected government in Nigeria could accept assistance tied to hiring of US companies, it is the government that should be blamed, not the United States.

In her contribution, a participant from the United States cautioned against generalisations about US’s agenda in Africa. She explained that the Clinton’s administration’s strategic engagement objectives in Africa are: peace and stability, freedom and democracy and prosperity cum well-being of all Africans. This, the administration pursues through its conflict prevention, management and resolution concept, promotion of military and police professionalism and trade and sustainable development. She highlighted various programmes – ACRI, JCET (Joint Combined Exchange Programme), IMET, EMET, FMF, EDA, ACSS, HAP/CA, De-mining, MedFlag, EDA/Bio-D arguing that they are not at variance with the espoused strategic objectives of many African governments. She however conceded that implementation of these objectives may be tied to US’ domestic politics especially in situations where the US Congress shows little interest in "out of area" operations. In addition, the United States is not immune to the vagaries of bureaucratic politics, which pitches one section of the administration against another, giving room for uncertainty and confusion among policy makers.

Participants agreed that external assistance programmes has their relevance in the quest for sustainable peace building in the sub-region. They however unanimously argued that what would be most beneficial is an assistance package that enhances the capacity of local initiatives through expanded resources, rather than duplicating existing initiatives or superimposing new ones with little regard what is in existence.

While several participants readily acknowledged the need for a permanent peacekeeping force in preference to an ad-hoc arrangement, many felt that any talk of a permanent peacekeeping force was premature until the conditions responsible for instability in the sub-region are fully addressed since the solutions do not necessarily require the use of force. Instead, concerted efforts aimed at developing an effective early warning observation system for conflict prevention and an accountable, efficient state system capable of promoting broad based consensus and perhaps indigenous capacities to prevent and resolve conflicts might prove more appropriate.

Intervention itself, where inevitable, must be based on thorough analysis of the causes, dynamics and trajectories of the on-going strife. It must also be carefully and comprehensively planned taking into full account the political, economic, cultural, institutional, border related and commercial factors. Also, any plan to intervene must be based on a sound assessment of emerging international norms and a clear-sighted understanding of existing institutional capacities. If a structured mechanism is available and deployable at a moment’s notice, it should be possible to convince smaller states that the protection of their territorial integrity does not necessarily depend on a standing army, if there is a standing peace-keeping force to which they too can contribute soldiers.

Ultimately, participants reached a consensus on the need for a conflict management mechanism in which militarism and militarisation are de-emphasised. A good place to start might be a review of the ECOWAS mechanism with a view to developing the necessary linkages between security, democracy and development in the regional integration process.

VII. Conclusion and Recommendations

In enhancing cooperative regional security, the conference argued for the adoption of peacebuilding approach to national and sub-regional security, which should result in an assessment of each country’s security environment and an evaluation of the structures, roles and missions of the different security forces. The conference also ended with a number of key recommendations and management options for the regional body – ECOWAS, national security services, civil society institutions and international organisations. These include:

• An urgent need for a Lessons Learned project which allows a review of ECOMOG’s peacekeeping role in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the influence of this on subsequent regional peace support operations.
• Enhancement of regional and sub-regional early warning systems and improving coordination in the collection and management of information between ECOWAS and independent civil society institutions.
• Improvement of the capacity of ECOWAS to manage the diverse security sector transformation challenges confronting the region and strengthening the implementation of the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution.
• Management of the proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines in the sub-region.
• Establishment of stand-by arrangements for Peace Support and other combined operations and the eventual creation of a viable peacekeeping capacity and rapid reaction capabilities in the sub-region.
• Establishing the maximum degree of interoperability between national security services towards the enhancement of sub-regional capacity.
• Developing of improved regional and sub-regional managerial and command and control capabilities and mechanisms.
• Building effective civil sector capacity for peace support operations and humanitarian activities.

Conference Participants

A. Mankattah, Col Army Headquarters, Accra, Ghana

Abbas Bundu, (Dr) Former Executive Secretary, ECOWAS

Adu Amanfoh, Col Director of Peacekeeping, Ministry of Defence, Ghana

Akwasi Aidoo, Dr Ford Foundation, Lagos, Nigeria

Alexandre Diam, Admiral Secretary-General, ANAD, Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire

Arnold Quainoo (Lt. General) Centre for Conflict Resolution, Accra, Ghana

Baffour Agyeman-Duah, Dr Centre for Democracy & Development, Accra, Ghana

C B Yaache, Brig-General Kofi Annan Int’l Peacekeeping Centre, GHANA

Charles Nelson, Major General The Presidency, State House, Dakar, Senegal

Cheriff Diallo, Ambassador Centre for Conflict Resolution, Conakry, Guinea

Chris Ali, Major-General (Rtd) Former Chief of Army Staff (Nigeria)

Christine Wing, Dr Ford Foundation, New York, USA

E. Gyimah-Boadi, Dr Centre for Democracy & Development, Accra, Ghana

Elise Loum, Ms Chadian Women’s Peace Forum

Funmi Olonisakin, Dr Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, London

Hawa Yakubu, Mrs Executive Secretary, GERDDES-Afrique, Benin

Herbert Howe, Prof Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

Ishola Williams, (Rtd Maj. Gen.) President, AFSTRAG, Lagos, Nigeria

J. ’Kayode Fayemi, Dr Centre for Democracy & Development

Jendayi Fraser, Dr National Security Council, United States

Jeremy Leveille, Mr Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK

John Aggrey, Mr Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accra, Ghana

Kwame Kuan-Kouassie, Prof National University du Benin, Lomé, Togo

Margaret Agama (Dr) Ministry of Defence, Accra, Ghana

Owusu Hackman-Agyeman, Mr Shadow Foreign Affairs Spokesman, Ghanaian Parliament

Robin Luckham, Prof Institute Of Development Studies, Sussex University, UK

Sidi Alghali, Prof Presidential Advisory Council, Sierra Leone

Theresa Leigh-Sherman, Mrs West Africa Women Association, Liberia Chapter