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CITIZEN’S FORUM FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (CFCR) Memorandum submitted to the Presidential Committee on Provisions and Practice on Citizenship and Rights in Nigeria February 8th 2002 Jibrin Ibrahim PhD, Convenor and Otive Igbuzor, Secretary Citizen’s Forum for Constitutional Reform 20 Olabode Close, Ilupeju, Lagos P. O. Box 15700, Ikeja Email – cfcr@cddnig.org & lawgroup@skannet.com Tel/Fax – 01 4934420, 8043221, 4939289 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY There is a crisis of citizenship and rights in Nigeria’s constitutional history. The numerous ethno-religious and communal conflicts, which the country has experienced over the years, are largely rooted in the problem of citizenship. The problem as will be shown in this memorandum, is not so much in the conditions listed for attaining the status of Nigerian citizenship such as by birth, registration and naturalisation. Rather, it has to do with provisions in the constitution, which relate to who can be recognised as an indigene of a state and local government. These provisions are additional preconditions for having access to certain rights and privileges, which the same 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria purports to confer on all Nigerian citizens. Additionally, the memorandum captures how political behaviour could be moderated through state institutions, policies and inter-group relationship as well as constitutional provisions. The major recommendations put forward in this memorandum are as follows: Ø There is need for dialogue and consensus building both at the national and local levels. Ø The reform of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should be accorded the necessary priority. There is need to provide for residency rights in the Constitution. The reform would affect Section 147, where a new provision would replace indigeneity with a five-year residency requirement. We also recommend that that Section 26 (2) be amended to guarantee conferment of citizenship on foreigners married to Nigerian women. Ø The provisions on social and economic rights should be made justiciable. Ø Independent commissions should be entrenched in the constitution. Ø Promote governance, transparency, accountability, and openness in the running of public affairs as well respect for due process and the rule of law. Ø There is need for political and civic education for the Nigerian people. Ø Workshops and seminars should be organised for media practitioners to emphasise the need for professionalism, integrity and social responsibility in the reportage of conflicts.
RESOLVING THE DILEMMA OF CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS IN NIGERIA
PREAMBLE: The Nature and Dimensions of the Crisis of Citizenship and Rights Nigeria provides a good example of a deeply divided society. In terms of ethnic composition for example, it has been estimated that the country is inhabited by about 470 ethnic groups. These groups are not only distinguished by language, customs and myth of origins, but they also vary in size, power and influence, making Nigeria a classic example of a country with unequal ethnic relations. The country is also marked by cultural, geographical and religious heterogeneity. It is in recognition of this that the architects of modern Nigeria, especially the early nationalists settled for a federal system of government as a mechanism for coping with problems associated with the deep ethnic and religious divisions that exist. Over the years, as part of the efforts to cope with the problems of a multi-ethnic society and to accommodate differences in the true spirit of “unity in diversity”, decision/policy makers have adopted a number of measures. Some of these measures include the creation of new states and local governments and the entrenchment of certain provisions in the constitution to guarantee fairness and equity such as the “federal character” principle enshrined in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Consociational measures of this type which involve some elements of power sharing and a deliberate attempt to regulate competition and access to resources/opportunities as a means of protecting groups considered to be relatively disadvantaged are not alien to federal systems. However, in the Nigerian context this has had a boomerang effect in the sense that problems, which they are meant to solve, are reinforced. Consociational measures or related policies that emphasise “ethnic arithmetic” are meant to moderate the divisive nature of ethnic and regional competition for power and opportunities. Unfortunately, in the Nigerian situation, especially due to the manner in which they have been implemented, the result is the heightening of ethnic tension and ill feelings. A good example of such measures which has created more problems than it was intended to solve is the provisions in the constitution regarding the implementation of the federal character principle which limits existing opportunities to those defined as “indigenes”. The consequence is that millions of Nigerians who find themselves in "effective" residency in places other than where they can claim ‘indigeneity' or where they can be accepted as “indigenes” are labelled as "strangers and "settlers". Nigerians so defined are subjected to all kinds of exclusions and deprivations, which differentiate them from the “natives”, and members of the” host communities”. What this does immediately is to place obstacles on the path of Nigerians who are so labelled from the enjoyment of their full citizenship rights which are formally guaranteed in the elaborate provisions in the constitution regarding the Fundamental Rights of citizens. Indeed, as one moves out of his/her local government of "origin", where he/she can lay claims to, and authenticate his/her status as an “indigene”, the quality of citizenship diminishes. The numerous incidents that have taken the form of communal violence and ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria are primarily rooted in the crisis of citizenship. There are numerous examples. They include the well known long and standing fratricidal war between the Hausa and the Kataf (Atyab) in Zango-Kataf in southern Kaduna, the protracted Jukun/Tiv conflict in Wukari, and the Chamba and Kuteb conflict in Taraba as well as the deadly confrontation in Nasarawa between the Bassa and Ebira. In these cases, different ethnic groups are pitched against one another. But similar conflicts have been recorded within groups who share the same historical and linguistic affinities as the examples of the Ife/Modakeke crisis and the Umuleri/Aguleri conflict have clearly shown. The sheer weight of human tragedy that has accompanied these conflicts in terms of deaths of thousands of people, the destruction of property and the displacement of population draw attention, not only to the security threat they pose to the state, but the potential danger they pose to the country’s nascent democracy. The events in Benue state in October 2001 which brought the Nigerian Army directly into confrontation with the Tiv, one of the warring parties to the protracted Wukari communal strife brings into bolder relief, the implication of the crisis of citizenship for state legitimacy. More recently, to be specific in September 2001, the city of Jos which has attracted the appellation “home of peace and tourism” for its long history of inter-ethnic tolerance and harmony experienced an unprecedented ethno-religious violence. Like many of the numerous examples cited above, the violence has its origin in the crisis of citizenship. It is easy to identify other factors, which account for ethnic and communal violence in Nigeria. For instance, some may simply wave them aside as resurgence of old animosities that colonial apologists had