Civil Society Consultation on the

ECOWAS Moratorium:

Beyond the UN 2001 Conference

jointly organised by

  African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)

Foundation for Security and Development

in Africa (FOSDA) 

Programme of Coordination and Assistance for Development (PCASED)

 

Venue:  Miklin Hotel, Accra

 Date:  June 7 - 9, 2001 

Rapporteur’s Report

Opening Ceremony, Thursday 7th June 2001

 

Introduction

This three-day conference began at 9.25 am on Thursday, 7th June, 2001 at the Conference Hall of the Miklin Hotel, Accra.  Participants were mainly from the West African subregion but includes others from Eastern and Southern Africa as well as Europe and North America.  (See participants list).

 

Chairman’s Opening Statement - Professor Eboe Hutchful, Executive Director, ASDR

 

Professor Hutchful, in a brief opening remark, welcomed participants, particularly those from outside Ghana, to the Civil Society Consultation on the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of light weapons.  He informed the conference that the Minister of Defence, Hon. Dr. Addo-Kufuor and the UNDP Resident Representative, Mr. Alfred Fawundu, would be represented by their respective deputies,  Hon. Eddie Akita and Mrs. Agnes Guimba-Ouedraogo.

 

Welcome Statements - Ms. Afi Yakubu, Director, FOSDA and Mr. Alfred Fawundu, UNDP, Resident Representative, Ghana

 

In the first of the welcoming statements, Ms. Afi Yakubu, Associate Director of FOSDA on behalf of the organising partners, noted that the problem of small arms is increasingly becoming an agenda at different international fora, including the UN, OAU and ECOWAS.  More significantly, civil society organisations have also been in the forefront for a better appreciation of the issue of light weapons.

 

She stressed that the conference was in preparation for the UN Global Conference in July 2001 and the renewal of the ECOWAS Moratorium due in October this year.

 

Afi stressed that probably no region in the world has suffered the lethal effects of small arms more than West Africa, expressed the hope that the meeting would lay the foundation for civil society organisations to share information and ideas on the problem and induce action towards the formulation and adoption of constructive policy options in the sub-region.

 

She regretted that two and half years after the adoption of the ECOWAS Moratorium, most West Africans hardly knew of existence of the Moratorium and/or its provisions.

 

In the statement read on his behalf by Mrs. Guimba-Ouedraogo, Mr. Fawundu, observed that opportunities for socioeconomic development had eluded the sub-region owing to the numerous conflicts resulting from the proliferation of small arms.

 

The UNDP Representative offered three reasons why he personally welcomed the subject under discussion because firstly it forms a major element of his own work as a security coordinator, and obviously impacts the efforts of the UNDP as a development partner;

 

Secondly, as a Sierra Leonean, he is keenly interested in the issue of peace in the sub-region;

 

Third, the role of civil society in fostering peace and security is crucial but often overlooked.  The efforts of CSO in this area must be assisted and encouraged.

 

According to Fawundu, the UN spends well over USD 200 billion on peacekeeping missions (mostly in Africa) compared to less than USD 50 billion for development assistance annually.

 

Drawing attention to the vicious cycle inherent the relationship between insecurity and arms proliferation, he emphasized “as the security of states worsens, the proliferation of small arms flourishes and as the arms proliferation flourishes the conflicts expand across boundaries”.  The impact of arms proliferation therefore transcends political boundaries.

 

It is against this background that the ECOWAS Moratorium needs to be sustained by governments, civil society organisations and all other stakeholders.

 

Concluding, he called on civil society organisations to strengthen their voices as a way of creating the awareness and advocacy needed to extend the Moratorium.

 

Keynote Address – Hon. Eddie Akita, MP, Deputy Minister of Defence, Ghana

 

The Deputy Minister in his introductory remarks indicated that the forum has provided an opportunity for African NGOs and their partners from abroad to fashion out a coherent African position for the historic UN Conference next month.

 

On the crucial nature of the small arms problematic, he reiterated the UN Secretary-General’s assertion that small arms proliferation was no longer a mere security issue but also an issue of human rights and development.  While admitting that small arms have been in use since time immemorial, they have in recent time become very cheap and more easily accessible.  They have also been used indiscriminately against non-combatants.

 

In Hon. Akita’s view, the adoption of the ECOWAS Moratorium in October 1998, the first of its kind in the world, is a manifestation of the determination of the people and governments of the sub-region to curtail the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.  He however, admitted that very little research has been undertaken on the movement and circulation of these  weapons.

 

The Minister expressed his government’s concern about the proliferation of small arms.  In Ghana, 40,000 small arms are currently unaccounted for; this has led to an upsurge in violence and armed robbery in the country.  As a manifestation of its commitment to curbing this menace, the Ghana Government in February this year initiated a joint operation of the police and the Armed Forces which has yielded concrete results.  But he admitted that the proliferation of small arms could not be controlled by a single country.  To him, “the notion that no conflict is purely internal is a sound starting point for the analysis on the proliferation of small arms.”