described as “inter-tribal wars” which allegedly characterised pre-colonial inter-group relations. They can even be explained in terms of the Nigerian economic crisis and the harsh economic realities, which have heightened the level of anxiety, fear and uncertainty. Such an explanation will not be out of place because under the prevailing situation individuals and groups tend to be less tolerant and more prone to violence. Similarly, it may not be out of place to explain these occurrences in terms of the deliberate exploitation of differences by opportunistic politicians and the elite in advancing their narrow interests. While all these explanations are not altogether useless, it is important to recognise in the first place that there is a fundamental defect in the way in which we have posed the issue of citizenship in this country. The problem as will be shown in this memorandum is not so much in the conditions listed for attaining the status of citizenship such as by birth, registration and naturalisation. Rather, it has to do with provisions in the constitution in relation to who is to be recognised as an indigene of a state and local government as a precondition for having access to rights which the same 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria confers on all Nigerian citizens. Although the basis of the crisis of citizenship is in Nigeria’s colonial and post-colonial history, and the conflicts arising from it had been there before the recent return to democratic rule, the general expectation is that democracy should provide the most congenial environment for finding lasting and enduring solution to the problem. Surprisingly, this has not been the case as clearly borne out by the numerous examples of communal violence and ethno-religious conflicts that have appeared to exert enormous stress on the new democratic experiment in the country. OUTLINE OF THE MEMORANDUM In this memorandum efforts have been made to follow the guidelines provided by the Presidential Committee on Provisions and Practice of Citizenship and Rights in Nigeria. For this reason, the memorandum is divided into five sections including the preamble. Section 2 deals with the intent and implications of the constitutional provisions on citizenship and fundamental rights highlighting the limitations of the provisions on citizenship and rights. Section 3 attempts to identify the conflict between the provisions on citizenship and rights on the one hand, and the issue of “indigenship”, “settler”, “host community” and “natives” on the other. The measures put forward to ensure a harmony between the legal provisions and practical application of the constitutional provisions form the focus of Section 4. Section 5 focuses on the roles of government and community leaders in eliminating conflicts arising from the tension between the legal provisions and the practical applications. Section 6 provides the conclusion and recommendations.
SECTION 2
THE 1999 CONSTITUTION, CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS Without doubt, the framers of the 1999 Constitution, like all the previous constitutions, had the intention of using the provisions on citizenship and fundamental rights to promote the national political objectives of building a united and free society for all Nigerians, and to as much as possible, promote reciprocal obligations between state and citizens. This is in keeping with the vision of the founding fathers of modern Nigeria as espoused in the anti-colonial struggle, which led to the attainment of independence on October 1, 1960. These objectives re-echo in many important national documents such as the Second National Development Plan and the various constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Second National Development Plan clearly stated that the goal of national development is to build a strong and buoyant economy, a free, democratic and egalitarian society in which no one is oppressed on the basis of sex, ethnic and religious differences. The provisions on Citizenship and Fundamental Rights in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are contained in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The most salient provisions are as follows. Chapter 3 which focuses on Citizenship basically contains provisions relating to citizenship by birth, registration and naturalisation in addition to provisions relating to dual citizenship, renunciation and deprivation of citizenship. While chapter 4 provides a detailed checklists of the fundamental rights which are the entitlements of Nigerian citizens. These include the right to life, right to the dignity of the human person, the right to personal liberty as well as the right to fair hearing and the right to family and private life. Others are: the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, right to freedom of expression and the press, the right to freedom from discrimination, the right to freedom of movement and the right to acquire and own immovable property. As can be gleaned from the above, there is nothing to suggest that the enjoyment of these rights have discriminatory application. A reading of other relevant provisions of the constitution lends credence to the point that the promotion of the political objectives of national integration and cohesion are of central concern to the constitution. For instance, Chapter 2, Section 14 (3) provides as follows: The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies. Section 14 (4) calls on the states and local governments in the country to implement the federal character principle. Furthermore, Section 15 (3) of the same chapter states that: “For the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the duty of the state to (a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the Federation; (b) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation.” It is also instructive to note that the Constitution allows anyone to contest election anywhere he/she wishes, as indigeneity is not a requirement for election into such bodies as the Senate, the Federal House of Representatives, or the State Houses of Assembly. The 1999 Constitution goes further to encourage “inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic or linguistic associations or ties in Section 15 (3c). What seem problematic however is the constitutional provisions regarding the implementation of the federal character principle. The issues of federal character and quota system have their origins in the recommendations of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) in 1976, which had reasoned that there was need to give every ethnic group in the country a sense of belonging. At the risk of repetition, Section 14 (3) of the 1979 Constitution which captures the reasoning of the CDC defined the objective of federal character as ensuring that the "composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies, and the conduct of its affairs, shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria, and the need to promote national unity, and also to command loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or form a few ethnic groups or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies". However, this provision has made it more convenient for the aspiring politicians and ambitious elite to hang on to birth and descent criteria to determine citizenship. In this sense the most problematic aspect of the issue of citizenship derives from the way in which the `indigeneity' clause in the 1979 constitution has tended to legitimise discriminatory practices against Nigerians of certain ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, especially for those who reside within a state, which is "not their own". According to the constitution, “indigeneship” of a state is conferred on a person whose parents or grandparents were members of a community indigenous to a particular state. We shall return to the specific ways in which the issue of “indigenes” and “natives” have provided practical obstacles to the implementation of the rights conferred on Nigerians by their citizenship of the Nigerian state in Section 3 below. The 1999 Constitution which resulted from the amendment of the 1979 Constitution, apparently in recognition of the controversy generated by the “indigeneity” clause, removed it from the previous sections regarding the implementation of the federal character principle. However, the caveat to Section 147 regarding the appointment of Ministers seem to suggest that the notion of “indigeneity” can hardly be expunged from the constitution. It states: “Provided that in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each state, who shall be an indigene of such state. (emphasis added). What this means in effect is that, Nigerians who cannot prove that they are indigenes of a state cannot be appointed into such positions no matter the length of their residence. The implication is that a tension exists between the formal provisions in the constitution on citizenship and fundamental rights on the one hand, and the practical application of these rights because of notions such as “indigenes”, “natives” and “settlers”. These categories have tended to undermine the very essence of Nigerian citizenship in the sense that one is not really a citizen of Nigeria, but only a citizen of the place to which he/she is indigenous. The result is that it has created a multi-layered system of citizenship as follows:
i. Those most privileged are those who belong to the indigenous communities of the state in which they reside. ii. Those citizens who are indigenes of other states are less favoured. iii. The least favoured are those citizens who are unable to prove that they belong to a community indigenous to any state in Nigeria. iv. Women who are married to men from states other their own are in a dilemma as they can neither be accepted in their “states of origin” or that of their husbands. v. Foreigners who are married to Nigerian women.
In addition to these, it is particularly difficult for migrants in rural locations to have access to farmlands because indigeneity implies membership of the local ethnic community which also gives undue power to the traditional ruler in regulating access to land understood as the collective, natural possession of the ethnic group. In the section which follows immediately, attempt is made to show the specific ways in which categories such as “indigenes”, “natives” and “settlers” are at conflict with the idea and practice of national citizenship in Nigeria.
SECTION 3
“INDIGENES”, “NATIVES”, “SETTLERS” AND THE PROBLEM OF CITIZENSHIP Categories such as “indigenes”, “settlers”, and “natives” are social and political constructions of the Nigerian ruling or power elite in their search for legitimacy within the local community/state and their quest for access to power and resources. In the ordinary meaning of the words, “indigenes” and “natives” simply refer to a region or country of birth, sons of the soil, aborigines and autochthones. In countries such as the United States of America and Australia with unique history of conquest of indigenous populations such as the native Indians (United States) and Aborigines (Australia), it may be more or less straightforward to use these categories to delineate between the natives and conquerors or settlers. Such may be difficult in the case of Nigeria given her peculiar history of state formation, constant migration of people and population shifts in the period prior to colonisation. More often than not, so-called indigenes and natives are pitched against settlers in deadly confrontations over access to local power, resources and questions of identity. To this extent these categories are used in a very negative manner to mobilise peoples’ sentiments and feelings that negate the national political objectives of integration and the evolution of a harmonious political community. Given the peculiar history of Nigeria just alluded to, every group resorts to history in order to prove its claim to the indigeneity of some specific local political space which is therefore, the major source of communal violence and ethno-religious conflicts in both urban and rural Nigeria. This point which we will return to later remains a major obstacle to the universal application of citizenship rights in Nigeria. Citizenship is applicable to a person endowed with full political and civil rights in a state. It has much to do with the political, civil and social rights attributable to the individual as a member of a state. In the modern state the acquisition of citizenship can be through birth (the law of blood), law of place, and through naturalisation. The notion of citizenship was developed in the context of bourgeois revolution and the ascendancy of liberalism. The idea evolved with the collapse of feudalism and the medieval state, which limited the rights, and freedom of the individual. The rights and freedom, which were won and secured with the birth of the modern state therefore, transformed the individual from subject to citizen. Citizenship is thus defined in terms of the special status granted by the state to its members and expresses at the formal level, the equality of all before the state. The rights of citizens essentially include political, civil and social rights. More often than not, the rights of citizens are limited to the right to life, freedom of religion, peaceable assembly and freedom from discrimination to mention just a few. Ordinarily, the rights of a citizen should include social rights such as the right to employment, education and to economic well being. In the contemporary Nigerian context, the discourse on citizenship and the application of citizens’ rights often generate political tension and violence because it is intricately tied with the issue of ethnic identity and ethnicity. This is the case in so far as indigeneity is tied to membership of a particular local ethnic community. At the heart of the discourse on citizenship and rights therefore, is the question of ethnicity and its political mobilisation by the politicians and the power elite. There are three reasons why ethnicity is problematic in relation to the discourse on identity and citizenship:
1. Ethnic identity is not a fixed form of identity. Although it may appear as a natural community distinguished by a common language, ancestry and myth of origin as well as a common consciousness of being one in relation to others, it is not a static category. It is therefore, subject to frequent reconstitution and redefinition. It is interesting to note for example, that from what the British colonialist identified as 90 ethnic groups in the early part of the last century, the number has expanded to over 470. Indeed, ethnic identity in Nigeria is quite recent and therefore, in constant need of redefinition, recomposition and reconstitution. In the present context of the crisis of identity, we are witnessing the emergence of new ethnicities, including groups who trade in new names with the ones given to them by others. 2. The state of unequal ethnic relations defined in terms of access to state power and resources. What exists in Nigeria is simply a state of ethnic relations characterised by intense unequal competition for resources of the state, the most sought after being the appropriation of state power, particularly its coercive and resource allocating elements. 3. Finally, it ignores the historical processes of integration of various communal groups that were in place before the intrusion of colonialism and contemporary tendency towards integration. This as we shall show below makes it difficult to establish which group can claim the “native” or “indigenous” status of a place at the expense of others.