 

Concluding, he commended the organisers - ASDR, FOSDA and PCASED - for their initiative and pledged his government’s support for civil society groups campaigning for the renewal of the ECOWAS Moratorium.  He also acknowledged receipt of a letter from FOSDA calling on the government to organise a symbolic destruction of small arms on 9 July, the first day of the UN Global Conference.

 

[P.S - A formal announcement to that effect came on the second day of the conference.]

 

Chairman’s Closing Remarks

 

Professor Hutchful in his closing remarks thanked the Minister and his government for expressing their support for civil society organisations on security issues.  He pointed out that until quite recently in Ghana, civil society groups’ involvement in security issues was considered ‘illegitimate’ by the political authorities and that was why the Government’s public support for the role of gratifying. 

 

The chairman also thanked the Commandants of the Military Academy and Training School (MATS) and the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) for agreeing to mount an exhibition on Small Arms (see below).  He emphasised that it was a truly unique development in Ghana to get the military to voluntarily lay out arms to be viewed by civilians - something which could not be found in too many places in Africa.

 

Small Arms Exhibition

 

The Ghana Armed Forces mounted a Small Arms and Light Weapons Exhibition.

 

The purpose was to introduce participants to the Small Arms and Light Weapons in use by the Ghana Army.

 

Twelve stands were mounted and participants, grouped into twelve, rotated clockwise.  At each stand, an officer explained the nature and capability of the weapon.  Participants asked questions and clarifications were made.  Weapons exhibited included locally made single and double-barreled guns, AK 47s, pistols, assault rifles and hand and rocket propelled grenades.

 

At stand 12, arms collected during the Liberian civil war had been converted into productive farming implements like hoes, shovels, rakes, sickles, axes and watering cans.

 

SESSION ONE

 

Theme:            Understanding The Scourge of Small Arms

 

Chairman:       Mr. Abubakarr Multi-Kamara, Ag. Director, PCASED

 

Presenters:     Ms. Lora Lumpe, The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

                                                           

Mr. Peter Bachelor, Project Director, Small Arms Survey, Geneva

 

Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana

______________________________________________________________________________

 

 

Mr. Abubakarr Multi-Kamara, in his introductory statement, indicated that PCASED’s involvement in the conference was a practical expression of its policy goal of forging strategic partnerships with NGOs and CSOs in the achievement of its programme goals.

 

The ECOWAS Moratorium initiative calls for a concerted effort at all levels and all sectors of society to flourish.  And this is where civil society organisations play a vital role.  He noted further that peace with justice is the most enabling environment for civil society to thrive and flourish.

 

He pledged PCASED’s commitment to building a viable and sustainable partnership with NGOs and CSOs in the fields of advocacy and information as well as in the practical implementation of practical activities for preventing and reducing proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region.

 

Mr. Multi-Kamara made the following observations regarding the theme of this session:

  • Of the 500,000 people killed every year across the world an estimated 300,000 of them are killed by small arms.

 

  • An estimated 50% of illicit weapons that proliferate in Africa are used in internal conflicts, armed robbery and drug trafficking.

 

  • West Africa alone has an estimated 8 million illicit weapons.

 

  • Availability of small arms outside the formal security structures has contributed greatly in creating a cycle of violence and instability in which particularly women and children are brutalised.

 

The violence and conflict fuelled by illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms undermines good governance, jeopardizes fundamental human rights, development, political stability, social justice and peace.

 

Against this background, he hoped the UN Conference would provide an opportunity to develop an international strategy to address the serious threat of small arms proliferation across the globe.  He was however not oblivious to the problems that would prevent consensus on the solutions.

 

In conclusion, he called on the participants to :

  • Share and exchange experience on the nature and scale of the problem in West Africa and the measures to tackle it;

 

  • Share information on various activities and initiatives that will impact on efforts to influence the outcome of the UN Conference and the expected renewal of the ECOWAS Moratorium; 

 

  • Look at types of NGO and CSO initiatives and campaign actions aimed at influencing and working with governments in tackling the small arms problem.                       

 

  • Build more effective ways to better organise with a view to strengthening networking and campaigning

 

Ms. Lora Lumpe’s presentation gave an overview of the global dimensions of the problem of small arms.  Among the factors which have given global prominence to the issue of gun-running in the 1990s are:

 

  • Newly opened borders, massive post cold war arms surpluses and the rapid expansion of free trade, all contributing to arms availability and the ease of smuggling.

 

  • The humanitarian campaign against land mines which has also made it possible to organise and work against the over availability of these weapons.