What all this means is that the ethnic category on which the definition of citizenship hinges is a very fluid category. It partly explains why the political disputations arising from contradictory notions of citizenship often leads to conflict and violence. In some instances, the groups at conflict over such claims are not necessarily from different ethnic groups. The groups at conflict may thus be sub-ethnic communities of the same ethnic groups as is the case of the recurrent Ife/Modakeke conflict. The dilemma of citizenship created by notions such as “natives”, “indigenes” and by extension, “statism” is real. For example, it is a very common practice for Nigerians of southern origin to be given contract employment in some northern states where they are considered "strangers/foreigners". It is not only southerners in employment in the north that are subjected to discriminatory practices. In one bizarre situation, following the creation of Enugu State out of the old Anambra State, people of Igbo origin in the new Anambra State who remained in Enugu State were urged to leave, for "their state". Indigenes of Nasarawa State which was created out of Plateau State in 1996 who had expressed the wish to continue to work in Plateau were given similar "hot pursuit", while Plateau State indigenes in similar situation in Nasarawa State suffered the same fate. In such situations, women who are married to men from other states suffer worse dilemma, as they can neither lay claim to the state of parents nor that of their husbands. This multi-layered system of citizenship breed confusion and controversy, it inhibits the development of national unity and the evolution of a harmonious political community. One obvious consequence is that it inevitably engenders discrimination in jobs, land purchase, housing, and admission into educational institutions, marriages, business transactions, and the distribution of social welfare services. Many Nigerians are therefore forced to limit their social and political horizons as the only level of realising the essence of citizenship is the lowest level of identity. Yet, a flashback at the country's history would show the issue is much deeper than it is imagined. First, is the complex process of state formation and the accompanying massive population shifts that preceded colonial rule? Similar patterns of movements and migrations were to continue into the post-colonial period. Second, is the fluidity and flexibility that characterise ethnic identity formation as alluded to above? Third, is the crosscutting nature of ties and civic engagements among various Nigerian groups? All these underscore the complexity of the citizenship question, and the imperative of confronting it decisively. What needs to be emphasised is the fact that after several decades of colonial capitalist development, and the tremendous expansion of infrastructure across the country as well as increasing cultural diffusion, Nigeria cannot simply be reduced to a mere geographical expression. Furthermore, objective conditions for survival and the logic of commerce and profit on the one hand, and the trans-ethnic and trans-regional character of religious and other forms of crosscutting civic engagements on the other, should suggest the existence of a national framework. What is more, discriminatory and exclusive practices are most expressed in relation to access to public goods or opportunities that are determined by the allocating power of the state at all levels. These include employment into the public service, contracts and award of scholarship and access to land. The shortcoming is most graphically illustrated by the emergent patterns of inter-ethnic conflicts it has engendered in relation to access to economic resources and political power at the local level. These conflicts relate to the crisis of citizenship in the sense in which groups at conflict deploy or even twist history in the contestation of identity by using such to establish "indigeneity" over a particular political space which could be a state or a local government area. In most of the recorded cases located within semi-urban and rural locations, attempts are often made to establish `indigeneity' over a local government or any other local political and economic space. A few illustrations will shed some light. The use of history of migration, early patterns of settlement or local history about patterns of power and domination among the different ethnic groups in establishing "indigenous" claims are evident in virtually all the cases. On the Mambilla Plateau, the series of attacks in the early 1980s on the Banso and Kamba by the Mambilla is hinged on this conception of citizenship. The Mambilla who lay indigenous claim over the entire Mambilla Plateau do so precisely on the historical claim that their settlement predated the arrival of other ethnic groups such as the Fulani, Banso and Kamba. For the Banso and the Kamba whose presence on the Plateau is more or less recent, the bulk of them having arrived in the post-second world war period, it is a lot easier to label them as "aliens". It is in this context that one understands the basis of exclusion that the so-called indigenous group seeks to subject the stranger elements. It re-echoes in Zango-Kataf, Tingno-Waduku and Wukari leading to recurrent violent outbursts. The situation in Zango-Kataf is fairly unique and more complex as centuries of interaction between the Hausa on the one hand, and the other communal groups such as Bajju and Kataf (Atyab) have failed to produce the basis of a more enduring harmonious community life. In this respect the situation differs from other cases where the adoption of Islamic religion and inter-marriages have attenuated the level of social and cultural distance between "immigrant" Hausa population and the "host" communities. What one finds in the Zango-Kataf area of southern Kaduna is the tendency for ethnic boundaries to remain impervious to social and cultural exchanges such as marriages across ethnic and religious boundaries. The representation made to the Cudjoe Commission by the Kataf following the violence of February 1992 is largely