 

  • In the black market, private dealers knowingly violate arms sales laws of source, transit and/or recipient states for commercial gain.

 

  • Arms originally exported legally could fall into illegal circulation through diversion, theft and capture of state security forces’ arms.

 

  • The secretive nature of arms smuggling makes it difficult to know the global (or regional) magnitude of the illegal arms traffic with any precision.

 

  • Many states are secretive about the ‘legal’ arms they are authorising for exports hence it becomes impossible to know with precision what percentage of the small arms trade is licit on illicit.

 

  • While lawfully acquired arms are just as deadly as illegally acquired ones, the latter contribute disproportionately to armed conflict and crime, since they constitute the principal supply for criminals, governments under embargo and insurgents.

 

  • Once weapons (vanish) into zones of conflict any apparent control system is rendered ineffective.

 

Measures to control small arms encounter several obstacles on the supply side:

  • Governments vary greatly in their intention, willingness and ability to prevent their territories being used for illegal gun-running purposes.

 

  • Documentation required by states for the import and export of weapons (such as end-user certificates) are commonly exploited for purpose of trafficking.

 

  • Private brokers, sellers, transport agents are becoming increasingly professionalised in putting together illegal deals.  These include the use of a chain of people and front companies, operation of aircraft or ships registered under flags of convenience and circumvention of the few rules and regulations that do exist.

 

  • Offshore banks and tax havens are used to hide large amounts of cash that are central to illegal arms sales.

 

  • The increasingly border less world allows for rapid and generally anonymous money transfers to destinations beyond the reach of that anti-money laundering efforts.

 

In addition to overcoming the many obstacles on the supply side, there is the need to focus attention on the social and economic issues that drive the acquisition of arms for crime, insurgency or self defence.

 

In her conclusion, Ms. Lumpe called:

  • For coordinated efforts at regional and global levels in all the legal and regulatory approaches, given the world-wide and interconnected nature of gun-running.

 

  • On states to police themselves and to hold accountable other states that contribute to the illegal gun trade through acts of commission or omission.

 

Peter Batchelor introduced his presentation on “Small Arms Production in Africa”, with the observation that the number of countries that produce or have capacity to produce arms, worldwide, has increased significantly since the 1980s.

 

With reference to Africa, he dismissed the common impression that small arms circulating and in use on the continent are produced elsewhere - Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, USA, China and Western Europe.  This assumption has allowed Africans to put the blame on outside suppliers. The reality is that small arms are also being produced increasingly in a number of African states.

 

Batchelor offered the following vital data on arms production in Africa:

  • There are at least 14 countries in Africa which produce or have the capacity to produce small arms and ammunition, namely, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt (North Africa); Guinea, Burkina Faso and Nigeria (West Africa); Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (East Africa/Horn); Cameroon (Central Africa); and South Africa and Zimbabwe (Southern Africa).

 

  • The two major producers, Egypt and South Africa, have well established diversified defence industries, with a capacity to produce a wide range of armaments and defence equipment including small arms.  South Africa is one of the developing world’s major producers and exporters.

 

  • Most arms production in Africa takes place in state owned and state controlled factories mostly under the direct control of the armed forces or the Ministry of Defence.  However, illicit production also occurs in some countries.

 

The problem with the production of arms in Africa is that there is hardly any data available within African countries themselves.  This is particularly true of production for domestic purposes. 

 

  • All of Africa’s small arms production capacities has been established with assistance from outside eg. Egypt (USA, Soviet Union and Belgium); Nigeria (Belgium and Italy); Zimbabwe (China), and South Africa (Britain, Germany and Belgium).

 

  • Most producers manufacture small arms and ammunition under license from foreign suppliers like Italy and Belgium.

 

  • Many of the factories also produce other non-military/civilian goods or engage in other businesses.  For example, Zimbabwe Defence Industries sells uniforms and tents while in South Africa some of the arms companies sell cricket bats.

 

Emmanuel Kwesi Aning examined the West Africa (Sub-Regional) Dynamics of the Small Arms problem.  According to him:

  • West Africa has earned the unfortunate reputation as one of the world’s leading theatres of excessive violence, intra state wars, low intensity armed conflict and violent human rights abuses.

 

  • The instruments of choice in this violence has been small arms and light weapons.

 

  • The macabre scene of violence in the sub-region is best demonstrated in the Mano River Basin comprising Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

 

He defined small arms as “both lethal and sub-lethal armaments that can be carried and operated by one person or by a crew in a light vehicle or animal,” e.g., pistols, handguns, shotguns, carbines, rifles, semi automatic weapons, bayonets etc.  More disturbing however, is the fact that other equipment not considered lethal like machetes, clubs and stones can all prove deadly.