hinged on the claim that the land belonged to the Kataf who accommodated Hausa immigrants on generous terms. By the traditional system of land holding, the Kataf claim, such land in principle should revert to the original owners. However, this historical claim to indigeneity is contradicted by the position of the Hausa community who claimed centuries of effective residency. It would seem from the grievances of the Kataf who presented a deluge of complaints of injustice, socio-economic deprivations and cultural suppression, and the extent of the chains of the violent outbursts targeted at the Hausa in 1992 that the ultimate goal was to "reclaim" their land by wiping out the Hausa community in Zango-Kataf. Otherwise, it would be difficult to come to terms with the scale of ethnic mobilisation, the sophistication of the weaponry deployed, and the scale of violence unleashed by both Hausa and Kataf (Atyab) on one another. Similar claims by "indigenous" groups aimed at excluding "strangers" appear to be central in the communal conflicts between the Kuteb and Chamba in Takum Local Government Area of Taraba state and the unending circle of communal clashes in Nasarawa involving the Ebira, Bassa and Gbagyi. These cases illustrate the enormous difficulty of resorting to history in the contest over identity. The difficulty arises from the fact that there can be no such a thing as eternal historical facts. There is the tendency for facts to be either carefully selected or for the same set of facts to be subjected to conflicting interpretations. Take the Kuteb/Chamba conflict for example. Although a number of ethnic groups such as Hausa, Jukun, Kuteb and Chamba are found in the Takum area, the major contest has been between the Kuteb and Chamba. From available historical evidence both Kuteb and Chamba had taken effective residency of the area around Takum prior to colonial intervention. However, in the present context of contestation over the "ownership" of Takum, each of the two communal groups has resorted to different accounts of history to bolster its claim. The Chamba account which is strongly challenged by the Kuteb, but which appeared to be the version initially accepted by the colonial authorities, suggests the Chamba as a warrior, conquest minority group who displaced the more numerous Kuteb around 1830, following the incessant harassment they had faced from the Fulani in the Tibati region of the Cameroon. It is further claimed that between this period and 1912, the Bachama produced nine rulers in succession. The Kuteb on the other hand, who make a strong historical claim over the area in addition to being the most populous in Takum area refute the claim by the Chamba to have conquered them at any point in history, and even cite colonial records in support of their position. The Chamba whom they claim migrated from the Camerouns were given a place to settle by the Kuteb near Jenuwa in Takum area. They also claim that the creation of Takum and Zumper districts for the Chamba and Kuteb respectively in 1912 was not a recognition of the conquest of the latter by the former. Rather, it was done as a measure to curb the incessant acts of banditry and slave-raiding of the Chamba, and that this form of `self-rule' was abolished in 1914 once it was clear that such acts could not be checked. In addition, the colonial authorities who later recognized the Kuteb as indigenes were said to have abolished a separate district for the Chamba in favour of the restoration of Kuteb rule over the area on account of the general maladministration of Chamba chiefs, extortion of the Kuteb and the comparatively few Chamba in the area. The rule of the Kuteb in Takum was later codified by the government of the Northern region in 1963. The situation was however, reversed in 1975 when the Chamba, apparently using their influence in the military government that followed the collapse of the first republic, got the then Benue Plateau state government to amend the 1963 law. The amendment ensured the eligibility of two Chamba families to contest and ascend to the Ukwe throne, increased the representation of the Chamba and Jukun on the Kings Selection Committee to three, while reducing that of the Kuteb to two thus ensuring advantage for the Chamba. In 1976, a riot broke out between the Chamba and Kuteb in Takum. The cause of the riot was the alleged manipulation of electoral wards by the Secretary of Takum local government, a Chamba, to give electoral advantage to Chamba contestants. The victory of a Chamba candidate where the Kuteb constitute the majority was not acceptable to the latter. Some of the allegations were later confirmed by a government panel set up to investigate into the communal disturbances. However, renewed violence between the two communal groups has its roots in the process of democratising the local government, which commenced in 1987. The numerical strength of the Kuteb had conferred on them electoral advantage in the elections that had been organised since then until the outbreak of violence in 1997. Although it would appear on the surface as tension between democratisation and multi-ethnic existence, it has a deeper basis in contestation over identity and for control of local power and resources. A similar pattern of contest over identity, but centred on the issue of "indigeneity" is at the root of the protracted communal strife which pitches the Bassa and Gbagyi on the one had with the Ebira on the other in Nasarawa/Toto in the present Nasarawa state. The first major outbreak of conflict occurred in May, 1986, following a series of skirmishes dating back to 1984 when the Bassa community in Ebira controlled villages refused to pay their taxes and other government levies through Ebira village heads. Anxiety and tension mounted when the parties waited in vain for the release of the report of a government panel appointed in 1985 to look into the administrative structures of the two districts where the warring ethnic groups reside. The violence of 1986 resulted in killings and mass destruction of properties. Another round of violence broke out towards the end of 1997 with more far reaching consequences