 

Equally significant, small arms are used continuously through their life spans, usually between two and three decades.  They can also be easily recycled from one conflict area to another or from zones of conflict to zones of peace and vice versa.

 

Small arms proliferation, (i.e., the easy and excessive availability of light weapons), facilitates widespread usage, leads to protracted conflicts, increases levels of violence and crime and raises the number of refugees and internally displaced persons and civilian casualties.

 

Unlike heavier conventional weapons, small arms find themselves in the hands of police, military, civilians, rebels and militias alike.

 

The possession of small arms among civilians is not necessarily criminal is intent, but may also meet a range of legitimate human security needs such as:-

A desire to defend property or live under circumstances where the belief is strong that state security cannot be relied upon.

 

Dr. Aning identified the following sources of small arms proliferation in the sub-region:-


  • Cold war pipelines, e.g., between 1980 and 1985 US fed USD500 million of weapons into Liberia.  Most of these weapons were stolen from government armouries during the war by different factions.

 

  • Those that could be bought on the illegal or parallel markets.

 

  • Systematic ‘political leaks’ from state armouries to supporters to fight or intimidate real or imaginary enemies/opponents.

 

  • Inter-governmental support to friendly governments, which are incapable of keeping these guns.

 

  • The most dangerous but least understood and unexamined source is the increasing production, sale and distribution of locally manufactured small arms in West African states.

 

He further indicated that though some countries like Liberia and Mali have collected and destroyed arms, they have been largely cosmetic.  Other states have merely declared their intent without any fixed dates.

 

Returning to the issue of locally produced weapons he expressed fears about:

  • The false perception that local small arms are of low technological quality and thus do not have the same lethality.

 

  • The fact that the register and processes regulating the proliferation of small arms in West Africa do not take those locally produced into consideration.

 

  • The ‘macho’ culture in the sub-region where gun possession is equated to manhood.

 

Dr. Aning expressed doubt about the commitment of West Africa leaders to the ECOWAS Moratorium.  He pointed to the fact that:

  • Several states have still not set up their National Commissions.

 

  • Two and half years after adopting the Moratorium, it remains a secret document as far as most citizens and in some cases government officials are concerned.

 

He ended his presentation with recommendations.

 

At the national level, he called for

  • Increased awareness of decision-makers to the growing threat of small arms to state and societal security.

 

  • The provision of technological, human and financial resources for relevant agencies.

 

  • The imposition of control of small arms in the possession of civil society

 

  • Installation of adequate mechanism to coordinate the efforts of different agencies responsible for this issue.

 

  • Implementation of training courses for those directly responsible for enforcing national laws in the field.

 

At the regional level, there is the need to:

  • Increase cooperation to enhance the detection and monitoring of the manufacture, supply and demand of arms.

 

  • Exchange information on criminal elements and traffickers.

 

  • Foster collaboration among countries in order to implement national control measures.

 

  • Encourage information flow among the national agencies specializing in the field to improve policies and legislation.

 

  • Concerning the investigations of illicit trafficking.

 

Discussion

 

The following themes emerged in the discussion:-

  • There is a glaring lack of interest on the part of governments of the sub-region to implement the ECOWAS Moratorium.

 

  • Lack of awareness of the existence of the Moratorium among citizens owing to non existent mechanisms for education on the document.  Such ignorance on the part of the people has prevented them from exerting pressure on governments.

 

  • The increasing inability of African governments to protect their citizens to the extent that individuals tend to protect themselves and in the process small arms proliferate.

 

  • There is the fear that over emphasis on human security may divert attention from the issue of order in society.

 

  • An underlying factor to the inability to control small arms is the issue of corruption which seems to cut across everything in West Africa, hence the need for transparency.

 

  • There was a call on West African leaders to strengthen their good intentions for adopting the Moratorium by seeing to its implementation.

 

  • Care must be taken not to undermine the crucial role of the state to the legitimate use of weapons to protect its citizens.  However, there have been instances where the state itself has become the major source of insecurity.

 

  • Africans will have to tackle the issue of small arms proliferation with all the seriousness it deserves.

 

  • Civil society organisations have a crucial role to educate the public on the dangers of small arms.

 

 

SESSION TWO

 

Theme:           Making African Initiatives Work: The Case of the West African Moratorium

on Light Weapons

 

Chair: General Ishola Williams, ASFRAG, Lagos

 

Presenters:     General Cheik Oumar Diarra, Deputy Executive Secretary        (Political

Affairs, Defence & Security), ECOWAS Secretariat

 

Mr. Abubakarr Multi-Kamara, PCASED

 

Dr. Olumide A. Ajayi, Programmes Manager, African Leadership Forum, Ota,

Nigeria

______________________________________________________________________________

 

 

General Diarra’s presentation was titled “An Account from the ECOWAS Secretariat on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium.”  General Diarra indicated that the easy availability of small weapons continues to pose a serious threat to the peace and stability of the ECOWAS sub-region.  Apart from facilitating violations of human rights and increasing tensions and conflict in society, small arms also hinder post conflict reconciliation and reconstruction.

 

The adoption of the Moratorium in October 1998 signified the willingness of West African leaders to tackle the problem of the proliferation of light weapons, a major factor fro instability in West Africa for as a follow-up, ECOWAS leaders in December 1999 also adopted the comprehensive mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, to tackle the issue of conflict (including the proliferation of small arms), on a wider platform.

 

Establishing the link between the Moratorium and the Mechanism, General Diarra noted that:-

  • Article 50 of the Mechanism deals with the control of small arms and the preventive measures the community would take for their illegal circulation.

 

  • Article 51 duplicates the Plan of Action for the implementation of the Moratorium adopted by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers in March 1999.

 

  • Unlike the Moratorium, the Mechanism has no time limit.  Thus whether the Moratorium is renewed or not, the issue of the proliferation of small arms is permanently fixed on the ECOWAS agenda.

 

Equally significant is the fact that the Moratorium had led to the creation of PCASED - the Programme of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development.  It is a UN creation aimed at assisting ECOWAS in its activities for the implementation of the Moratorium and associated measures.

 

General Diarra conceded that not much has been achieved over the past three years.  An evaluation carried out by the UN, PCASED and ECOWAS has revealed that the objectives spelt out in the Plan of Action were over ambitious in view of the unavailability of structures, mechanisms, funds etc within the member states, the ECOWAS Secretariat, and PCASED.

 

It has therefore become necessary to adopt a more realistic approach by focussing on areas that can achieve meaningful results.  The priority areas chosen are:

  • Establishing and strengthening the National Commissions;

 

  • Training of the armed forces and other national security personnel;

 

  • Developing an effective media and communication strategy and establishing partnership with organisations and actors holding similar interests as a means of expanding and strengthening application of the Moratorium;

 

  • Developing the Arms Register and Data Base;

 

  • Adopting a more aggressive resource mobilisation strategy.

 

On the issue of the renewal of the ECOWAS Moratorium, he indicated that:

  • ECOWAS Foreign Ministers have recently acknowledged in Bamako that the fight against light weapons is a continuous one and pledged their support;

 

  • The ECOWAS Secretariat has received several appeals from CSOs both within and outside the subregion in support of renewal;

 

  • The recommendations from the evaluation meeting if adhered to would certainly boost the implementation.

 

He concluded his presentation acknowledging the support of countries of the Wassenar Agreement particularly Germany and the United Kingdom.  They require that exports of light arms from their member states to any ECOWAS State should be channeled through the ECOWAS Secretariat for the grant of exemption certificates.

 

Mr. Multi-Kamara, made a “Review of Associated Measures and Implementation Arrangement”.  He indicated in his introduction that the up coming UN Conference to discuss small arms and light weapons in all aspects has made it likely that the ECOWAS Moratorium would be given an extended lease of life.  However, there was the need to generate renewed momentum and support for the renewal of the Moratorium as well as assistance for its implementation.

 

In his view, the West African Moratorium represents a concrete and comprehensive attempt to come to grips with the problems posed by uncontrolled flow of light weapons.  It is built on the premise that economic and social developments are dependent on a secure and stable political environment.

 

On the implementation of the Moratorium:

  • The primary responsibility lies with individual member states;

 

  • The ECOWAS Secretariat has the crucial role of providing over all political leadership and coordination;

 

  • PCASED is the main implementation mechanism for the associated measures.

 

Among the associated measures relating to the regulation and management of legal arms transfer are:

  • The National Commissions, assigned the primary responsibility for managing and overseeing the implementation of the Moratorium in member states;

 

  • Exemption procedures on Legal Transfers to meet the legitimate requirements, primarily for national security and peacekeeping;

 

  • Arms Register and Data Base to ensure exchange of information among member states;

 

  • Peacekeeping weapons Register to control the transfer of weapons following peacekeeping operations;

 

  • Visitors Certificate to control the movement of arms in and out of a country by visitors.

 

  • Dialogue with Arms Producers and Suppliers (a novelty under the Moratorium).

 

Commenting on these measures, the PCASED Director declared that the ECOWAS Secretariat has received several applications for exemptions.  While this is an encouraging indication that the provisions are being respected, it is not sufficiently representative of the prevailing picture of arms transactions in the sub-region.  There is therefore the need for clear exception guidelines and for more effective exchange of information between producers and suppliers of light weapons on the one hand and the ECOWAS and PCASED on the other.