for human lives and properties. At the heart of this recurrent violence is the alleged discrimination against the Bassa and the Gbagyi experienced over time. However, it was the former that directly challenged the imposition of Ebira `hegemony'. The Bassa claimed that they had been indiscriminately subjected to the rule of Ebira district and village heads; not represented in the local government traditional council; not employed into the service of the then Plateau state and the local government; and not equitably represented in the electoral colleges for the selection of village heads with the consequence that the Ebira had twelve salaried village heads out of the existing thirteen, and nineteen village heads out of the existing twenty-six. Other allegations made by the Bassa are that "indigenes forms", a pre-condition for enjoying scholarships and even placement in admissions into schools were not being signed for children of Bassa origin and that the Ebira have two paramount Chiefs in Umaisha and Toto while they had none. All these denials are said to be based on the historical claim that the Ebira are the indigenes of the area, having settled there around 1750. On their part, the Bassa claim to have occupied the area prior to the arrival of the Ebira at about 100 AD during the `Habe' days which in addition to their numerical strength should give them the "ownership" of the area. However, as the panel concluded, there was enough evidence that the two ethnic groups had settled in the area well before 1900 as supported by the existence of Ikereku and Opanda, Bassa and Ebira Kingdoms respectively, and reinforced by the existence of villages designated as belonging to the two ethnic groups. Against this backdrop of conflicting but nevertheless, strong claims to indigeneity by the two groups, the denial of citizenship rights which the Bassa and the Gbagyi are alleged to be subjected to, is a recipe for violent conflict. Indeed, the government panel set up to investigate into the 1985 crisis confirmed some of the allegations made by the Bassa and recommended immediate administrative re-organisation in the area. All that was needed to spark off violence in an atmosphere filled with tension in May 1985 was a shooting incident believed to have been carried out by some Ebira youths who allegedly went beserk against the Bassa. The Tiv/Jukun conflict in Wukari, the recent ethno-religious upheaval in Jos and the enduring Ife/Modakeke face-off, all are manifestations of the crisis of citizenship. The protracted Tiv/Jukun conflict provides a very clear illustration of how in a diverse rural setting access to farming land for those considered settlers community can provide the basis of perpetual conflict. A very aggressive group whose expansionist tendency in search of farming land is well recognised, Tiv migration into the Wukari area pre-dated colonisation, devoid of any antagonism with the “host” community. In the early phase of colonial rule, the traditional authority in Wukari, the Aku Uka superintended the administration of Tivland, a fact that may have encouraged more Tiv migration into Wukari. However, electoral politics changed the nature of the relationship between the two communal groups as the numerical strength of the Tiv increased their political profile. This became the basis of tension between the Tiv and the Jukun in the first republic. Inter-group conflict became more pronounced in the second republic as electoral politics conferred more political visibility on the Tiv in Wukari. The fear of Tiv domination in the local political arena incurred the hostility of the “host” Jukun community who invoked their historical claim to the ownership of Wukari to threaten the Tiv over access to farming land. The crisis assumed a frightening dimension in the late 1980s with the return of electoral politics during the transition to the aborted Third Republic. Since then the crisis has crossed the threshold of irreversibility. Consequently, it has led to massive destruction of lives and property. By the end of 1994, it was estimated that about 500,000 people were killed in the fratricidal war. Until recently Jos stood out as one example of an ethnically and culturally diverse city whose record of harmonious inter-group relations earned it the appellation of “home of peace and tourism”. Founded as a colonial city based on the tin mining industry, Jos witnessed rapid expansion as an urban centre with a tradition of ethnic tolerance and peaceful co-existence which made it possible for Nigerians of all ethnic origins to have played active role in the political and civil life of the city. In more recent times however, elites of the “indigenous” ethnic communities such as the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere have risen to challenge what is perceived as the domination of the “Hausa/Fulani” who are labelled settlers. The long history of residence of the Hausa community in Jos and the fact that many of them have no other place to go to hardly seem to matter. In 1994, the appointment of an Hausa man as the Chairman of the Caretaker Management Committee of Jos North Local Government was opposed by the indigenous ethnic communities. The disagreement over this led to the communal violence of April 12, 1994. The most recent September 7, 2001 ethnic-religious violence was a result of attempt by these ethnic groups to protest the appointment of another Hausa man as the co-ordinator of the Federal Government initiated Poverty Alleviation Programme in the Jos North Local Government. The crisis in Ife/Modakeke is fuelled by the same dynamics despite the fact that it pitches one sub-Yoruba group against another. The Modakeke who are believed to be refugees from the Yoruba wars that followed the breakdown of Old Oyo empire are believed to have come from Oyo. While tension had often characterised the relationship between the two communal groups, the conflict between the two communities which was sparked off by disagreements over the creation of local governments goes to show that the question of access to local power is at the core of the unending conflict between the two communities.
SECTION 4
TOWARDS HARMONY BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND PRACTICE In putting forward proposals for ensuring harmony and a just balance between constitutional provisions on citizenship and rights and their practical applications, three pertinent observations are necessary to be made in respect of the discussion in the preceding Section 3:
1. There is a clear dilemma between individual and group rights in Nigeria’s constitutional history. The basic foundation of a liberal democratic order is the rights and freedom attached to the individual as a legal entity, and citizens’ rights are primarily conceived as individual rights. At the same time, given the existence of deep divisions in the society along ethnic, religious and regional lines giving rise to “minority” and “majority” identities, there is also need to provide constitutional guarantees for disadvantaged groups as the “federal character” and “quota” provisions have sought to do. But there appears to be a greater obsession with group rights to the detriment of individual rights. 2. The notion of ‘indigeneity’ entrenched in the 1979 Constitution is at variance with public law in the sense that it has given rise to a layer of citizenship and for creating problems for people that may have settled in their present abode by 1900, or people who by October 1, 1960, the date of Nigeria’s independence are defined by law as citizens of Nigeria. 3. The exclusion of people from access to certain rights and privileges occur in relation to political power and related benefits controlled by the state such as employment, promotion and contracts, as well as access to vital resources such as land and water (for farming, grazing and fishing). And as it is obvious the real actors appear to be the elite, be it in urban situations or in rural areas with a high number of retirees. On the basis of the foregoing, we suggest the following as practical measures to be undertaken to ensure a harmony between formal constitutional provisions and practical applications. They range from actions that bother on constitutional reform to the pursuit of public policy. A. Constitutional Reform Issues There is need for the political will to confront the issue of building a national citizenship in the country through a reform of the Nigerian constitution. With specific reference to the provisions on citizenship, suggested constitutional amendments are as follows: i. There is need to add a new section after S. 31 e.g. Section 32 to be titled Residency Rights. The new section should provide that a Nigerian citizen who has resided continuously for a period of five years in any state of the federation and performs his/her civic duties including paying taxes, shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges of the state. This will be in accord with the practice in most federations, and will strengthen the provisions in the Constitution, which removes restrictions on, who can contest elections from where in the country. ii. There is need to reform the proviso to Section 147 of the Constitution which states that those to be appointed Ministers from each State of the Federation must be indigenes of the State. In this sense, indigenes are defined as those who meet five years residency requirement. iii. There is need to state in express terms that a woman married to any man from a state other than her own should have the rights to choose which of the states to claim as her own. Similarly, there is need to amend Section 26 (2) (a) such as to give foreign men married to Nigerians the opportunity to acquire citizenship. iv. As a means of promoting social citizenship, there is need to make the provisions on Social and Economic Rights justiciable. The import of this derives from the fact that lack of access of most Nigerians to the basic means of livelihood is at the root of the various communal strife in Nigeria. v. There is need to entrench independent commissions in the constitution to monitor the implementation of some of the provisions in the constitution. Such commissions include Gender and Social Justice Commission, National Orientation and Mobilisation Commission and National Human Rights Commission with powers to investigate and punish. It is a requirement that such commissions be truly independent and funded from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. B. Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building: The country has witnessed recurrent conflicts since the attainment of independence. Government response to these conflicts which is largely characterised by a “fire brigade” approach points to the absence of a systematic and institutionalised way of obtaining early warning signal. If such is in place, it would be possible to anticipate conflicts by detecting the various flashpoints of violent conflicts that have torn many communities asunder. For the purpose therefore, of designing effective conflict prevention and peace-building strategy, government needs to put in place the structure, requisite personnel and equipment for monitoring conflicts and transform existing conflict situations into enduring and sustainable peace. However, it is a requirement for success that such conflict management schemes be inclusive to include community leaders (of both “settlers” and “natives”), religious leaders, traditional rulers, CBOs and NGOs involved in conflict management and human rights, intellectuals and researchers, and women groups and leaders. In recognition of the role of the media in promoting conflicts through information (mis)management, it is necessary to expose media practitioners to the importance and need for moderation, less sensationalism, integrity and professionalism. This can be done through workshops and seminars aimed at sensitising media practitioners to the national political objectives of building a united, strong and prosperous society in the context of diversity and pluralism. C. Governance and Policy Issues: Apart from the constitutional issues identified above, there are issues that are located in the realms of governance and policy. The imperative of governance and policy issues arise from the larger economic and political context which frames ethno-religious and communal conflicts rooted in the crisis of citizenship. It is obvious that mass poverty and lack of access to the basic means of livelihood for most Nigerians contributes significantly to divisive politics based on the manipulation of ethnic and cultural differences. The absence of social citizenship therefore is a key issue that needs to be addressed by putting in place a framework of governance and public policy that can alleviate mass poverty and enhance the economic empowerment of the vast majority of the Nigerian people. Specific issues to pay attention are: i. The need to strengthen democratic governance by promoting transparency, openness and accountability. In this regard, government is called upon to strengthen the institutions for promoting accountability and transparency and ensuring that corrupt public officials are subjected to the full weight of the law. ii. The need for government to promote economic policies that can galvanise the productive and creative energies of the Nigerian people as opposed to the pursuit of macro-economic policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank which have the consequence of retarding growth and resulting in mass economic disempowerment of the Nigerian populace. Economic policies capable of providing the basis for sustainable development must emphasise social welfare, poverty alleviation and popular participation. iii. The need to promote even and balanced development in the country by ensuring that resources are distributed in a manner that favours all the ethnic and regional homelands. iv. There is need to demonstrate commitment to due process and the rule of law.