 

The establishment of a new Department of Political Affairs, Defence and Security headed by a Deputy Executive Secretary is likely to improve the capacity within the ECOWAS Secretariat for matters of conflict management.

 

Among the associated measures to reduce and prevent the destabilising accumulation and proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons are:

  • Collection and Destruction of surplus and Unauthorized Weapons.

 

  • Training of Law Enforcement Officers.

 

  • Enhancing Border Controls.

 

  • Review and Harmonisation of National Legislation and Administration Procedures.

 

  • Awareness Raising and Involvement of Civil Society in Practical Activities.

 

  • Resource Mobilization.

 

Concluding, Mr. Multi-Kamara emphasised that despite its initial problems, the ECOWAS Moratorium represents a model worthy of emulation by other regions in Africa.  There still remains a common vision among ECOWAS states about the goal and its long term implications for the stability, peace and development of the region.

 

Dr. Olumide Ajayi’s paper was “Mobilising Against Small Arms Proliferation: The Role of Civil Society Organisations using the CSSDCA Framework”, in which he attempted to introduce a set of containment strategies.

 

He noted that small weapons do not just gravitate to a particular region without reason, nor are they harmful in themselves.  They become an object of concern only within a certain environment.  In Africa, proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a response to inherit weaknesses in the socioeconomic and political environments within the continent.  These inducements include:

  • Governance problems such as mismanagement of resources, marginalisation, non-adherence to the rule of law and human rights, rampant corrupt practices, ineffective policing, ethnic domination and manipulation.

 

  • Weak national and regional legislation as regards the manufacture, trade and use of small arms as well as inadequate information and communication infrastructure.

 

  • Porous state armouries.  Owing to economic deprivation and lack of motivation, state defence  and police officials sell or barter official weapons for monetary gain.

 

  • Current conflict zones are also major sources of supply and accumulation of small arms.

 

  • Pecuniary motives on the part of the manufacturers and benefactors of conflicts are also a major motivation for production and distribution of small arms and light weapons.

 

  • Lack of political will and consensus among leaders in the countries of origin as well as those of the recipient countries.

 

Given the above underlying factors, it becomes clear that arms proliferation is a multi-faceted phenomenon that requires concerted effort and strategies.

 

To effectively control these tools of violence, a comprehensive approach to peace building is required as a fundamental process in addressing all the ramification of small arms proliferation.

 

It is in this direction, Dr. Ajayi noted, that the implementation of the principles of the Conference on Security Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) becomes relevant.

 

The CSSDCA, introduced in 1991 by African Leadership Forum (ALF) through the Kampala Document, is premised upon a general principle of interdependency which states that stability and development of every African country is intricately linked with other African countries.  The CSSDCA has four components, referred to as calabashes.  These are Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation.  Dr. Ajayi concentrated on the security calabash and emphasised that:

  • The concept of security must go beyond military considerations to embrace all aspects of society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community, local and national life.

 

  • The security of a nation must be based on the security of the individual citizen to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs while being able to participate fully in societal affairs and enjoying freedom and fundamental rights.

 

  • Among the deep-rooted causes of in security are lack of democracy, denial of personal liberties, abuse of religion, imbalance in public resource allocation, favouring military expenditures over other sectors of national life and the absence of proper machinery for the control and management of public funds.

 

Discussing the way forward he stated that, it should be the sacred responsibility of all African governments, individually and collectively to ensure the security of the African people in order to ensure stability and development.  He called for the activation and prompt enactment of the following policy measure:

  • Strengthening mechanisms for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration in African.

 

  • Creation of a continental peacekeeping machinery as an instrument for the reservation of peace.

 

  • Confidence-building measures including exchange of information on troop locations and movements; joint military training, joint studies and seminars on security issues.

 

  • The signing of a non-aggression treaty among all African countries.

 

  • Lowering of Military Expenditures.

 

  • Establishment of an African Elders Council for Peace comprising distinguished African elder statesmen, women and personalities.

 

Dr. Ajayi was insistent that African CSOs must be fully involved in shaping the security framework in Africa because:

  • CSOs are often better placed to respond quickly to emergencies, and with far less ambiguity;

 

  • The personal security of individual officials in power must be delinked from the security of the African state system, since the two should not be synonymous.

 

On the particular important roles that CSOs and NGOs have to play in helping to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, he identified:

  • Research and original thinking on strategies for controlling small arms.

 

  • Organisation of fora for discussion of common approaches and the sharing of practical experiences.

 

  • Tracking the flow of small arms.

 

  • Investigating practices and patterns in small arms proliferation such as brokering agents.

 

  • Arranging strategic meetings and training for the media on how to properly define and focus on arms proliferation and its implication for peace and stability in Africa.

 

  • Helping in designing new programmes and initiatives and the evaluation of the performance of existing small arms - related projects.

 

  • Collaborating on regional and continental basis for lobbying and advocacy so as to bring small arms-related issues to the public domain.

 

  • Organising Annual Essay Writing Competition on culture of peace among the youth.

 

For Civil Society Organisations to effectively play these roles with maximum impact:

  • Governments, regional and inter-governmental organisations like UN, OAU and ECOWAS must see them as active partners in the resolution of arms proliferation problems.

 

  • Governments and intergovernmental organisation must be willing to support initiatives of CSOs with human and material resources.

 

  • CSOs should be clear of their roles so as not to duplicate the efforts of the governments.

 

Discussion

 

Below were highlights of the discussion, which followed the presentation:

 

  • he reluctance of some governments to set up the National Commission and the fact that some of those set up were by presidential decree rather than parliamentary legislation.

 

  • Because of the unwillingness of governments to give fair representation to civil society organisations on the National Commissions, there was a call on PCASED to make that a conditionality.

 

  • The state sometimes becomes a major source of arms proliferation when it distributes arms to their supporters to defend themselves or terrorise their opponents.

 

  • Could CSOs escape blame for not educating the public on the Moratorium and other related measures when they (the CSOs) were represented at meetings where those measures were signed?

 

  • For CSOs to be effective, they must be organised at the national levels with coalition and networking at the sub-regional level.

 

  • Could the National Commissions be independent enough to perform their functions when members are appointees of governments?

 

  • The designation of Monrovia and Ouagadougu as capitals of two of the ECOWAS observatory zones was seen as anomalous given the two states’ record in the role of illicit arms.

 

The chairman for the session, General Ishola Williams when summing up raised a number of questions for further consideration:

  • What are the social costs of small arms proliferation in Africa?

 

  • Do small arms determine the social dynamics of African states?

 

  • Is security becoming a private enterprise in Africa?

 

  • Are we developing a culture of violence in Africa?

 

  • Have we lost confidence in our traditional conflict resolution mechanisms?

 

 

 

SESSION THREE

 

Theme:           Towards the Renewal of the West African Moratorium

 

Chair: General Cheik Oumar Diarra, ECOWAS Secretariat

 

Presenters:     Ms. Afi Yakubu, FOSDA, Accra

 

Mr. Anatole Ayissi, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

(UNIDIR), Geneva

 

Ms. Lora Lumpe, Nisat, Oslo

______________________________________________________________________________

 

 

Ms. Afi Yakubu, in her presentation on “The Campaign for the Renewal of the Moratorium”, gave an elaborate description of the small arms and light weapons situation effects in West Africa in general and Ghana in particular.

 

·        There are eight million small arms outside the control of governments in West Africa out of which 40,000 are in relatively peaceful Ghana.

 

  • West Africa has earned the unenviable reputation of the mother theatre of excessive violence and irrational wars.

 

  • Small arms in (West) Africa has also become an issue of gender, poverty and environmental degradation.

 

  • According to ICRC estimates, 18 months after conflicts have ended, 60% of the population of communities in the crossfire still live with tangible injuries sustained from small arms.

 

On the Moratorium, she indicated that while West African leaders should be commended for introducing such a regulatory mechanism to control small arms, they have rather been reluctant to inform and educate their citizens about the document.

 

Under what she described as “The Moratorium Barometer”, the FOSDA Director outlined the pluses and minuses of the Moratorium”.

 

On the positive side:

  • It is the first of its kind as a regional mechanism for small arms control.

 

  • Though not legally binding, states have complied by applying for permission to purchase ammunition.

  • It has increased transparency in discussing military procurement.

 

  • It has raised the issue of the need for small arms register for peacekeeping in West Africa.

 

  • It has encouraged the establishment of National Commissions against Small Arms in Mali, Niger, Guinea, Gambia, Togo etc.

 

  • A regional curriculum for Training of Trainers has been developed by ECOWAS and PCASED.

 

  • The Moratorium has put West Africa in the forefront of the international campaign against small arms.

 

On the negative side:

 

  • In spite of the Moratorium, civil wars have continued to wreak havoc in the sub-region.

 

  • The Moratorium has failed to curtail the re-cycling of weapons from one conflict zone to another in the sub-region.

 

  • There is no effective arms collection and destruction strategy on the ground.

 

  • The Moratorium is silent on how the skills of the ingenious local gun manufacturers can be rechannelled into a more constructive human resource rather than the manufacture of killer weapons.

 

  • There is no organised civil society network to take the Moratorium into the homes and offices of the people and to campaign for its renewal.

 

FOSDA in its own little way has done the following to educate the public and advocate the renewal of the Moratorium:

  • A quarterly bulletin, FOCUS on Small Arms in West Africa, dedicated to researching, informing, educating people on/about small arms.