SECTION 5
THE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY LEADERS In resolving the conundrum of citizenship and rights in Nigeria, government and community leaders have a major role to play. Among others, the role of government in building a national citizenship and promoting harmony in the country includes:
i. Giving priority attention to the reform of the 1999 Constitution so as to incorporate the suggestions made in Section 4 above in the constitution. To this end, government should appreciate the need to support the process by setting up an independent body to engage in the consultations of making a truly people-driven constitution. Not only should the body be independent and autonomous of government, the Independent Constitution Review Commission should be broad based to include representatives of the executive and the legislature, NGOs, labour, ethnic nationalities, women and students with a specific agenda and time table. The draft is to be debated and adopted at a national conference. ii. In situations where open conflicts and violence have resulted from contestations over citizenship rights, government should give support to peace-building efforts that have been initiated by the NGOs and conflict resolution experts. Government can do this by redressing specific cases of injustice that are at the root of the conflict since this is beyond the mandate of the NGOs. iii. Government needs to encourage further liberalisation of the polity and encourage dialogue and negotiation between groups at conflict and between government and the contending groups as a means of resolving disputes and differences. iv. Government needs to promote the culture of rule of law and due process as a necessary compliment to the consolidation of democratic governance. v. Finally, there is need for government to give priority attention to political and civic education of Nigerians. The setting up of the National Orientation and Mobilisation Commission with appropriate level of funding and autonomy will provide the institutional framework of carrying out mass education of the Nigerian people. The focus of such education will among others, draw attention to the dangers of ethnic and religious manipulation. In addition, civic and political education should be included in the primary and secondary school curricula.
Similarly, community leaders have responsibilities to discharge in relation to the practical implementation of the provisions in the constitution on citizenship and rights. Community leaders are a critical factor in the crisis of identity that has afflicted post-independence Nigeria. They vary from occupants of traditional offices such as paramount rulers and District Heads to office holders at the local level such as chairmen of local governments, councillors and opinion leaders. These categories of people constitute the elite at the local level whose interest is decisive in shaping views and perceptions at such level. Whether in relation to conflict or the resolution of conflicts and peace-building their role and influence cannot be ignored. As it is obvious from the numerous cases of ethno-communal violence, the refusal of local government chairmen and paramount rulers to sign “indigene” certificates for those perceived as “settlers” is often a major source of ill-feelings and animosity. The specific responsibilities of community leaders can be identified as follows: i. Being closest to the people, they should see their primary role as that of promoting dialogue and understanding between different communal groups for the purpose of either pre-empting conflicts or peace-building in situations where conflicts have occurred. ii. Community leaders need to act more responsibly in both words and deeds. iii. There is also need for community leaders to observe the principles of justice, fairplay and equity in dealing with people placed under their jurisdiction.
SECTION 6
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION The recommendations put forward in this memorandum can be summarised as follows: Ø There is need for dialogue and consensus building both at the national and local levels. Ø The reform of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should be accorded the necessary priority. There is need to add a section on residency rights in the Constitution. The reform would affect Section 147, where a new provision would replace indigeneity with a five-year residency requirement; and amend Section 26 (2) to guarantee conferment of citizenship on foreigners married to Nigerian women. Ø The provisions on social and economic rights should be made justiciable. Ø Independent commissions should be entrenched in the constitution. Ø There is a need to promote governance, transparency, accountability, and openness in the running of public affairs as well as respect for due process and the rule of law. Ø There is need for political and civic education for the Nigerian people. Ø Workshops and seminars should be organised for media practitioners to emphasise the need for professionalism, integrity and social responsibility in the reportage of conflicts.
In our view, it is simply traumatic that many Nigerians are labelled as `colonisers', `strangers', `aliens' and `settlers' in places where they have had effective residency for several decades before independence or for centuries before formal colonial conquest. There is need to return to the Political Bureau's report which urged that laws should be promulgated which tie citizenship rights to either place of birth or residences. The Bureau was definite in recommending the adoption of full residency rights for Nigerians wherever they may reside, provided such Nigerians are made to fulfil minimum residency requirement of ten years. Such residency rights, it suggested, should include all rights, which are enjoyed by those previously regarded as indigenes of the States. In addition, there is need to build a society based on social justice, equity, and mutual trust and tolerance for one another. Such a society must take as its basic goal the promotion of genuine development and the attenuation of the grinding levels of poverty which most Nigerians have found themselves in. It should be equally possible to consciously build unity using ethnic and cultural diversity as the foundation. The factors that unite rather than divide Nigerians on the basis of such diversity can be consciously emphasised.
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