 

  • An appeal in the FOCUS to all readers to write personal letters to the ECOWAS chairman  in support of renewal.

 

  • A similar appeal is launched through the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), on the website ( with tremendous response in both cases.

 

  • A letter from FOSDA to Ghanaian President, J. A. Kufuor for symbolic destruction of small arms on 9th July 2001, the first day of the UN Conference (NB. An official response to that effect came on the second day of the conference).

 

  • Forthcoming publication of a research on local manufacture of small arms in Ghana.

 

  • A FOSDA poster against the illegal possession of guns with the inscription “An Unauthorised Gun Keeper is a Security Risk: Make Ghana A Gun-Free Nation”.

 

In conclusion, Ms. Yakubu made the following recommendations on behalf of FOSDA:

  • Civil Society groups should meet to review the content of the Moratorium and suggest improvement to the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.

 

  • The formation of a West African Network of CSOs with an e-mail to mount a vigorous campaign for renewal.

 

  • The development of a media-friendly relationship so that many policy makers, politicians, parliamentarians, civil society groups can understand that renewal of the Moratorium is in the interest of democratic forces.

 

  • Lobbying West Africa leaders during the ECOWAS summit in Bamako.

 

Mr. Anatole Ayissi shared his experiences working on “Project on Peace Building and Practical Disarmament in West Africa” with UNIDIR.

 

The basic objective of the project which began in January 1999 is “the promotion of the role of West African Civil Society in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region”.

 

Among the major objectives of the project are to:

  • Inform and raise awareness on the problems of small arms and light weapons proliferation in the subregion;

 

  • Undertake research with locally-based civil society in peace, security and disarmament to produce collaborative publications;

 

  • Organise in West Africa, national and regional debates aimed at promoting confidence and building transparency, sharing experiences, learning lessons and forming policy recommendations;

 

  • Build local capacities for peace and security research and light weapons monitoring regimes;

 

  • Work for transparency and facilitate participation in decision-making and implementation of small arms and light weapons policies.

 

  • Enhance confidence building and strengthen regional peace through community-based and cross-border arms control and peace building.

 

·        Assist in the establishment of a culture of peace and disarmament.

 

The project operates in partnership with local non-governmental and community-based organisation and for the past two years concentrated its activities in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

 

Most of the lessons learnt from concrete experience in West Africa are related to:

 

  • The role of small arms and light weapons proliferation in violence escalation;

 

  • The fundamental weakness in peace building and practical disarmament;

 

  • The role of civil society in Peace building;

 

  • The nature of the West African security complex.

 

  • The high personalization of conflict in the region.

 

  • Ethnic polarisation and cross-boarder pericolation of conflicts.

 

  • The importance of co-operation and partnership in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

 

  • The importance of transparency, information-sharing and accountability in disarmament and security sector reform policies.

 

Elaborating on some of the above experiences, he emphasized that civil society must play an important role in disarmament and peace building endeavours since it is directly affected by the security and humanitarian threats created by small arms proliferation.  An analysis of a few success stories in post conflict disarmament initiatives such as in Northern Mali suggests their, the involvement of civil society has been a key factor for progress, where ownership of the arms collection and destruction initiatives was given to the local communities.  On the other hand, the Sierra Leone diarmament process failed largely because of the top-down implementation policy which left no room for civil society.

 

On the importance of cooperation, he noted that the fight against proliferation of small arms in West Africa is a highly complicated task that necessitates a tremendous mobilisation effort in terms of human, material and financial resources.  Cooperation among relevant actors (governmental and non-governmental) is also important.

 

Looking at the way forward he called for:

  • Empowering Civil Society  through but also beyond the state.

 

  • Prioritising specific groups within civil society such as women, young people, religious and traditional leaders and the mass media, which have high peace building potential.

 

  • Acting beyond capital cities.

 

  • Cross-border networking.

 

  • Building and enhancing local research capacities in disarmament and peace building.

 

Ms. Lora Lumpe’s presentation was on “International Support and Advocacy” with the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) as a case study.  NISAT is a coalition of three NGOs, made up of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, the International Peace Research Institute and the Norwegian Red Cross.  It was formed in 1977 on the anniversary of the year in which several Red Cross workers were killed.  It was therefore formed out of humanitarian concerns.

 

The coalition works in following ways:-

  • Mobilising church agencies and other networks.

 

  • Supporting regional activities of CSOs.

 

  • In West Africa, it is focussed on the Moratorium.

 

  • Conducting research and publication as well as production of videos.

 

  • Bringing regional partners to the UN Conference.

 

There are similarities between the circumstances of civil society groups in Europe, America and West Africa in these respects:

  • They do not get the message to those at the grassroots.

 

  • They do not put enough pressure on the politicians to get them to oblige.